Ad Hoc Assembly instructed to work out a draft treaty setting up a European Political Community, Session of January 1953. Report of the Constitutional Committee. Paris, 20 December 1952 by unknown
AD  HOC  ASSEMBLY 
INSTRUCTED  TO  WORK OUT A DRAFT TREATY SETTING UP A 
EUROPEAN  POLITICAL  COlVIMUNITY 
Session  of  Januarv 
'  .I  1 9 53 
REPORT 
of the 
Consti  tu  tiollal Coinini  ttee 
f  ' 
PARIS,  20TH  DECEMBER  1952 DOC.1 
AD  HOC  ASSEMBLY 
INSTRUCTED  TO  WORK OUT A DRAFT TREATY SETTING UP A 
EUROPEAN  POLITICAL  COl\IMUNITY 
Session  of  January  1953 
REPORT 
of the 
Constitutional Coinmittee 
PARIS,  20TH  DECEMBER  1952 TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 
Part. I  - Powers and competence of the Community 
(M. BENVENUTI, Rapporteur) 
I. - Historica Survey : Import of the project for a  Community. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7 
Note on the duties of the Rapporteur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10 
II. - Conc-:rning powers a~d  com~ten~e.within the scope of  the E.<:. S.  <:.and E. D. <:. 
Treaties and coneemmg therr reVJsJon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10 
A) Transfert of the powers and competence of E. C.  S.  C.  and E. D.  C.  . . . . .  10 
B) Methods of exercising normative powers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13 
C)  Revision of  the E. C.  S.  C.  and E. D.  C.  Treaties  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14 
III. - Powers and competence within the general framework of the  system created by the 
E. C.  S.  C.  and E. D.  C.  Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17 
A) Powers in matters of foreign  policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17 
B) Powers in financial matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18 
IV.- Economic powers and competence  ........  , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19 
V.- Powers and competence with regard to human rights arid fundamental freedoms...  20 
VI. - Procedure for the amendment of the Statute . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20 
VII. - Question of<<  Membership »  ...........•...•.......•..•  , • • . • . . . • • • . • . . • . . • . . . •  21 
VIII. - General Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22 
ANNEX. - Discussions in CoDJmittee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26 
a) Resolution I ...................  ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26 
b) Resolution II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27 
c)  Special Resolution ...............................................  ; . . . .  30 
Part. 2  - Political Institutions of the Community 
(M.  DEHOUSSE, Rapporteur) 
I. -Introduction.................................................................  33 
II. - The political insti~tions of the Community . . . .. .. . . .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. . .. . .. .. .. .  33 
A) Parliament of the Community  . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33 
B) The Executive Power .....  ,•  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34 
C)  The Econ01nic  and Social Council ...........  ; .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. .. .  36 
D) Links between the European Community and the free World............  36 
ANNEX. - Discussions in CoDJmittee . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38 
Part. 3  - Judicial Institutions of the Community 
(M. von MERKATZ, Rapporteur) 
I. - General Observations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4  7 
II. - Attributes of the Court of Justice of the Comnnmity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 7 
III. - Composition of the Court of Justice of the Community  ......................  ; . .  49 
IV. - Rel~ti?n~ between the  Court of Justice of the Community and other International 
Junsdicbons ••.•.•.......••........•.••..•...•  ,  .........  ; • . . . . • . • • • • • . . . . . . . .  49 
V  • ...:_  Status of Judges of the Court 'of Justice of the Community  . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . .  50 
VI. - Conseil d'Etat and Special Court of the Exchequer  .. . .. . . . . .. . .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .  51 Part. 4  - Relations of the European Political Community with third States and 
international organisations 
(M. SEMLER, Rapporteur) 
I. - Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55 
A)  Proceedings of the Constitutional Committee............................  55 
B) Terms of reference of the Committee and results of its discussions  . . . . . . . .  55 
II. - Associated  States • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57 
III. - Relations with lntematienal Organisations, Administrations and Institutions. . . . . . .  .59 
A)  General observations,  and relations  with the new  Specialised  Communities 
to be created . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59 
B) Relations with N. A.  T. 0 .........................  •...................  61 
C)  Relations with 0. E. E. C.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63 
Part. 5 - Liaison to be established between the Community and the Council of 
Europe 
(M.  WIGNY, :Rapporteur) 
I. .....,.  General OhaervQtions  67 
II. - The two types of Liaison ..........•  , ....  -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68 
A)  Internal Liaisons  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68 
B) E:x:te:rnQI  Liai.&Q:qs  .• , .• , . , ......  , . . . . ... . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . .  69 
Ill. - First solution =  lntemal Liaisons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69 
A)  General principles ..•.......  , ......•............. '...  ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69 
B)  Competence of the Council of Europe  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . .  70 
C)  The organs of the Council of Europe .. , ...••  , , ...• , ..... :  . , •.. , .•...  ,  71 
D) Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . .  72 
IV. - Second solution =  Extemal Liaisons .......................  ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .  72 
ANNEX to Part 5. -Note  submitted by M. PARIS, Secretary-Generalofthe CoQDcil of Europe  74 
Part. 6  - Conclusion adopted by the Constitutional Coinndttee 
Resolution I.  - The in.tegration  of the Ew:opellll  Steel and Coal  Community and of the 
· European Defence Community in the Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79 
Resolution II.  - The powers and competence of the Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80 
A)  General Principles  , ........  , , ..• , , .• , ....  , •..... , . . . . . . . . . . .  80 
B) Concerning  powers  and· competence within  the  compass  of the 
E. C.  S.  C.  and E. D. C,  treaties, and the  revision thereof. . . . •  81 
C)  Powers  and competence within the general  scope  of  the system 
created by the E. C.  S.  C.  and E. D.  C.  treaties..............  81 
D) Economic powers .• ,.........................................  84 
E) Powers and competence to elllilure  the safeguard of human riJ!ihts 
and fundamental treedoms .......•..  , , ....•....•..  , . , , . . . . . . .  85 
F) Procedure for the amendment of the Statute ...•...  , • , . • . . . . . .  85 
G) « Membership » .....•......•..........•.....••..  , • . . . . . . . . . .  86 
Resolution III. - The politi®l iru;titutiom of the Community  • . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . . . . . . . . . . .  86 
A)  The Parliament of the Community. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86 
B)  The Executive ...........•...............  ; . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . .  87 
C)  Economic and social  Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  90 
Resolution IV.  - The judicial institutions of the Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  90 
Resolution V.  - B.clationa  of tho Com.nnmity  with third  State~ and international organi-
sations...........................................................  92 
Resolution VI.  - Links to be established between the Community and the Council of Europe  94 
Special Resolution. - Certain measures to te taken forthwith by the Gc!veJ'W:II,Illlte •.....  , .  96 
ANNEX  Composition of the Constitutional Committee and of the  sub· 
committee .. , ...  _  ....  , , ......  , .. , ......•......  ,  ....•..  · .... ,  97 
Observers  .........•.•.................................  , . .  99 , 
PART I 
POWERS AND  COMPETENCE  OF THE COMMUNITY 
REPORT 
submitted hy M.  BENVENUTI I. - HISTORICAL  SURVEY:  IMPORT  OF  THE PROJECT  FOR 
A  COMMUNITY<1> 
1.  a)  On  14  September 1951.  at  WASHINGTON,  the three  Ministers  for  Foreign  Affairs 
of the United  States, France and the.  United  Kingdom,  after noting that the action  taken 
by the French Government with a  view to the creation of a  European Coal  and Steel Com-
munity and a European Defence Community constituted «an important step in. the direction 
of European Unity »,  announced their agreement with the creation of a European continentaJ 
Community. The Government of the United Kingdom made it clear that it wished to esta-
blish the closest possible ties with the continental Community in all stages of its development. 
Since that date, the work of the Six Governments and of the European  Organizations 
has helped to clarify the import and define the structure of the continental Community. 
b)  The .  Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe was the first  European institu-
tion  to give  definite  form  to the principle  annomiced at  Washington. 
On 10 December 1951, the Consultative Assembly, referring to the  declar;;~.tion of Wash-
ington, ·advised  the Committee of  Ministers  (2)  to encourage the early conclusion, between 
a:p.y  Member States that were so  d\sposed, of an agreement setting up a  Political Authority, 
subject  to the democratic  control of a  Parliamentary Assembly  and having a  competence 
limited· to  the  domains of defence  and external affairs, in which the exercise of sovereignty in 
common  becomes necessary through the organization of a  European army and its employ-
ment  within  the orbit of the Atlantic  Treaty. 
The  Recommendation made  it clear that the said agreement must specify the liaisons 
which  could  be  established  between  the  Community thus  created  and the  non-signatory 
Member States of the Council of  Europe, in particular, the United Kingdom. 
c)  This aim, common to the Six continental countries -the creation of a  Community 
-has been officially recognized in article 38 of the E. D. C. Treaty, signed at Paris, on 30 May 
1952,  an  article  which  outlines  the essential structures of  the  future  federal  or confederal 
Community: 
- an Assembly elected on a  democratic basis, 
- a  two-Chamber representative system, 
- the separation of powers, 
- suitable representation of the  States. 
d)  Three  days after the signature of the E. D. C. Treaty, on  30  May 1952,  the Consul-
tative Assembly of the Council of Europe took up the same problem  and,  following the line 
of its recommendation of November  1951,  made an immediate advance,  as  compared with 
the positions of the Six Governments. 
For article 38  E. D. C.  entrusted the future E. D. C.  Assembly with a  definitely limited 
task : to examine  the constitution  of  an Assembly  of  the  European  Defence  Community, 
·elected on a  democratic  basis,  and to define the powers which  would  be vested in such an 
Assembly,  and the changes  which  might  have  to be  made in consequence  in  the E. D. C. 
Treaty while  bearing in mind that this permanent organization of the Defence  Community 
should be able to constitute one of the·  elements in a  subsequent federal or confederal struc-
ture. 
The Consultative Assembly pf the Council of Europe, on the contrary, regarded the de-
finition  of the constitutional foundations  of the European  Political Community  as  a  task 
that should be undertaken at once . 
. '  (I)  The, term u Community» is employed throughout the present report to denote the  European 
P9Utical Community.  ·  . 
(2)  Translated from the French text. 8  Report of  the  Constitutional Committee 
In its  Resolution  14 of  30  May  1952  the  Consultative  Assembly: 
«considering that several Governments and Parliaments have held it essential that the 
setting up of the European Defence Community should be accompanied by the constitution 
of  a  supranational  political  authority »  ; 
«considering that it would be of great advantage if the basic principles of this autho-
rity and the limits  of its powers  were  to be  defined within  the next few  months,  without 
waiting for the entry into force of the Treaty instituting the European Defence Community >>  ; 
pr<Jposed :  << that the clauses in the Treaty of. the .  European Defence Community which 
relate to the determinatitm of  the future political structure of Europe should be incorporated 
in  a.  special agreement, distinct from  the Treaty itself, and capable of being put into ;effect 
immediately lJ,  ·  ·  ·  . 
«arid desired that, b¥ the terms of the. agreement thus contemplated, the Governments 
concerned should charge e1ther the Coa.l and Steel Assembly,  or the  Assembly of the Council 
of Europe sitting with a restricted membership to draft the Statute of a supranationalpolitical 
community, which would remain open to all Member States of the Council of Europe and would 
include  provisions  for  the association  of those  States which had not yet adhered to  it >>. 
The Consultative  Assembly was  thus proposing to ·the Governments  a  two-fold change 
in  the system  of  article  38 :  · 
(i)  that  the constitutional mandate should be given -to an  inst~tution, other than the 
Assembly of  the E. D. C.,  which  would be in a position to exercise its functions immediately. 
(ii).  that the institution to which this mandate had been given  would not confine itse1f 
to studying the permanent  organization of the E. D. C.  (which  was  the mandate conferred 
on the Assembly of the Defence Community by article 38) but should proceed to draft  a statute 
for  a  supranational European  political community. 
e)  The prot?Osals  of the Consultative Assembly were. approved by the Six Governments 
which, by their Luxembourg resolution, a.t;lopted on 10 September 1952, requested the merubers 
of  the Coal and Steel Assembly to co-opt nine more representatives and to draw up a  draft 
Treaty instituting a.  European Political Community.  ·  ·  · 
The Luxembourg resolution also  gave information as to the nature of the powers and 
competence of the Political Community. The Six Ministers for Foreign Affairs expressly referred 
to the Consultative  Assembly's resolution of  30 May,  and they .further recognized that the 
Constitution  of  a  European  Political  Community,  with  a  federal  or confederal structure, 
«is linked to the establishment of common bases of economic development and to a merging 
of  the essential interests of the ·Member  States )).  · 
The Community is also linked to the E. D. C.,  which is indeed one of its principal com-
ponents. It will have, therefore, to contribute to the preservation of «the spiritualand tnOral 
values which ilte the common heritage n of the peoples of Europe (Preamble of the E. D.<:· 
Treaty),  that is,  in  the  first  place,  to the maintenance  of .human rights  and fundament£l.l 
freedoms. 
2.  That is the nature of the mandate  conferred on the Ad. Hoc Assel;Ilbly ; it  is a far wider 
mandate than that which was conferred by article 38 on the E  ..  D. C. Assembly: it even extends 
to t~e  ~tud:v: o~ the structures which article SS only reg~r~ed  as a « <<subsequent  >>eo~sio~ration, 
for 1t  had lim1ted the. task of the E. D. C.  to determmmg the<< permanent orgamzahon >>  of 
the Defence  Community only.  ·  ·  · 
Su~h  .. is the  iJ?p~rt, and.such are .the.limits?f the Community: human rights, defence, 
economic  and soc1al  mtegrabon, and foretgn  pohcy.  ·  . 
It  must not be forgotten that, in recent years, several treaties ~in  particular, the European, 
Convention  for  Economic  Co-operation,  the Statute of  the  Council  of  Europe, .  the  North 
Atlantic Treaty and the Convention of Human Rights -'-have recognized the fact that these 
matters were of common interest.  for the peoples of·  Europ~. Economic integration, in particular, 
has just made. decisive  progress  with the coming into. operation of the E. C.  S. C.,  the :firSf 
actual example of a common market in one of the key-sectors of economy.  · Part 1.  - Powers  and Competence  of the  Community  9 
A Comtnunity founded on the union of the peoples cannot exclude, in advance, from its 
activity those  fields  in which the peoples  have already recognized,  through their qualified 
representatives,  that they have  common  interests.  ·  · 
We shall have to determine subsequently the powers and meansofaction ofthe Community 
in every  field  of its competence,  their nature, their limits and the conditions under which 
they will be exercised, and the possibility which the Statute provides for enabling the powers 
and competence of the Community's institutions to be conferred on them progressively during 
the successive phases of the implementation of the Statute. The present remarks in no way 
pre~judge these  subsequent  decisions.  .  · 
For that reason, I am most anxious  that the Committee should arrive at a general agree-
ment on  this conception of the import of the Community. It is not a  question of new data, 
but s~mply of a  clarification of the texts, ~Jrimarily, of the Luxembourg resolution- which 
constitute the terms of reference  of the A  Hoc  Assembly.  ·• 
These texts, as presented by  the governments, no  doubt £ail to give full satisfaction to 
anyone.  They  are too  advanced for  some  people  and  they  fall  short  of  the  :aspirations 
of others. It would be easy for either of these two groups to criticize  them ;  but  is  it  not 
better to admit that they represent a basis of work which could not easily be replaced ? 
3.  The Sub-Committee has sought, with the support of most of its members, to establish 
in the opening part of  its resolution, the principle  referred  to above - that the powers and 
competence  of  the  Community should  be  progressively  extended to domains  of  common 
interest~ and I wouldadd: solely to those domains~  thus adopting a very pertinent obser-
vation by one of our colleagues: national States, in the same way as men, possess fundamental 
and inalienable rights which  must never be  encroached upon by the general competence of 
a  federal  or confederal Community. 
I emphasize this  principle  which  constitutes a guarantee for us all. We are all attached 
to the traditions, the culture, and the special characteristics of our different  countries. The 
Community could  never be entitled to infringe them, to absorb them or confuse them with 
one another, thereby destroying their originality. On the contrary, it must be the task of the 
supranational institutions, to which our States will have entrusted the exercise of  some  of 
their sovereign  rights,  to afford  them protection. 
In order to avoid ambiguities and, at the same time, to give full effect  to  the  principles 
on which our action is founded, the Committee proposes that the indication of the immediate 
powers and competence conferred on the Community should be prefaced by an enumer9-tion 
of the general tasks which fall to a Community founded on a union of the peoples, as a result 
of its very nature and of the prior engagements undertaken by the States. This amounts to 
delimiting  the  fields  in which  wo  envisage  a  progressive  enhancement  of  the powers  and 
competence  of the  Cotr1munity (1). 
The Sub.committee considered that, by acting in this way, the Assembly would be indi-
cating to our peoples, simply and clearly the path which has been marked out for  the past 
two  years by the recommendations of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Coal and 
Steel Community, the Defence Community and the session of our Assembly. That is a vision 
sufficiently inspiring to encourage their efforts  and to sustain their hopes. 
4.  I  wish  to dispose  of two objections : 
(i)  The  first  is  that any enumeration has a  restrictive character which  might  hamper 
the development  of the Community if it were  found  necessary,  later on,  to invest it with 
competence in other fields  than those referred to in  § 2 of Resolution  2.  . 
The answer is simple. The Community will, at the least, have a right of initiative in con-
&titutional matters  (cf.  § 31).  If circumstances should arise of such gravity that it became 
necessary to extend its tasks still further, the text defining those tasks could itself be modified 
by the procedure laid down  for  constitutional amendments. 
· .. · "  ·~.· (U  ct. Resolution 2  § 2.  In the Annex.§ 3,  b)  will be found the details of the discussion  on  § 2 
6f Resolution. 2,  in pa.rticula.r;.  in regard to an important amendment relating to the tasks ari.d  aims 
of the Community in the economic  sphere.  · 10  Report of the  Constitutional  Committee 
(ii)  A  second  objection,  which relates to an important political problem, is that the for-
mulation of objectives of such a general kind might convey the impression that the Community 
of the Six was isolated from the rest of Europe, whereas efforts have already been undertaken, 
on the widest possible European plane, in some of the spheres enumerated in  § 2 of Reso-
lution  2. 
In answer to that, it must be said that the Community will not only remain open to all 
the European States, but will  also  offer them wide  opportunities of Association  (cf.  Resolu-
tion 2,  § 35 and Resolution 5, Section 1). Moreover the last part of § 2 of the resolution implies 
that the Community, so far from «seceding», must, on the contrary, endeavour to «vitalize» 
as much as possible the larger European (or Atlantic) organizations and to pursue their objec-
tives in the interests  of  all,  with increased energy. 
Is it not the fact that the Community has been constituted with the agreement and encou-
ragement of all the other free States of Europe ? Its consolidation so far from being an obstacle 
to closer European co-operation, will, on the contrary, result in a  strengthening of Europe's 
position and in enhanced security for the whole of the free world. The Community only contains 
Six countries at this moment,  but it is constituting and developing  itself in the  interests of all 
the  countries 
Note  on  the  duties  of the  Rapporteur. 
5.  The Assembly will  allow its Rapporteur to explain his conception of his role in the 
present situation. He considered it a  primary duty to have constantly in mind the terms of 
reference givenby the Six Ministers, and in consequence to submit proposals within the scope 
outlined by the Six Governments and approved by the Ad Hoc Assembly, He has endeavoured 
to define their limits and to formulate proposals which would go right up to those limits but 
not beyond them, regardless  of his  own  personal preferences. 
It was in that spirit that the Committee's work was conducted. The Assembly  will of 
course have to pronounce on its conclusions in complete liberty; but the Rapporteur hopes 
that his  colleagues  will take these considerations into account when  they come to examine 
them. 
II.  CONCERNING  POWERS  AND  COMPETENCE  WITHIN THE 
SCOPE  OF  THE E. C.  S.C. AND  :E. D. C. -TREATIES,  AND 
CONCERNING  THEm REVISION 
A.- Transfer of the powers and competence of the E. C.  S.C. and the E. D.  C.  (cf.  Reso-
lution  I  and Resolution II, § 6). 
6.  General agreement was reached within the Committee on the principle· of the transfer . 
to the Community of the powers and competence of the E. D. C. and the E. C. S. C. The Com-
munity, together with the E. C. S. C.  and the E. D. C.  will constitute a  legal unit. 
It was  pointed out that, while article 38  requires  the transfer to the Community of  the 
powers and competence of the E. D. C. a transfer of the powers and competence of the E. C. S.C. 
is not expressly demanded and already represents an enlargement of competence, as compared 
with the provisions, article 38. The Committee was, however, unanimous in considering that 
the question of the E. C. S. C.  must be placed on the same plane as that of the E. D.CC.  In 
both cases one is dealing with sovereign supranational institutions, and it would be unthinkable 
that they should. exercise their powers side by side with,· and independently of, a  sovere~gn 
supranational Political Community having a  general mission..  ··  .·  ..  ·  . · Part 1.  - Powers  and (;ompetence  of  the  Community  11 
7.  The Committee discussed the detailed methods of this transfer at great length. General 
agreement was reached on the following points: 
(i)  The transfer of the powers and competence of the E. C.  S.C. and the E. D. C.  to the 
community does not in itself involve any fresh waiver of sovereignty by the Member States. 
It only affects, indeed, the powers and competence which the States have already granted to 
the supra-national Communities.  Consequently,  this transfer can, and must, be carried out 
even if the Sattes refuse the few extensions of competence  proposed later on in the report ; 
(ii) the transfer of the powers andcompetence of the E. C. S.C. and the E. D. C.  neces-
sarily involves certain changes in the pro'Visions of the E. C. S.C. and E. D.C. Treaties, parti:-
cularly in the institutional provisions, in their section  II. It is,  however,  desirable  in  view 
of the present situation, to reduce these changes to the minimum that is necessary to ensure 
satisfactory conditions for the operation of the Community at the moment when it is instituted; 
(iii)  in order to arrive at this. result the transfer will be made on the general principle 
that the Community's institutions will at once. take the place and assume  the powers  and 
duties of the corresponding institutions of the E. C.  S.  C.  and the E. D. C.  which are most 
similar to them in their structure : at the same time they will exercise their functions according 
to the rules laid down in the E. C.  S. C.  and·E. D. C.  Treaties, so  long as those rules  have  not 
been modified by the  Community (cf.  §§ 15, to 21 below). This does not neccessarily involve the 
permanent maintenance of a  Council of National Ministers.  That Council need only continue 
to exist, in the view of some members of the Committee, during a transitional period, simply 
as a  «heritage >>  of the E. C.  S.  C.  and E. D. C. Treaties.  It was for reasons independent of 
this problem and of a more general kind that the· Committee agreed to maintain a Council of 
National Ministers, furnished with substantial powers, within the permanent structure of the 
Community (cf.  Resolution III, §§  14 and 19 to 24). 
In pursuance of the principle set forth above the Committee proposes that the judicial 
powers of the Community should be vested in the Court of the E. C. S.C. and the E. D. C., 
that the Parliament and the Council of National Ministers of the Community should imme-
diately take the place and assume the powers of the Common Assembly and of the Councils 
of Ministers of the E. C.  S.  C. and the E .. D. C~, and that, under the definitive regime, the Euro'-
pean Executive Council should similarlyassume the functions of the High Authority and of 
the Commissariat (Resolution I,  §§  2 to 5 and 7). 
However, as regards the latter institutions, it seemed necessary to the Committee  (with 
one abstention) to provide for a  period of adaptation during which  special provisions  would 
. apply  (Resolution  I,  § 6). 
8. During the discussion on the latter point two points of view emerged in the Committee : 
a)  Some  representatives  considered  that  any  immediate  modification  of  the  present 
situation of the High Authority of the E. C. S. C. and the Commissariat of the E. D. C.  might 
involve changes in the treaties so  far-reaching that they might endanger either their effective 
application or their ratification. In order to avoid this risk these members recommended that, 
during the early stages of the Community's existence, there .should be only a  simple juxta-
position of the executive institutions of the E. C.  S.  C.  the E. D. C.  and the Community. 
The Euro12ean  Executive Council would not· be entitled to intervene in the activities of 
the High Autirority or of the Commissariat. Nevertheless, the Presidents of these two insti-
tutions would sit, by right, with the European Executive Council with a  right to vote; this 
would be justified because of the importance of the responsibilities imposed on them by the 
E. C.  S.C. and E. D. C.  Treaties and in order to enable them to assist in the preparation of 
the protocols designed to ensure the progressive establishment of the definitive regime (cf.  § 7 
above, in fine,  and  Resolution I,  §§  6,  iii and 7). 
The methods by which these protocols are to be put in effect have not yet been settled. 
However,  some representatives  suggested  that the  procedures provided  in Resolution  II 
( § 8, ii) in regard to the. revision of the E. C.  S. C.  and E. D. C. Treaties would be applicable 
to a  certain extent  (approval by the Community's Parliament and unanimous approval by 
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b)  Other members of the Committee held, on the contrary, that one of the chief reasons 
for  the setting up of the Community is  to ensure that the  « Specialised  Authorities 1>,  the 
E. C.  S. C.  and the E. D. C.,  should  be subordinated to  a  political  power responsible  to a 
democratically elected Assembly,  and that one of the. first  tasks of the Community must be 
to ensure the indispensable unity in the political conduct of the  <<  Specialised  Authorities )>. 
Those members demanded that the supra-national powers  of the High Authority and of the 
Commissariat should be transferred to the European Executive Council as soon as the Statute 
of the Community comes into force.  The two Presidents of the two Specialised Communities 
would sit in the Executive Council but would have to share in its jointresponsability. In case 
of a motion of censure regarding the Executive Council being carried they would have to resign 
from  their offices. 
In the view of those members the two Presidents would have a position analogous to that 
of Cabinet  Ministers  who  are required to apply the general directives of the Cabinet within 
the scope  of ther ministerial departments.  As  regards the members  of  the High  Authority 
and the Commissariat, they would be in the position o£  Under-Secretaries of State, working 
under the orders of. the Minister. It is quite conceivable that (as is the case in Germany) the 
resignation of the.<< Minister »,  ori  account of a  censure 6£  the Executive Council,  would not 
involve that of the Under-Secretaries of State, i. e.  of the members of the High Authority 
and of the Commissariat; in that way any too extensive upheavals might be avoided. 
The application of these principles would manifestly involve some changes in the provisions 
of  the Treaties  concerning the  High  Authority  and. the  Commissariat ;  but these  changes 
would be limited, in fact, to a part of Chapter I  of Title II of the E. C. S. C.  and E. D. C. 
Treaties.  Furthermore,. some representatives declared that such changes would be calculated 
to facilitate the approval of the E. D. C.  Treaty by some of the Parliaments in which there 
had been very insistent demands that the organisation of European defence should be made 
subject to a  supra-national political power, responsible to Parliamentary Assemblies. 
9.  In its Resolution I the Committee adopted a position midway between the two stand-
points referred to above. It approved by 9 votes, to 7,  with one abstention, the important 
principle that, from the moment when the Community was instituted, and during the period 
of adaptation, the High Authority and the Commissariat would continue in  office but would 
discharge their duties under the  direction and supe'f'Vision of the European Executive Council, 
in which their Presidents would sit with the right to vote (1). The Committee afterwards agreed 
by 16 votes to 2,with3 abstentions, that theJwo Presidents wouldnot be held jointly respon-
sible with the Executive Council in case of the latter being censured (Resolution I,  § 6,  ii). 
This last provision calls in question the unity and coherence of the European Executive 
Council and its authority as the institution appointed to direct the general affairs of the Com-
munity, as is laid down  (Resolution III, § 22). It appears however from the explanatory state-
ments accompanying the votes that a large number of members of the Committee were con-
cerned especially with the need of securing a  certain stability for the executive institutions 
recognised by the Treaties -the.  High Autho:ity and the Commissariat. The  .Principle .havin.g 
been adopted (by 9 votes to 8,  w1th  3 abstentions) that the European Executive Counc1l could 
be censured by a simple majority of each Chamber of Parliament,.these representatives thought 
it best to support the formula in  § 6, ii o£ Resolution  I. 
The general problem of the Executive, its stability, its responsibility to Parliament and 
its relations with the latter body are of such fundamental importance that tl:'Jiy  must  inevi~ 
tably be the subject of renewed and careful studies both by the Assembly and the Committee. 
Your Rapporteur will return to this point, in a more personal capacity, in the general conclusion 
of the report  (§§  31  and 42). 
10.  Apart from the changes in the institutional dauses which are immediately necessary 
to  enable the principles referred to above to be applied  (and, we  must repeat, these changes 
will fn all cases be very limited), and apart from the amendments to tWO other Articles, which 
.(1)  It has been pointed out that this rule might be applied by dif(~:rent methods irt the E. C. s. c. 
and m  the  E. D. C.  ·  · Part  1.  -.Powers and Competence  of the  C()mmunity 
will be referred to below (  §§  11 to 21)  a,nd  which are of high importance for  the subsequent 
evolution of the Community, no other. modification should, in the Committee's view, be made 
in the E. C. S. C.  and E. D. C. Treaties. As  already mentioned the duties. devolving on  the 
E. C.  S. C. and the E. D. c. will continue to be discharged in ac:;corda.nce with the rules which 
are laid down  in the Treaties. 
A great partof the articles in those treaties constitute the basis pfa genuine  European 
legislation in matters of defence and coal and steel, a legislation whic:;h has just been ·~  or will 
soon be- approved by the Governments and the Parliaments. It would be unwise to upset 
it before it has even been fully applied. The coming into force of the whole system, based on 
the two  treaties, might be delayed or even  endangered~ 
This, of  course, in no  way prevents us from providing possibilities of a subsequent pro-
gressive  transformation  by the action  of the Community itself (cf.  §§  15  to  21  below). 
B.  - Metb.ode  of exerciJiug  the  DOI'IlJI,tive  powers  (cf.  J;lesolution  II, § 7). 
11. TheE. D. C. and E.C; S. C.tteatiesconfer certain normative powers on the Communities. 
As  regards  th6  E.  C.  S.  C.: this power is, as a rule, exercised by the High Authority, in 
some cases in virtue of the concurrence of  th~ Coun<;il of  Minist~rs. If  we except  c~rta.in mea-
sures, such as the :fixing of levies on coal  and steel (which is entrusted to the High Authority) 
and the provisions in regard to decisions and recommendations in article  95,  which are ana-
lysed below,  this power is  essentially  concerned  with the making of  regulations. 
As  regards  the  E. D.  C.: the treaty contains an article 124, the equivalent of article 96. 
sub~paragraph (1) of the E.  C.  S.  C.  treaty, and the Commissariat  has a  normative power 
similar to that of the  High Authority.  ,  , 
Furthermore, the Council of .  Ministers has the power ~  deciding unanimously it is true 
~  of passing laws which the Commissq.riat  is  required  to put in force; the.se laws regulate 
certain matters of  the highest  importance in all parts of  the territory of  the Community, 
e.  g.  length of service periods (article  72),  conditions of service, recruitment, establishments, 
officering of the Forces, plan for constituting the European Defence  Forces  (article 44)  etc  ... 
The E".  D.  C. treaty withdraws from the national Parliaments, in regard to these points, 
the powers  of  decision  which  they at present  possess,  and entrusts them to the Council of 
Ministers. 
19. It will,  therefore,  be observed,  that the  Common  Assembly  provided  in the two 
treaties  plays  no  part in  the exercise of the normative powers which  devolve upon the two 
Communities. As the transfer of the powers and competence of the E. C. S. C. arid the E. D. C. 
does not involve any change in the rules governing the functioning of these two Communities, 
it follows  that the Parliament of  the  Political Community wiU  not,  at the outset,  possess 
any  normative  powers. in these  two  vital  domains .  of  europ(}qn  polir;y  .and  er;onomy  - d~fence 
and coal and steel - the whole of these matters being retained in the hands qf the ex;ecutive 
institutions  (European· Exe((utive  Council,  High  Authority, Commissariat). 
It is  not possible to alter this state of affaires  without  altering clauses  of the treaties 
in which the rules for the e;~eercise of the powers of the E. C.  S.  C.  and the E. D. C.  are laid 
down  ......  a  course  which  we  have already rejected  (§  10).  · 
13.  There remain the C4ses net proviua for by the E. C. S, C. and E. D. C: Treaties. That 
question is expressly dealt with in articles95 of the E. C. S.C. Treaty and 124 of the E. p, C. 
Treaty,  which  allow of  an  intervention  by the Community,  provided that it  keeps  within 
the scope of the Community's aims and does not exceed the limits of its generalcoiD~etence. 
The CoJnmunity thus possesses considerable nonnative powers : n&.mely. the power to supple-
ment the E. C.  S.C. and E. D. C.  Treaties,  to legislate on  all the new problems  which will 14  Report of the  Constitutional  Committee 
arise in  the functioning of the common  market or in the direction of the European forces. 
The manner in which these normative powers are to be exercised raises the question of the 
future of the European institutions. The reasons of expediency which have led us in so  many 
other cases to maintain treaties (even when they are unsatisfactory) are no longer acceptable 
in this case.  · 
It would  be  inadmissible for  the  future rules of the  Community to  be  established without the 
participation  of the  Community's  Parliament.  · 
A revision of articles 95  E. C.  S.  C.  and 124 E. D. C.  becomes necessary once  a  Peoples' 
Chamber, elected by universal suffrage, has been set up. It should be effected simultaneously 
with the transfer of the powers and competence of the E. C.  S.  C. and the E. D. C.,  as soon 
as  the Co;rnmunity's  Statute comes  into  force. · 
14.  Articles 95 E. C.  S.C. and 124 E. D. C.laydown that,new rules are to be issued by 
the executive institutions with the unanimous concurrence of the Council of Ministers. Some 
members thought that the role of the Council would have to be assumed by the Parliament 
· of the Community. It seems possible, indeed,  tha~, atthe time when the treaties were drawn 
up, the parliamentary institution which they provided may have appeared inadequate, because 
it lacked an electoral basis  and was  too  narrowly specialized  - thus justifying a  recourse 
to  the Council of Ministers.  Such reservations would no longer seem  justifiable, once a  two-
chamber  Parliament,  with  a  general mission,  has  been  called into existence. 
The Committee, however,  considered  it was  not yet possible to dispense with the safe-
guard represented, for. the States, by the necessity of obtaining the unanimous concurrence 
of  the Council  of  Ministers.  It was,  however,  agreed that the measures  to be taken under 
these two articles would have to be submitted to the Parliament of the Community, either 
for  prior approval, or,  if the case is  urgent,  for  subsequent  ratification. 
The initiative in matters of legislation thus remains with the executive institutions, the 
«veto ))  of the governments is ;maintained,· but the Parliament is  associated with the exercise 
of those normative powers of the Community which are most important for the development 
of future European legislation. That is the lea;;t  that can be required in a  statute involving 
the institution of a European Parliament, one Chamber of which will represent the sovereign 
will of. the  peoples. 
C.  - Revision  of the  E. C.  S.  C.  and  E.. D.  C.  Treaties  (cf.  Resolution II,  § 8). 
15.  The foregoing  provisions only enable the Parliament of the Community to be asso-
ciated with the measures designed to fill a possible gap, in the normative sphere, in the domains 
of coal and steel and of defence. In order that it may pia  y a decisive part in European policy 
of defence and coal and steel, it is necessary that it should be endowed with powers to inter-
vene in matters already regulated  by the legislative ·provisions  of  both treaties. 
The new rules introduced in application of Articles 95 E. C. S.C. and 124 E. D. C. cannot 
modify the legislation contained in the treaties, The adoption of new rules in conflict  with 
those laid down by the treaties would  amount to undertaking a  revision  - explicit or im-
plicit  - of the treaties. 
Reference must here be made to the clear distinction already drawn at the end of  § 10. 
Though we are convinced that the Statute of the Political Community must not modify any 
of the normative provisions of the treaties, thatfact in no way deprives  the Community of 
the right to adapt the treaties to the necessities of European life, in other words of its own 
right to revise certain of  their provisions  by methods,  which  would have to be laid down, 
and after the expiry of a  tran~itional period.  · 
16.  The provisions of the E.  C.  S. C. and E, D.> c. Treaties fall into two main categories : 
...-.the constitutic)nal·proV:isions; which"have~theeffect·of transferring part ·of the sove-
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- the normative provisions,  which have the character of an internal.« European legis-
lation», andwhich are designed to regulate the details  of the  exercise  by each  Specialised 
Community of the powers and competence transferred to it. 
a)  Constitutional  Provisions. 
·17.  These are the provisions which relate to the powers and co~petence of the E. C. S.C. 
and the E. D. C.  and to  their institutional structures.  They cannot  be revised except  by 
the procedure laid down for the analogous clauses of the Community's Statute (d. § 31 below) : 
namely,  approval by the  qualified institutionsof the  Community and ratification by the 
Member States. 
The term« constitutional provisions» has not, in this context, merely its usual significance, 
in  contradistinction to  «normative provisions )).  The constitutional provisions  of the E. C. 
S.C. and E. D. C.  Treaties, whether they fix competences o;r whether they confer powt;rs, or 
whether again they create legal structures, have the effect of transferring a  part of the  sove~ 
reignty  of the  Member  States  to one or other of these Specialised Communities, therefore to 
the Political Community itself. They  constitute an actual contract, any modification of which 
requires the intervention·. and consent  of each party ; of the ·.Community,  by. the approval 
by its Parliament ; of the participating States, by the approval of the respective national 
Parliaments.  · ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
b)  Normative  provisions. 
18.  This term applies to the whole body of clauses which regulate, within the. Community 
itself, the operation of its institutions,  the  powers which are assigned to them, the methods 
by which  those powers are exercised, etc. 
Their essential characteristic is that, unlike the constitutional provisions, they are internal 
provisions of the Community.  · 
In support of this view, we must emphasise the profound difference between the clauses 
providing for the transfer to the Community, in certain spheres,. of the powers.of the Member 
States, and the clauses which regulate. the exercise  of .these powers.  Once the powers and 
competence have been conferred on the Community, no  matter what internal procedure is 
adopted, the decisive step has been taken, even if a  clause requiring the unanimous concur-
rence of the Council of National Ministers is maintained.  · 
Once  the approval of the Council of Ministers has been obtained, the High Authority, 
or the Commissariat, have their hands free  to give  effe~t to the provisions that have been 
approved; the simple assent given by the Ministers in the Council suffices, by the operation 
of the Treaties, to oblige each State to accept the Community's decisions and to see that they 
are carried out, even if radical changes subsequently take place in the parliamentary majority 
or in the policy of the government.  This is a remarkable illustration  of the fact that the 
Council of National Ministers is not just a  means of affording representation to the States, 
but is,  in fact,  one of the institutions of a  supranational Community. · 
The  essential step is therefore the attribution  ofcompetences to  th.e  Community. The rules of 
procedure- whatever they may be- fixing the interrtalallocation of powers between the 
institutions of the Communities, do not involve a fresh transfer of the powers and competence 
of the States to the supranational Community.  As they constitute internal legislation of the 
Community they must normally  be  liable to  revision by the  Community Uself.  · 
19.  The internal provisions laid down in the E. C. S. C. and E. D. C. Treaties are however 
of such varied natures and importance that it is not possible, from a political standpoint, to 
provide a uniforni procedure for the revision of them all. TheCommittee was therefore led to 
distinguish between two cases and two types ofprocedure, both of which leave the decision 
solely t<:>·the  Community~ inconformity with Conclusion § 2Q: 
· .  ··:(i)  A realistic view of  the present· state ofthe:process ofEuropeari unifitationleads one 
to group together the clauses of the E. C. S.C. and E. D. C;  Treaties whicliare designed for 16 
th,e  protecti~n of the .interests of the Member Sta.teP within th~e !'luprantltion~J Communities 
(e, g. the conditions governing the exercise o{ the powers of the High A11thority, the obligation, 
in certain cases, to obtain the approval of  thl:l  Council of  M.ini~ters, fl.Cting  by a unanimotJ.s 
decision, etc  ... ) or designed to ensure a certain equilibrium between the institutions. 
The Committee proposes that it should be impossible for these clauses to be amended 
except with the unanimous concurrence of the Council of National Ministers. 
Some of us will regret the latter condition. It" would no doubt be much mon sat\sfa.ctory 
if the Member State~  ~oukl af?ree that the CommlJnity's Statute should authorise the J?arli~~:nt 
of that body to limit or abohsh, in favour of itself, the powers of the otherspevialised Commu  .. 
nities (e.  g. of the Councils of Ministers). However, for the present, there seems to be no pos--
sibility of  the States agreeing on that point. 
A proposal to that effect, which some members of the Committee would have gladly sup  .. 
ported, would therefore have remained without praetical effect. 
(ii)  The revision of the normative clausesf other than tb.ose defined abovt, mJght on the 
contrary be brought a.bout  by an ordinary law of  the Comm,mity,  adopted by th~ latter's 
legislative institutions a.ccordm~ to thelr normal procedur~ (§  8,  U b, of  Re~olution U).  On~ 
possibility of appeal il'>,  however, left. open to the Sta.teli, i. e.  the right to petition the Court 
under conditions similar to those laid aown in Articles 37  E. C. S.C. and 56 E. D.  C. 
The Court may also intervene to settle the procedure applicable for the ~xa.mina,tion and 
adoption of a  proposed amendment. 
~0. Although the constitutional and normative pro~sioP.s (of either of th~ types indi~;ated 
above) are sometimes closely intermingled in the te:x;ts of the Treaties, and often in the actuaJ 
clauses of the articles, they can be fairly easily distinguished in most cases. For instance, a 
summary analysis of  Articl~ 72  E. C. S. C.  ena.blets  us to iUu5tr!il.te,  Y'Y  WtJ'Y  of  exaffl/Pte,  the 
manner in which the revisional procedures thus laid down can pe  applied. 
The text of  Articl~ 72  E. C. S. C  is  as  follows : 
« Minimum rate$,· below which the Member States are bound not to lower their·· Customs 
duties on coal and steel with regard to third countries, and maximum rates, above which they 
are bound not to raise such duties, may be fixed by unanimous decision of the Council upon 
the proposal of the High Authority, which ma.y act on its own initiative or at the rGquest of 
a  Member State. 
«Between the limitli fixed by the  s~~rid de§ision e.ach Gov~rnn1ent  will :~tlt i.tfll tariffs according 
to its :n!il.Uonal  procedure. The  High  Author.ity may, on its own initiative or at the request 
of one of the Member St~te~. issue a11  opinion smgg~sting a modification of the tariffs of sueh 
participating country )1, 
(l)  Constitutional Provisions :  the  Comw.unity  li competent to :fix: the rates. of Customs 
dues on coal and steel in regard to third States.  ·· 
(ii)  Normative Provigions: these eonstitqte the rest of the Article, and one ean recognise 
the two <:ategories  which  were distinguished in § 19. 
- one clat~se  dett~n:nine!'l the res~ctive  power~.' of the institutions in rtspect of the fixing 
of Customs dues : a power of decision by the Council of Ministers ; a power of initiative and 
issue of opiniona by the lligh Authority (end of the 11rst sub  .. paragraph). This claus~  oould not 
be amended by, the Community,  except with the unanimo\ls concuncmee of  th~ Cotuwil oi 
Ministers. 
=  one  clau~ fixes  the cc:>ndiHo~ u.nd~r whi<:lJ  th~ High Authority ID!il.Y  iSiu~ opinions 
in r~gard to Cwstoms  tCtriff~ (end of second su~paragraph). It  could be modified by an ordinarY 
l!'l.w enacted by  the Community's Parliament. For eKJi:m.plfl,  it  i~ wuceivable that obligatory 
consqltation with the Consultative  Comroitt~  of the ;E. C. S. C. roight  b~  introd~d  in thfl.t way, 
21.  lt,will not~~pe  notic~ that Artielet~ 9£1  and 96 E. C,S.  C.  and 126  E, D. c,  ins-
titute procedures for J·eVision  far  stricter  than those prvpoS€d here. All amendments to th<;l Part 1.  ~  Powers  and Competence  of the  Community  17 
E. D. C.  Treaty, no matter of what kind, have to be approved by a specially convened diplo-
matic conference and ratified by the States. The same applies to amendments to the E. C. S. C. 
Treaty, except that Article 95, actually allows the adaptation of some of the legislative clauses 
defined in § 19, ii  above (those relating to «the exercise by the High Authority of the powers 
conferred on it») by the institutions of the Community themselves, though this right is, it 
is true, hedged round by procedural obstacles. 
The E. D. C.  and E. C. S.C. Treaties, in the present state of  affairs, are« fixed» treaties. 
This was  comprehensible in view of the specialised  character of the Communities and  the 
absence of ti popular basis for their institutions. The creation of the Community not only justifies 
but makes it necessary to simplify, and give more flexibility to, the procedures by which they 
may  be revised. 
Ill. - POWERS  AND  COMPETENCE  WITHIN  THE  GENERAL 
FRAMEWORK  OF  THE  SYSTEM  CREATED  BY  THE 
E. C. S. C.  AND  E. D. C.  TREATIES 
The Committee recognised  that the mere existence of the Community implies certain 
extensions of the powers stipulated in the E. C.  S. C. and E. D. C.  Treaties. 
A.  - Powers in matters of foreign policy (cf.  Resolution I!,  §§  9 to 14). 
22.  The Committee studied the vitally important problem of the Community's respon-
sibilities for the definition of a  common external policy for the Six countries in connection 
with coal and steel and defence. 
This question is not a new one. As early as December 1951· the Assembly of the Council 
of Europe emphasised clearly (Recommendation  21,  B  already cited,  § 1)  that the creation 
of a  common defence force  necessarily involved the definition of a  common defence  policy. 
Some  decisions have already been taken by the States. With regard to coal and steel, 
the E. C.  S.  C.  has already been given restricted powers in matters of commercial policy. The 
statements made by MM.  MoNNET and SPIERENBURG to the Committee on the Organisation 
of the Common Assembly (November 8 1952) show that the governments are far from objecting 
to an enhancement of these  powers. 
In matters of defence, though the E. D.  C.  Treaty does not provide for the definition 
by the E. D. C. of a common policy (it leaves that duty to the Atlantic Council), it lays down 
(Article 47) that the Council of Ministers of the E. D. C. ma;y decide (by a majority) to request 
a  joint meeting of the N. A.  T. 0. Council and the Connell of Ministers of the E. D.  C. 
These  meetings are designed  (see  § 1 of the Protocol regarding relations  between the 
E. D.  C.  and N. A.  T. 0.) for the study of questions concerning the common objectives of 
the two organisations and, if necessary, the measures to be taken if one of the Member States 
considers  that its safety is  seriously  menaced.  · 
In the course o£  the deliberations in which it decides to  request such a  joint meeting, 
the Council of Ministers must necessarily undertake a first examination of the problems whicb 
have occasioned it, and it may be expected that, before the meeting takes place,  the  Six 
governments will endeavour to co-ordinate their attitudes. What the Committee now proposes 
is to clarify and systematise these possibilities,  which are already· implicit in the E. D. C. 
Treaty, and to make room for the intervention, in this process, of the European Executive 
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23.  The Community will therefore have the task of defining the common objectives of 
the foreign  policy of the Member States in questions of defence and coal and steel, while the 
responsibility for  the execution of this policy devolves on the Community and the Member 
States. That is the significance of the provisions concerning the right of representation and the 
conclusion  of treaties in Resolution  II,  §§  9 to 14 (1). 
During a transitional period the States would have the safeguard, both in regard to the 
definition  of the common objectives,  and to the conclusions of treaties,  of  concurrence  or 
prior approval, of the Council of National Ministers,  acting unanimously (cf.  Resolution  II, 
§ 13). 
24. It is doubtless true, as was  pointed out by a  member of the Committee, that the 
principle of  unanimity may paralyse action when a decision has to be made. In the case we 
are considering it seems preferable to run this risk - which  will certainly be mitigated by 
the action and control of the Community's Parliament -rather than to allow the Member 
States to follow independent, and even divergent, foreign policies at a  time when the inter-
national situation is exceptionally delicate and dangerous. 
The conditions under which powers and competence are transferred from the E. D. C. 
to  the  Political  Community  practically  impose  the maintenance  of  the· rule of  unanimity 
during the transitional period. No change has been made in the rules governing the operation 
of the E. D. C.,  which provide that all important matters must be decided unanimously by 
the Council of Ministers. It would therefore be inconceivable that the Community's objectives, 
in matters of foreign  policy,  should be defined by a  majority, whereas  the direction of its 
armed forces,  and the decision  as  to  their use,  are subject to the unanimous agreement of the 
Ministers  (cf.,  in particular,  Articles  18,  75  and 123 of the E. D. C.  Treaty). 
The question of abandoning the unanimity rule in matters of foreign policy would only 
arise if the E. D. C.  Treaty had been amended, in particular in regard to the clauses referred 
to above. 
25.  In connection with the Community's powers in matters of foreign  policy, attention 
is drawn to a proposal by one of the Committee's members for an extension of the Commu-
nity's competence  in regard to  the policy  of  Specialised Authorities.  This proposal,  which 
the Committee hopes  to study after the Assembly's session, is analysed in the Annex  (§  3, 
b, note on  § 14 his of Resolution II). 
B. - Powers in financial matters (cf.  Resolution II, §§  15  to 20). 
26.  The  financial  provisions  proposed  by  the  Committee  are  in  accordance  with  the 
general rules laid down in the corresponding parts of the E. C. S.C. and E. D. C.  Treaties. 
The said provisions systematise and supplement these rules in the light of the new fact repre-
sented by the existence of a Chamber elected on a democratic basis. The Community is given 
fiscal  powers  (Resolution II,  § 16)  - thus generalising the principale accepted for the first 
time in the E. C. S.C. Treaty, in connection with .the European tax ( «levy») on coal and 
steel. The details of the exercise of this power will have to be laid down  by  the  Community 
itself, subject to the unanimous approval of the Council of National Ministers. The Committee 
proposes  to consider,  later, the desirability of settling the general lines for  its exercise,  at 
once, in the Statute itself (cf. Annex  § 3,  b, Note on  § 16 of Resolution II). 
(1)  The Rapporteur draws attention to the important observations made by some of the mem-
bers of the Committee on these questions; these are summarised in the Annex (§  3,  b, note on  §§  12 
to 13 of Resolution II). These observations must be studied in detail by the Committee after the session 
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IV.  - ECONOMIC  POWERS  AND  COMPETENCE < 1> 
27.  The Committee had to express its opinion on a  preliminary question : some of the 
representatives considered that no new economic powers and competence should be conferred 
on the Community, and that it was even unwise to insert the progressive achievement of the 
common market among the Community's general aims and objectives  (Resolution  II,  § 2). 
These representatives considered that the said objectives might be. more usefully pursued in 
a  wider  European framework,  such as would be afforded by the Council of Europe or the 
O.E.E.C  .. 
The Committee, almost unanimously  (Cf.  Annex,  § 3,  b, note on  § 2 and Section  D of 
Resolution  II}, rejected this point of view and agreed that the achievement of the common 
market was one of the general objectives of the Community, subject to the important consi-
deration that this market must be conceived in the spirit of the E. C. S.C. Treaty: in other 
words  that any autarchic  tendency must  be excluded  from  the Community's  commercial 
policy which, on the contrary, must seek to facilitate a general lowering of Customs barriers 
and other obstacles to trade, and to promote measures of economic integration extending to 
the largest  possible number of countries. 
There were some divergencies of opinion as to the magnitude of the powers, which should 
be conferred on the Community, at the present moment, in order to enable it to achieve this 
aim. While some of the representatives almost made. their acceptance of the Community con-
ditional on. the assignment  to it of substantial economic  powers,  others considered that it 
would be inexpedient, at this moment, to ask the Member States to consent to further transfers 
of sovereignty to the  Community. 
28.  The Committee was of opinion that the normal operation of a Community, having the 
duties of the E. C. S.C. and the E. C.  D., necessarily implied certain general economic powers. 
It felt that it was impossible to ignore the importance of the repercussions on the economies 
of the Six countries of the creation of a common market for coal and steel, of a partially trans-
ferable budget for military expenditure, and of a common armaments programme administered 
by the Commissariat. It considered that by the mere fact of the application of the Treaties 
-E.  C. S.C. and E. D. C.-the Community would have to intervene, directly ot indirectly, 
in constantly expanding economic spheres. 
· The Committee therefore suggests that a  foundation be laid for  a  system of permanent 
consultation on economic matters between the Community and the Member States : such a 
system as, without involving any waiver of sovereignty by the States, would be of a nature 
to facilitate, by indirect action, the creation of conditions favourable to the common market. 
§§  21  to 23 of Resolution II set forth in detail the method of organising this system of 
consultation : to begin with the Community has general consultative competence in economic 
matters. In addition, except in cases of urgency, Member States are bound to consult it before 
taking any measures for ratifying the treaties, in matters directly connected with the creation 
of the common market. In the case of treaties, the Parliament of the Community would nor-
mally be required to make a  pronouncement. 
To give  the Community, and particularly its democratically-elected !Peoples' Chamber, 
the opportunity of making a pronouncement beforehand on any measure likely to have imme-
diate repercussions on the economic situation of the peoples of Europe, is the essential feature 
of the suggested system of consultation, the feature which can doubtless permit of achieving 
practical results.  · 
29.  Many of the representatives felt that these provisions were certainly of a  nature to 
prevent the adoption of measures conflicting with the principles of the common  market, but 
that they were not adequate to solve the tremendous economic problems with which Europe 
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is now faced; for,  without transfer of sovereignty by Member States to the Community,  the 
latter's institutions, particularly its Parliament, will never be able to take any effective action 
or cause the Member States to take essential measures. This point of view is strikingly illustrated 
by the activities of European consultative bodies during the last few  years. 
However, the Committee thought it would be inexpedient on political grounds, to insert 
provisions granting it powers of decision in economic matters. A proposal to that effect  was 
?ompletely rej~ted (d. Annex,  ,§  3, b, not~ on  §§ 24-25  o~ ?esolution II): On the .other. h~d, 
1t  was  agreed, m  spite of certalli reservations, that proV1s10ns  (concermng the hberahsat10n 
of the exchanges, the abolition of Customs barriers, and monetary unification) should be intro-
duced in a  special protocol,  which  will  have  to  be  submitted to the National Parliaments 
together with the Statute, though its approval will not necessarily be linked to that of the 
Statute. In that way it should be possible to confront the Parliaments with decisive measures 
which will no  doubt, in every one of our countries, promote the expansion of production, the 
increase of employment, and the raising of the standard of living of the peoples. 
V.  - POWERS  AND  COMPETENCE  WITH  REGARD  TO  HUMAN 
RIGHTS  AND  FUNDAMENTAL  FREEDOMS < 1> 
30.  The Committee emphasised the high significance of the decisions that will have to 
be taken in order to enable the Statute to guarantee the protection of human rights : 
for  is  not  the foremost  aim of the efforts being made to-day by Europe and the free  world 
in the sphere of defence, to ensure the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms by its peoples ? 
The Committee proposes that the Statute guarantee enjoyment of human rights and of 
fundamental freedoms,  and  give  the Community competence  to uphold and maintain them. 
The  conditions  governing  the exercise  o£  the latter powers  and competence  form  the 
subject of clauses in Resolutions II (§ 27) and IV(§ 1), which are commented on in thereports 
of MM.  DEHOUSSE and von  MERKATZ. 
VI.  - PROCEDURE  FOR  AMENDMENT  OF  THE  STATUTE < 2> 
The procedure for the amendment of the Statute must be as simple as possible, while a 
the same time giving the Member States the necessary guarantees of stability. 
The Committee considered that the Community must have a right of initiative in consti-
tutional matters and that a  means must be sought of simplifying the traditional procedure 
for formulating and ratifying amendments to a treaty. It felt that it was not possible to lay 
down a uniform rule with regard to all the provisions of the Statute, and it agreed to classify 
them in different categories on the basis of the same principles as were adopted for the revision 
of the E. C. S. C. and E. D. C.  Treaties (cf.  §§  16 to 19 above). 
§ 28 of Resolution II, without leading to an «auto-extension »of the Community's powers, 
nevertheless  simplifies  the problem in one  important respect  by avoiding the convocation 
of a  diplomatic conference ; that conference is replaced by the deliberations of the Council 
(1}  Cf.  Resolution II,  §  26. 
(2}  Cf.  Resolution II,  §§  27  to  31. , 
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of  National  Ministers  (who  must  approve  the  amendments  unanimously),  so  that  the 
amendments adopted by the Community can be sent direct to the States for approval by the 
national Parliaments. 
However,  some  members of the Committee  were  unable to agree to this formula,  and 
demanded that all amendments relating to powers and competence,  and to institutions of 
the Community, should  form  the subject of a  treaty concluded by the governments, after 
a  specially  convened conference  (cf.  note on  §  28,  Resolution  II). 
82.  §§  29  and 30 of Resolution  II, on the other hand, offer an abridged procedure for 
the adoption of amendments to the international provisions of the Community. Here again 
the Committee adopted  the  same  criteria  as .  in  the  case of the revision of the E. C. S. C. 
and E. D.  C.  Treaties: the procedure for revisions takes place within the Community, and 
without intervention by the States and National Parliaments, though the States are  given 
adequate safeguards. 
On the same grounds of  political expediency as were mentioned in § 19.  (i), it was con~ 
sideredimpossible to give the Community's·Parliament the right to decide for itself on changes 
·in the allocation of powers between the institutions, and thereby to increase its powers within 
the Community, on its own initiative. The unanimous concurrence of the Council of National 
Ministers  is  required  for  amendments  in this category. 
VII.  -QUESTION OF  MEMBERSRIP<l> 
88.  The Committee held divided views on the question of the length of time for which 
the Statute should be concluded,  and,  in the same connection, on  the right of withdrawal 
or exclusion.  Some representatives considered that the solution  least  likely to give  rise  to 
dispute during the present period wotlld be to adopt the methods laid down in the E. C.  S.  C. 
and E. D. C. Treaties: a period of fifty years, without any provision for withorawal or exclu~ 
sion.  Nevertheless,  the possibility of renewing the Statute would  be provided for.  · 
The majority of the Committee considered  that such a  provision,  though  acceptable in 
regard to Specialised  Authorities,  was  inconsistent with  the essential  character of a  Com-
munity, having a general mission and founded on a union ofthe peoples. It therefore proposed 
that the Community should be indissoluble (cf.  Annex  § 3,  b, note on § 1 of Resolution II). 
34.  The other provisions adopted in §§ 32 to 35 of Resolution II do not call for any special 
explanation. With regard to the procedure for admitting members, however, the Rapporteur 
thinks it may be useful, after a fresh study of the wording adopted by the Committee (Reso-
lution II, § 34), to suggest a new formula which more nearly approaches that provided in the 
E. C.  S. C.  and E. D.  C.  Treaties, and which takes more account of the fact that the Com-
munity's institutions include a democratically-elected Chamber. 
While it is normal that the admission  of a  new member -a  decision  which  implies 
reciprocal political, economic and military undertakings of extreme gravity- can only result 
from an Additional  Act  to the Statute, it appears that, so  far as concerns the Community, 
its adoption must be a matter solely for the Community's institutions, and in the first  place 
for the Community's Parliament. The new proposal amounts, in fact, to giving the Community's 
Parliament the right of approving the admission, a right, which-according to the Committee's 
wording, - is still vested in the National Parliaments (cf. Annex  § 3,  b, note on § 34 of Re;;. 
solution U).  · 
35. The Committee  did  not complete  its examination  of the delicate  question  of the 
«composition  of the membership ,,,  a  problem  which  is linked  to that of the participation 
in the Community of the non-European territories of certain States. The declarations on this 
subiect made by some of the representatives are set forth in the Annex § 3,  b  (note on § 36i 
of Resolution  II).  . 
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VIII.  - GENERAL  CONCLUSIONS 
36.  An  objective and impartial examination of the conclusions arrived at by the Com-
mittee in regard to the powers and competence of the Community leads us to conclude that, 
at the moment of its foundation,  the European constitutional edifice  will rest on  a  rather 
modest collection of competences and powers of what may be called a  « pre-confederal  >>  cha-
racter. The same solicitude for impartiality compels the Rapporteur to declare his firm con-
viction that it would be a gross error and a grave injustice, both in regard to the Committee 
and to the Ad Hoc Assembly (from which the Committee derives its powers), to undervalue 
the  substantial importance  of  the  progress  that has  been  accomplished. 
It is true that the powers  and competence  of the  European  Executive  Council in the 
spheres of coal and steel and defence are still incomplete and  that the  condition~ for  their 
exercise  must be  formulated  later; however,  the principle  is  already  established that the 
executive organisms of the two Specialised Communities  will henceforth exercise their acti-
vities under the direction and supervision of the European Executive Council and that powers 
and competence of the E. C. S.C. and E. D. C.  will be transferred to the Community, a deci-
sion  which  is  of importance for  the cohesion  of the European organisation. 
It is true that the normative powers of the Community's Parliament will at first be very 
limited, in view of the fact that almost the only fields in which it can exercise them are already, 
to a  great extent, occupied by the ((European legislation  >>  embodied in the E. C. S.C. and 
E. D. C.  Treaties.  However, the Parliament will none the less  be associated- though with 
restricted powers - in the developments of that legislation and will even be able after a tran-
sitional period to alter it or improve it, if necessary. 
It is true that in questions of foreign  policy the Community will only possess the power of 
co-ordinating the diplomacy of the Member States within the  limits of the requirements of defence 
and of the production of coal and steel, and will have no power to impose a unified European 
policy. But it is also true that, after the institution of the Community, the Member States 
will be required, when they seek to initiate important actions, to submit to a fairly strict pro-
cedure of preliminary opinions and subsequent controls which the  goodwill  and mutual con-
fidence  of all the members can invest with a  very  real import, in practice. 
It  is true that the fiscal powers of the Community may only be exercised within the limits 
of an organic law which must be approved by the National Ministers, acting by a unanimous 
vote; butit is also true that, in the elaboration of that law, the Parliament of the Commu-
nity will  perform the functions  of  a  legislative  organ. 
Finally,  it is  true that the powers of decision  of the Community in economic  matters 
may not be approved by the National Parliaments, until a later stage. However, the imme-
diate exercise of the competence to issue opinions and above all the obligation of the Member 
Sta:tes to consult the Community in advance befor taking certain measures in fields of special 
importance, is calculated to facilitate the early granting of powers  of  decision,  by general 
agreement. 
37.  According to an opinion which is very widely held by the militant supporters of the 
European cause, the chief obstacle to the effectual operation and development of a  federal 
or confederal  Community is  the maintenance - as proposed in the Report - of a  Council 
of  National Ministers, invested with important prerogatives.  Several of our colleagues have 
insistently pressed for  the total abolition  of  this institution. 
I  trust the that Assembly will allow the author of the present Report - entirely in his 
personal capacity- to express his opinion on this important question. In hisviewthe grant-
ing of  autonomus powers of decision to a Council of National Ministers would be an unsound 
method to adopt for the building of Europe. The interesting counter-project  of  one of our 
colleagues, which is referred to in another patt of the report (cf. Annex §2),and which the com-
mittee considered inconsistent with the basic principles  of its terms of reference, was founded 
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To be more precise it may be said that a Council of Ministers with autonomous powers 
of decision  would imply the desire to move towards an organisation based on the intangi-
bility of the sovereign  structure of the National States, that is,  in a  direction  inconsistent 
with any federal or confederal system and likewise with the principles of the E. C. S, C.  and 
E.D.C. 
On the contrary, when we speak of granting the Council of Ministers a power of merely 
issuing Opinions -or  perhaps  c< approvals», and although these are made subject to the rule 
of unanimity - a  power that has to be exercised  within a  supranational constitutional sys-
tem, the judgment should be less rigid. The Council of National Ministers may, in such a case, 
be a necessary instrument for facilitating progress in the right direction i. e.  for assisting in 
the transfer of certain powers of the States to the institutions of the Community. 
The discussion on the powers and competence of  the Community showed  clearly that 
a  definite  connection  exists between the extent of  the powers granted to the Community 
and the methods by which they are to be exercised : in particular, the guarantee that a Council 
of National Ministers will always be able to control or influence the action of the European 
Executive Council  and of the Parliament by its competence to issue  an «approval»  (avis 
conforme). It was the acceptance of such a procedure which made it possible to obtain una-
nimous, or almost unanimous, agreement in the Committee on the granting of certain fun-
damental powers (powers in fiscal affairs, in fo;reign  policy, in the revisicn of the E. C.  S.  C. 
and E. D. C.  Treaties and in the revision of the Statute). 
The Council of National Ministers must be regarded  (cf.  § 18  above)  as an institution 
of  the Community which  participates with the European Executive Council  and the Par-
liament in the formation of the supranational decisions of the Community. True,  the National 
Ministers are the spokesmen of the national points of view, but it is better that the latter 
should be defended in the Community rather than that the powers should be rejected outside 
the Community,  together with the spokesmen who would  have been  prepared to sanction 
their exercise by the institutions of the Community, especially by its Parliament, with all 
the weight of its autonomy, if they had been duly represented in the Community. 
38.  It would not suffice that the draft Statute should be held, in spite of its imperfec-
tions, to be satisfactory as an immediate measure. It  is essential, further, that the possibilities 
of a progressive extension of the powers and competence of the Community and of the con-
ditions for the harmonious development of its institutions towards authentic federal or con-
federal forms should be assured. The problem of the Council of National Ministers, and more 
generally the problem of the duties and responsibilities of the executive institutions and their 
relations with the Parliament should also be considered frcm this point of view. 
In the Rapporteur's opinion three essential principles must be respected. It  is important 
that the Assembly should take them into account when it comes to study the conclusions 
of its Committee. 
A.  - The  conclusions of the  Council of National  Ministers  in the  field of its competence 
are  binding on the Member  States  (cf.  § ·18  above). 
39.  This is  a principle which  is radically different from that adopted in the Council of 
Europe (and in many other international organisations)  where the conclusions of the Com-
mittee of Ministers have only the value of recommendations,  without binding  force,  and 
where the representatives of the governments,  are usually without veritable  powers other 
than that of veto-ing  a  decision .... 
In the system devised by the Committee, as soon as the Council of National Ministers 
has issued its «approval», the measures elaborated by the Committee's institutions (the Par-
liament or the Executive Council, as the case may be) can come into force immediately, and 
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instance, to the normative decisions provided for in the E. C. S.  C.  and the E. D. C. Treaties 
and in the Community's Statute. 
The application of this principle has enabled a radical simplification to be made in 
the procedure for  the extension of powers and competence by way of amendments to the 
Statute. The unanimous agreement of the Council of National Ministers with such an amend-
ment, which has been adopted by the Parliament of the Community, binds the governments 
and obliges them to defend the amendment in their National Parliaments, all further inter-
governmental deliberations, such as  a  diplomatic conference, being excluded. 
B.  - The Council of National Ministers may only intervene in certain cases, laid down in 
advance in the statute or in the treaties instituting the Specialised  Communities.  · 
40.  It would  be out of the question that the Council of National Ministers should be 
entitled to guide the action of the European Executive Council of the Parliament at every 
step, and to intervene in proceedings of minor importance .... The efficacy of these institutions 
would very soon be compromised and the supranational character  of the Community would 
become illusory. The Executive Council would be demoted to the grade of a mere executive 
agent, and the National Ministers would hold the real reins of power in the Community. 
The obtaining of an « approval» from the Council of National Ministers must only be 
regarded as one of the stages ~  though an important one ~.  in the constitutional process, 
a  necessary sanction, but one which is only to be taken after a  careful elaboration of the 
provisions formulated by the Community's institutions. Before the Council of National Ministers 
takes action, those institutions are completely at liberty, within the limits of their competence, 
to initiate any appropriate actions. When they have obtained the approval of the Ministers, 
they again have a free hand to carry out the measures that have been adopted. 
It was  in that way,  for instance, that the intervention of the Council of National  Mi~ 
nisters in the conclusion  of  the treaties by the Community was  conceived.  The  Council's 
« approval >>  only becomes necessary at the time of the signature of the draft treaty (Reso-
lution II, § 13). That is also the conception which prevails in the E. C.  S.  C.  Treaty, and its 
general application to the Community will greatly facilitate the development of the European 
institutions. In § 19 of Resolution III the Committee was concerned to safeguard that prin-
ciple. 
C.  - The control of the European Parliament must be capable of being e:x:ercised over all 
the constitutional organs through  which the Community exercises its powers and competence. 
41.  Several representatives made it clear in the Committee that their assent to the gran-
ting of  supranational powers and competence to a Community was conditional on a genuine 
parliamentary control of the exercise of the said powers and  competence by the executive 
institutions. This requirement  is  parallel to that which we referred to above in cqnnection 
with the Council of National Ministers  (§  37). The elaboration of effective rules, constituting 
a  new European parliamentary law,  is a  condition for the agreement of the National Par-
liaments to the extension  of  the Community's  powers. 
The effect of the present circumstances is  that European parliamentary control cannot 
be exercised by methods as simple as those adopted in our National States,for the following 
reasons: 
- because the European Executive Council is not fully autonomous, but ]las to obtain 
the approval of the Council of National Ministers for its chief decisions. 
- because  the Community's institutions  are composite,  including,  side  by side  with 
the European Executive Council, the High Authority and the Commissariat, which interlock 
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42.  It appears to the Rapporteur that, in order that satisfaction may be given to the 
legitimate concern of the National Parliaments When they are called on to relinquish some of 
their powers  and  competence  in favour  of  the Community,  the «European parliamentary 
law>>  must be based on the following  points:  . 
(i)  The Parliament must be  able  to  exercise its control,  not only over the European Exe-
cutive Council, but also  over the Council of National Ministers- though naturally according 
to other rules. 
That is already provided for in the E. C.  S. C. Treaty, whose Article 24 lays down that 
the censure pronounced by the Common Assembly relates to  .the general report of the High 
Authority, a report which deals (Article 19) with the activities of the whole of the Community, 
incJuding  therefore  the Council of  National Ministers  as well.  On the contrary, Article  38 
E. D.  C.,  § 2,  limits the scope of the censure solely to «the administration of the Commis.;. 
sariat ll,  thus making the scope of the. censure administrative rather than political, in other 
words ensuring that it shall not imply a  judgement on the work of the Council of Ministers 
of the E. D. C. That amounts, in fact, to giving the Parliament power to force the resignation 
of an administrator but not to discuss the policy - and here it is a  question of European 
defence policy -'- which this administrator has had to apply and in the formulation of which 
the Council  of  Ministers had a  large responsibility. 
European parliamentary law on this subject sh9uld be founded on Article 24 E. C.  S.  C. 
and the Community's Statute should provide for an immediate adaptation of Article 36 E. D. C. 
That adaptation, which does not imply any real waiver of sovereignty by the States could 
be effected in connection with the institutional amendments to be adopted with a  view to 
the transfer of the powers and competence of the E. C. S. C.  and the E. D. C.  to the Com  .. 
munity (cf.  § 7,  ii above).  . 
(ii)  The faint responsibility of the  members of the European Executive Council to Parliament 
must  be  ensured.  · 
·  The Committee has specified that the Presidents of the High Authority and the Com  .. 
missariat should retain their personal status, i. e.  that they could only be censured by Par-
liament in strictly limited cases and by a  tw<Y-thirds  majority, whereas the other members 
of the European Executive Council may be censured by a simple majority. This cannot fail 
to produce prejudicial confusion in the exercise of the powers and competence conferred on 
the different branches of the Executive. 
For instance, the European Executive Council might enjoy the confidence of a majority 
of the Parliament for its defence policy but might find  difficulty in having it carried by the 
Commissariat (although the latter is under its direction by the terms of § 6, i, of Resolution I) 
because the Commissariat  can only be censured by a  two-thirds majority. 
Conversely, .the European  Executive Council  might  be censured  for  its defence  policy, 
though the President of the Commissariat, who  would. have borne an essential responsibility 
in the elaboration of this po1icy,  would not be affected if the motion of censure had failed 
to  secure  a  two-thirds  majority. 
It seems to the Rapporteur that our National Parliaments will criticise us severely for 
allowing the Parliament of the Community to be paralysed by contradictory rules, and. that 
this might gravely compromise the subsequent development of the Community, It is essential 
that a  democratically-elected  Parliament should  be able, as soon  as it has been instituted, 
to exercise its activities within the framework of coherent rules which  will enable it to dis-
charge  fully its duties of control and, later, to exercise its normative powers. 
43.  In conclusion,  your Rapporteur desires  to express his conviction  that it is  not by 
constitutional texts that the union of the peoples will be created; it is  the peoples who, by 
their resolute and tenacious  will  for  union, will  impart effectiveness and driving power to 
the constitutional texts. The COJ;nmittee's proposals are on a modest scale but they will be a 
touchstone of the will of the peoples. It they wish, they will be able to make m;e  of them as 
a means of traversing immediately and without hesitation the first stage of the journey. What 
will count is to act quickly, and to leap the first  ditch while keeping the gaze  fixed  on the 
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ANNEX 
DISCUSSIONS  IN  COMMITTEE. 
1.  At its session  23-27  October  1952  the Constitutional Committee  set up a  Sub-Com-
mittee on Powers and Competence. The Chairman was M. BLAISSE and it appointed M. BEN-
VENUTI  as its Rapporteur. 
The Sub-Committee on Powers and Competence held meetings on thirteen days. In the 
first part of its proceedings it undertook an exhaustive examination of the different questions 
refered  to it by the Plenary Committee on the basis of notes written by several of its mem-
bers.  It then requested its Rapporteur to collect  and systematize its first  conclusions  with 
a  view to their reconsideration  at the secound  readin~. 
The Sub-Committee  benefited, in particular, in everything concerning the powers  and 
competence of the Community, by notes prepared by MM. BEC:KER,  BENVENUTI,  BERGMANN, 
BLAISSE,  DEBRE,  DELBOS,  KOPF,  PARIS  and WIGNY,  and in  regard  to  «membership)),  by 
the notes of MM. BENVENUTI,  BLAISSE,  DELBOS  and WIGNY.  It was also  greatly assisted in 
regard to the E. C. S.C. and the E. D. C. Treaties by the analytic notes on the Coal and Steel 
Community and the  Defence  Community prepared by its Chairman, M. BLAISSE. 
The  Sub-Committee's report  was  submitted to the Plenary Committee,  which  selected 
the parts concerning the integration of the E. C. S.C. and the E. D. C.  in  the Community 
and discussed them in conjunction with the proposals on the 'same subject put forward by the 
Sub-Committee  on  Political Institutions.  Its conclusions  on  this subject constitute Resolu-
tion  I. The  general  problem of  the Community's powers  and competence  is  dealt  with in 
Resolution  II  (1). 
The active assistance furnished by all the members of the Sub-Committee greatly faci-
litated the task of its Rapporteur, who  expresses his special thanks to  M.  von  BRENTANO, 
President of the Committee and to M. BLAISSE,  Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Powers 
and Competence. 
2.  The idea  of  a  European  Political  Community,  regarded  as  a  development  of the 
E. C. S.C. and E. D. C., led to express reservations on the part of one of the members of the 
Committeej  who  submitted a  comprehensive  plan,  based upon  other principles: the project 
of an political authority founded on a  union of States. 
It was  difficult  for  the Committee to pronounce upon these proposals, in spite of their 
great interest : for  what was proposed was a  system which seems incompatible with the po-
litical and juridical premises on which the preparatory work entrusted to it by the Assembly 
were  founded. 
Our colleague, after defending his ideas with an ability and a conviction worthy of the 
highest consideration, consented to accept this point of view and to continue to take an active 
part in our work, it being understood that he retained his full liberty of action before the 
Plenary Assembly.  Your Rapporteur is convinced that the:Assembly will give these proposals 
the attention  which  they  deserve. 
3.  The following notes relate  to different resolutions concerning the powers and compe-
tence of the Community : 
a)  Resolution  I  (integration  of the E. C. S.C. and the E. D. C.  in  the Community). 
§ 1.  - Adopted by 23  votes to 0. 
§ 2.  - Adopted by 17  votes to 0. 
(1)  Cf.  Part VI  - Conclusions of the Constitutional Committee. Part 1.  -Powers and Competence  of  the  Community 
§§  3  and 4.  - Adopted by 20  votes to 0. 
§ 5.  - Adopted without opposition. 
§ 6,  (i).  - Adopted by 9 votes to 7,  with one abstention. 
§ 6,  (ii).  - The clauses  were voted on separately: 
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- «The  President of the High Authority of the E. C. S. C.  and the  President  of the 
Commissariat  of  the  E. D. C.  will  sit,  by  right,  with  the  European  Executive 
Council ... » 
Adopted by 17 votes to 0, with 2  abstentions. 
- <<  •  •  •  with a  right to vote. » 
Adopted by 13 votes to 5,  with 2  abstentions. 
-.  « • • •  but retaining their  personal  status,  as resulting  from  the  E. C. S. C.  and 
E. D. C.  Treaties,  in  particular from  Articles  24  E. C. S. C.  and  26  E. D. C. » 
Adopted by 16 votes to 2,  with 3  abstentions. 
§ 6,  (iii) .  ...:....  Adopted by 14 votes to 0,  with one abstention. 
The Committee had first  rejected  (by 16 votes to 3, with 2 abstentions) an amendment 
seeking to make the Presidents of the High Authority and of the Commissariat jointly res-
ponsible,  with  the European  Executive Council; the latter would  be liable to be censured 
by a simple majority vote in each ofthe Chambers of the Parliament. It  also rejected by 9 votes 
to  8,  with  3  abstentions,  a  proposal  whereby a  two-thirds majority would  be required to 
enable a  vote of censure to be carried in either of the Chambers (in this case, also, the two 
Presidents would gave shared the responsibility of the European Executive Council). 
The question, as a  whole, is examined in the report in  §§  7 to 9, The principal theories 
confronting one another are discussed in  § 8. 
§ 7.  - Adopted by 16 votes to 0, with one abstention. 
b)  Resolution II (on  the powers and competence of the Community). 
§ 1.  - Adopted by 13  votes to 4,  with 4 abstentions  (cf.  Report  § 33). 
§ 2.  - An amendment seeking the omission  of  § 2 was rejected by 18 votes to 2. 
An  amendment seeking to enlarge  the general objectives and aims of the Community 
. in the sphere of foreign policy was retained for further study after the session of the Assembly. 
One  representative wished  the principles  on  which  the  common  market  (referred  to 
in the 5th sub-paragraph) would be founded to be clearly stated. He mentioned that he had 
more than once strongly emphasised the great importance that he attached to the paragraphs 
of the Resolution  relating to economic  and social powers and competence  (Section  D).  He 
also thought it very desirable that account should be taken in Sectioh A  (general principles), 
of economic and social considerations. 
This representative had made a  previous observation on this point. He had emphasised 
the interdependence of the structures of the Community and the spheres in which it would 
exercise its powers. In his. view, the Community's scope would be very greatly restricted if 
it was to be confined solely to questions of Coal and Steel and Defence. This did not imply 
the advocacy of immediate action in other fields  but that of a  possible  wider integration at 
a  later date.  This idea, he considered,  should govern  the formulation  of the Community's 
general principles.  . 
As a  consequence, the representative in  question  would  have preferred the text to be 
drawn more widely in regard to the economic principles, which are referred to in § 2 in terms 
which he regarded as unduly restrictive ; it should, he considered, lay down the guiding lines 
for  the Community's action regarding the following  matters: 
- Quantitative restrictions, 
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- free  interchange of manpower, 
- provisional  measures,  and measures  calculated to ensure the effective  operation  of 
the market. 
Finally,  the representative esplained that these  ideas regarding a  possible  integration 
in new spheres - ideas which are in conformity with  §  § 21  et seq. of Resolution II - did 
not exclude a possible «auto-extension » of the Community's competence, it being understood 
that this «auto-extension » could only take place within the framework of the Statute, which 
would  have to provide  the necessary safeguards. 
Another  representative maintained that it was  inappropriate for  a  constitutional text 
to contain directives for the Community's line of conduct in economic matters. Having re-
gard to the instability of the situation, methods which, at the present moment, appear the 
best for ensuring the economic progress of Europe might prove to be less suitable after a lapse 
of some years. The Statute should confine itself to laying down some very general principles, 
leaving due freedom  of interpretation to the qualified institutions of the Community. 
The Committee  agreed to re-examine this question after the  Assembly's  session. 
§ 2.  - was adopted by 15  votes to 1,  with 2 abstentions. 
§ 8.  - Adopted  by 23  votes to  0. 
§§  4  and  5.  - .Adopted  without opposition. 
§ 6.  - Several representatives submitted an  amendment  calling  for  an  express  sta-
tement to the effect that the Community would possess, within the scope of its competence, 
the power to enact laws  and to  put them in force. 
This amendment was retained for later consideration by 18 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions. 
A representative  submitted an amendment  calling for  a  mention in this paragraph of 
«federal citizenship >>  in conjunction with the whole problem of the Community's competence 
in regard to the maintainance of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms  ( «federal exe-
cutive procedure >>  ) •  As this question had already been touched upon in various paragraphs 
of the resolutions (Resolution II § 26 and Resolution III § 27), it was agreed by 22 votes to 
0, with  1 abstention, to retain the amendment for subsequent study by the competent Sub-
Committees. 
· § 6  was  adopted by 23  votes to 0. 
§§  7 and  8.  - Adopted without opposition. 
§ 9.  - Several  representatives  submitted  drafting amendments,  which  were  retained 
for subsequent study when the Committee was drafting the Treaty itself. 
§ 9  was adopted without opposition. 
§ 10.  - An  amendment  seeking  to  replace  the.  word  «representation » by the  word 
«legation»  (in  the  French text)  was  reserved  for  subsequent  study. 
§ 10  was adopted without opposition. 
§ 11.  - An  amendment seeking to clarify the procedure for  the conclusion of treaties 
by the Community was  reserved for further study after the Assembly's  session. 
§ 11  was _adopted  without opposition. 
§§ .12  and 18.  - Amendments  were  submitted  with  the  object  of  making  it  clear 
that, if the Community desired. to conclude,  within  the sphere of its competence, an inter-
national agreement  which  might specially affect  one  of the Member  States, the  European 
Executive Council must first  obtain the opinion of the said Member State. Conversely, any 
Member  State wishing  to conclude  an  international agreement  must  keep  the Community 
informed. 
Severals member of the Committee .  expressed general agreement  with the principles of 
the amendments.  Some  of them, however,  pointed out that the effect of the amendments 
would be, especially, to define the permanent regime referred to in § 14 of Resolution H. During 
the transitional regime  the necessity of obtaining the unanimous  approval of the Council Part.l. - Powers  and  Competbnce of the  Community  29 
of National Ministers  (  § 13  of Resolution  II) implied, ipso  facto,  that every Member State 
would  be  consulted.  Other representatives considered that a  more  precise  wording seemed 
to be  required. 
·.  The Committee considered that the amendments inquestion would have to be very care-
fully studied after the Assembly's session  by the competent Sub-Committees, and it agreed 
to draw the special attention of the Assembly  to their principles. 
§§  12  and  13  were  adopted  without opposition. 
§ 14.  - Adopted without opposition.  ' 
§ 14 bis.  - Specialised  Authorities.  A representative. asked  for  the insertion  of a  new 
sub-title dealing with the powers and competence of the Community within the scope of the 
. policy of Specialised Authorities, and specifying that the Community would be required to 
put into effect a policy for the Specialised Authorities invested with a competence of their own 
in the economic, social and cultural spheres and operating under the political control of the 
Community. 
The representative in question pointed out that it would be possible in this way to en-
sure the indispensable decentralisation of the Community's administration, and also,  more 
especially,  to contribute to the success of a policy for Specialised Authorities which all the 
.Member States ot the Council of Europe have supported. It seemed justifiable to hope that, 
when  the creation of  new Specialised Authorities was  undertaken,  the links of association 
which the Community proposed to establish with other European States might be strengthened. 
Some members of  the Committee considered,  however,  that the policy  of  Specialised 
Authorities ought to be developed within the scope of the Council of Europe and not in that 
of the Community ; for otherwise the result might be the creation only of Specialised Autho-
rities limited to the Six countries.  Other representatives expressed  a  fear  that a  clause in 
such  general  terms might imply an inmmediate extension of  the Community's competence 
in every sphere - and that would conflict with the provisions adopted by the Committee. 
On the other hand, some representatives supported the principle of the amendment but 
asked that its wording should be modified in suc.n a way as to avoid, at least in part, some 
of the objections mentioned above. 
The Committee agreed by 15 votes to.  2,  with 2  abstentions,  to  take the amendment 
into consideration with a view to submitting it to careful study after the Assembly's session. 
It calls the Assembly's attention, here and now,  to this important problem. 
§.  15.  - Adopted without opposition. 
§ 16." - An amendment requiring the basic  principles of  the organic  law referred  to 
in the tnird sub -paragraph to be specified in the Statute Itself was reserved for further study 
after the Assembly's session. 
§ 16.  - Adopted without opposition. 
§§  17  to  20.  -Adopted without opposition. 
Section D. - Economic  Powers  and  Competence. 
An amendment seeking the rejection of the whole of Section D was defeated by 18 votes 
to 1,  with 1 abstention. 
§§  21  to  23.  - Adopted  by 19 votes to 0,  with 1  abstention. 
§§  24  and  25.  - An amendment calling for the insertion of the provisions of  the Pro-
tocol referred to in § 25 in the Statute itself, so that the latter would  invest the Community 
with a right  of decision in economic matters, was defeated by 20  votes to 0.  · 
.  Some representatives observed that, though they agreed  in principle with the basis of 
the Protocol, they thought it was inexpedient at the present moment, from a political point 
of view, for that instrument to be drawn up and submitted to the States for ratification at 
the same time as the Statute.  · 
§  § 24  and  25  were adopted by 15 votes to 1, with 4  abstentions. 
§ 26.  - An amendment seeking the omission of the second sub-paragraph of  § 26  was 
rejected by 16 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions. 
§ 26 was adopted by the same 111ajotity. 30  Report of the  Constitutional  Committee 
§ 27  to  29.  - Adopted.  without opposition. 
§ 30.  - An  amendment  seeking  to add  a  supplementary article  providing,  after  the 
tenth year of the Community's existence, a simplified procedure for  the revision of the Cons-
titution, in particular for the clauses referred to in §§ 29 and 30 of Resolution II, was reserved, 
for  study after the Assembly's session. 
§ 30 was  adopted without opposition. 
§ 31.  - Adopted  without opposition. 
§§  32 and  33.  - Adopted.  without opposition. 
§ 34.  - Adopted  without opposition. 
The  Rapporteur considers,  however,  that  the wording  adopted  is  unduly restrictive, 
appreciably more so  than the corresponding provisions in the E. C. S. C.  and E. D. C.  Trea-
ties (Articles 98  E. C. S.D., 129 E. D. C.).  The admission of a new member is, in his view, 
an internal act by the Community, and must be decided  solely by the Community's insti-
tutions, without reference to the States. 
The Rapporteur accordingly suggests  the following  text : 
«The European Executive Council,  with the approval of  the Council of  National Mi-
nisters acting by a unanimous vote will decide what action should be taken on a request for 
admission and will define the conditions for admission. These conditions would be embodied 
in an Additional Act to the Statute, which will be submitted for  approval by the Commu-
nity's Parliament and for ratification by the new Member State, in conformity with the latter's 
constitutional rules. 
« If the, conditions for the admission of the new member would involve .amendments to 
the Community's Statute, such as are referred to in § 30 of Resolution II, the procedure in-
dicated in that paragraph must be followed. 
«The adjustements in the Statute necessitated by the admission of  a  new member, in 
order to regulate : 
(i)  the representation of  the said State in the Community's institutions; 
(ii)  the qualifying coefficients  referred to in Articles  43  and 43 bis  E. D. C., 
are not included in the cases referred to in  § 30 of Resolution  II >l. 
§ 35.  - Adopted  without opposition. 
§ 36.  - The following  observations  were  made  in regard  to  the composition  of  the 
membership; 
The Belgian  and  Netherlands representatives  stated that there was  no  constitutional 
obstacle to the application of the Statute only to the European territories of the kingdoms 
of Belgium  and  the Netherlands.  · 
The Italian representatives pointed out that, as Somaliland was a  country under trus-
teeship,  the question of its possible association with the Community would not arise until 
Somaliland had reached a stage enabling it to determine its own destiny. 
A French repres~ntative observed that the E. C. S.C. and E. D. C.  Treaties only applied 
to the metropolitan territory of France.  He pointed out that certain overseas States or ter-
ritories are united to France by links of very varying kinds. He added that the method by 
which  this French group of  territories - which could not be dissociated from one  another 
- could participate in a European Political Community would depend on the legal structure 
of  the  said  Community. 
c)  Special  Resolution. 
.  It was made clear that §b) of the Resolution did not imply the adoption of uniform postal 
rates, and only had in view the issue of some  identical postage stamps in the Six countries. 
The resolution  was  adopted  without  opposition.  · PART II 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS  OF THE COMMUNITY 
REPORT 
submitted by M. DEROUSSE, Rapporteur. INTRODUCTION 
1.  Resolution III, on the politicalinstitutions of the Community, contains the conclusions 
adopted by the Committee on this question. 
Resolution I also deals with the problem of the institutions ; it defines the position of the 
institutions of the Community and those of the E. C. S.C. and the E. D. C.  during the first 
period of the Community's existence. The institutions of the Community will carry out the 
functions attributed to those of the E. C. S.C. and the E. D. C., and, in co-operation with the 
President of the High Authority of the E. C. S.C. and the President of the Commissariat of 
the E. D. C., will draw up the protocols intended to ensure the gradual integration in the Com-
munity of the two specialized Communities. 
In the first part of this report, M.  BENVENUTI comments on this resolution and sets forth 
the political problem that confronted the Committee in its attempt to ensure that, frqm its 
inception, the Community should  have the necessary unity without prejudicing the  re~mlts 
attained by the E. C. S.C. and E.D. C.  Treaties.  · 
2.  The Committee has endeavoured to define the form of the institutions which will  be 
necessary in order to unite, under a single political authority, and under a single  demo~ratic 
control, the Coal  and Steel Community, which is already established, the European Defence 
Community, the creation of which awaits the approval of the national Parliaments, and those 
other domains to which the competence of the Community may hereafter be extended. 
The impelling idea of the proposals of the Committee resides in the election by universal 
suffrage of a  popular Assembly, in other words, in the participation of the peoples themselves, 
by the direct selection of their representatives, in the construction and direction of a  united 
Europe, the scale of whose development has hitherto been mostly determined by the Govern-
ments. 
3.  These conclusions are incomplete and their drafting requires revision. The Committee 
is, however, convinced that the general principles by which it has beeninspired, and to which 
it has sought to give practical form,  are those which political considerations require in the 
construction  of a  European  Political  Community. 
These  principles  are the following : 
- to establish European political institutions of a  democratic character ; 
-to  ensure1 step by  step, the unity ot the Political Community, resulting from the creation 
of these  institutions,  with  the  already organized  Communities  (Coal  and  Steel,  Defepce) ; 
- to provide for the functioning and development of the Community thus constituted, 
. in co-operation with other free  nations. 
TUE  :POLITICAL  INSTITUTIONS  OF  THE  COMMUNI'J.'Y 
4.  The Committee proposes  to create : 
A Parliament; 
An executive organization ; 
An  economic and social Council. 
A.  - Parliament of the  Community. 
a)  The  Peop es'  Chamber. 
5.  The importance attached by the Committee to the election by direct universal suffrage 
of the members of the Peoples' Chamber has already been stressed. 
The desirability of a  transitional system, the effect of which would be to postpone the 
election  of the Peoples'  Chamber by universal suffrage,  was  considered,  but this idea  was 
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Certain  representatives  contended that public  opinion  was  not  yet  ripe  for  European 
elections, that there were no European parties or programmes. Against this, it was argued that 
the same situation had existed when the Member States first  made their appeal to universal 
suffrage and that the same difficulties would  always recur at the outset, no matter what date 
were chosen for the first European elections. It was further pointed out that the abandonment 
of elections by direct suffrage would deprive the plan for a Political Community of its substance 
and its driving power.  Consequently, it was  observed, at the very moment when  the ratifi-
cation of the Treaty instituting the European  Defence  Community  was  encountering great 
difficulties in certain countries, one would be excluding the possibility of improving that Treaty 
and of putting the European army under the control of a  popular assembly. 
6.  The distribution of seats in the Peoples' Chamber (sixty, three each for France, Germany, 
and Italy, thirty each for Belgium and the Netherlands, twelve for  Luxembourg), is not, of 
course,  proportionate to the respective  populations of the  Member  States. The  Committee 
considered that the democratic character and the balance of the Community would be better 
ensured if the larger countries were  required to make some  sacrific~ in the matter of repre-
sentation.  The  qualification  selected is  the same  as  that adopted for the Assembly of the 
E. D.C. 
The Committee had also regard for other requirements of a political and technical nature. 
It considered that the Peoples' Chamber should have sufficient members to ensure adequate 
representation of the political parties of the six States, and the smooth working of its committees. 
7.  With regard to the problem of electoral law, the Committee confined itself to laying 
down  the following  principles : 
- Each Country shall be  free  decide  to whether the voting for  the European elections 
is  compulsory ; 
'--'- electoral disputes shall be submitted· to the Peoples' Chamber itself ; 
-- each deputy shall represent the Community as a  whole ; 
--voting by direction shall not be allowed. 
It was  suggested  that after the  first elections  the task of drawing  up regulations for 
subsequent  European  elections  should  be entrusted to the Comip.unity  itself. 
With regard to the first election, four proposals have been submitted, and will be found 
in  the  Appendium to this part of the Report. 
b)  Senate. 
8.  The establishment of a  second Chamber would guarantee to the Community a  fuller 
degree of parliamentary control ; it would also make it possible to establish a liaison between 
the  European  Parliament, the national parliaments, and the Consultative  Assembly  of the 
Council of Europe. 
The second Chamber represents the States. The notion that it might take the form of a 
mere Council of national Ministers was definitely ruled out. The Committee was in favour of 
a second Chamber having a parliamentary character in conformity with the traditions of the 
Member  States. This will  ensure that all possible  developments of the Community  will  be 
based on  the European  Parliaments. 
For the same reason,  the Committee  decided  against  parity of representation  for  the 
individual States, voting by substitutes and collective voting. 
The distribution of seats in the Senate is the same as that in our Assembly. 
B. - The  executive  power. 
9. The structure of the executive power proposed by the Committee will inevitably appear 
complicated, especially the organization envisaged for  the initial period of the Community's 
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The Committee is aware of the difficulties inherent in the proposed solution: but it took 
the view that  a  theoretically  perfect  solution  would be less desirable than one which made 
allowance for political realities, that is to say, for the structure and the historical background 
of the Member States ; the need for the Community to further a closer co-operation not only 
among Member States, but among all the Western democracies ; and the efforts already made 
by the Member States in constituting the E. C. S.C. and in signing the E. D. C.  Treaty. 
10. The Executive Organization of the Community shall comprise the European Executive 
Council and the Council of National Ministers.  These two Councils  will meet periodically in 
a  Conference with the representatives of the  Associated States. 
11.  The European Executive Council shall be entrusted with the g~neral direction of the 
Community. With regard to its composition and its method of appointment, various proposals 
have  been  submitted and  referred to the Assembly  without any previous decision  by the 
Committee. 
Paragraph  17,  which  stipulates that the President  of the European Executive. Council 
shall be elected by a two-thirds majority of the Council of National Ministers,  was inspired 
by the wish to adopt the procedure best calculated to result in the election of a  sufficiently 
authoritative  figure.  Some  representatives  consider,  however,  that  in  order to  stress  the 
political implications of the choice of a President, he should be elected by the Peoples' Chamber. 
12.  The  system  proposed  by the  Committee  for  establishing  the responsibility of the 
European Executive Council is a parliamentary system which, in conformity with article 38 
of the Treaty instituting the European Defence Community, and the Luxembourg Resolution, 
is based on the separation of powers. 
The Committe did not adopt a system such as that of Switzerland, in spite of the advan-
tages of the stability which it confers on the Executive, because the Community's Parliament 
does  not possess  - particularly in budgetary matters - sufficient  powers and competence 
to enable it to counterbalance an Executive Council which, though of a collegiate form, occupies 
a presidential position. Furthermore, the parliamentary system is that adopted by the Member 
States, and the Committee wished to make the political institutions of the European Community 
conform to the constitutional principles ·which they themselves are applying, 
13. The Committee recognised that in creating a  supranational European Political Com-
munity the application of the principle of separation of powers must take account of a twofold 
necessity. For, while creating institutions which would guarantee a satisfactory balance between 
the common and national interests of the Member States it was necessary to set up a European 
Political Authority, which has not yet come into being, whereas the separation of powers had, 
from a  historical point of view,  been introduced in the Member States in order to curb an 
Executive which had been created some time previously and whose powers were more extensive 
than those of the national governments of those days. 
14.  The European Executive Council shall take its decisions in virtue of an  «approval » 
issued by the Council of National Ministers. In stipulating the issue of this «approval», the 
intention was not to imply that it would be obligatory in every case. The possibility of drawing 
up a list of matters regarding which the approval of the Council of Ministers must necessarily 
be obtained, is a  question for  subsequent consideration. 
The rule laid down in paragraph 19 is in no way prejudicial to j:he corresponding provisions 
offhe E. C. S.C. and E. D.C. Treaties, nor to the right enjoyed by the Council of Ministers of 
delegating to the European Executive Council general powers in regard to day  .. to-day problems 
of administration. The Executive Council would otherwise be unable to take necessary action 
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The Committee considers it of great importance that in issuing an « approval » the Com-
mittee of National  Ministers  shall not be required to achieve  unanimity, except in certain 
special and strictly defined  cases.  · 
The members of the European Executive Council will take part in the discussions of the 
Council of National Ministers when the latter is  exercising its power of decision in subjects 
covered by the E. C. S.C. and E. D. C. Treaties, and in the manner stipulated in those Treaties. 
15.  The Conference to be held periodically by the European Executive Council, the Com-
mittee of National Ministers, and the representatives of the Associated States, was first of all 
conceived as a  «practice »,  and not as an organ of the Community in the strict sense of the 
term. However, the Committee attaches so  much importance to this  cc practice>> that it was 
led to propose that the Conference should be mentioned in the Community's Statute, so  as 
to give it an institutional character. 
16.  The European Executive Council  will lay down the general policy for  the existing 
and future European specialized authorities. This competence with which the European Exe-
cutive Council is endowed will allow of the creation of a  fairly decentralized administrative 
organization and avoid a multiplicity of organs acting independently one of the other. 
Administration of the  Community. 
17.  The Community's administration will, in principle, be delegated to the national admin-
istrations. The administration of defence constitutes an exception. The Community is, however, 
entitled to establish an administration of its own ifthe Parliament authorizes it to do so, and 
is empowered to supervise the implementation by the national administrations of any measures 
it may decide. 
Ruman Rights and Fundamental  Freedoms. 
18.  The  maintenance in  Member  States of a  democratic  regime,  respecting individual 
freedom,  is an indispensable condition for  the existence and development of the European 
Political Community. · 
The Member States must apply the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome in 1950. The European Executive 
Council may have recourse, like a  Member State, to the judicial mechanism set up by that 
Convention. The European Executive Council shall also be entitled to afford assistance to a 
Member  State, at the latter's request,  in order to  uphold democratic institutions and fun-
damental freedoms within its territory. 
C.  ~  The  Economic and  Social Council. 
19.  To enable the European Executive Council to act in close liaison with those concerned 
with  social  and  economic  matters  in  the  Community, the Committee has stipulated that 
this Council shall be assisted by an Economic and Social Council acting in an advisory capacity. 
D. ~  Links between the European Political Community and the free world. 
20. The establishment,of the European Political Community should result in binding the 
Member States and the other democratic nations in a  closer and mote intimate contact. In 
working out the provisions which will enable that result to be attained; the Committee bote 
in mind the different situations which must be taken into account as regards the non-member 
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cases  than  in  others.· Accordingly,  the  Committee  has  envisaged,  in  the first  place,  the 
direct  association  of  non-member  States  with  the  Community and,  secondly, the  co-ope-
ration of those States with the Community by means of liaisons with the Council of Europe. 
The problem of liaisons  between the Community and non-member States is dealt  with 
in the sections of this report which were drafted by MM. SEMLER and WIGNY. However, certain 
aspec~s of these problems are more particularly related to the institutions of the Community. 
The Committee suggests that the treaties of Association which the Community is entitled to 
conclude shall be negotiated by the European Executive Council. They will come into force after 
ratification by the Community's Parliament. The treaties ·of Association may provide for  the 
admission of representatives of the Associated States into the organs of the Community. They 
will lay down the rights and obligations of these representatives in· the Parliament or other 
institutions of the Community. 
Furthermore, as has already been  mentioned, representatives of  the  Associated States 
will meet periodically in conference with the European Executive Council a.nd the Committee 
of National Ministers. 
Liaison with the Council of Europe shall be effected chiefly by the Senate, but  also by the 
Peoples' Chamber and the Economic and Social Council. 
The Committee recommends that the members of the Senate shall at the same time be 
representatives in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
As regards the Economic and Social Council, the Committee proposes that if the Council 
of Europe should, in its turn, constitute an Economic and Social Council, the latter shall absorb 
the Community's  Economic  and Social  Council,  it being understood that, if  required,  the 
opinion of the Economic and Social Council of the Council of Europe may be obtained in a 
dual form ; an opinion by the majority of the Fifteen and an opinion by a majority of the Six. 38  Report  of the  Constitutional  Committee  -----------------------------
ANNEX 
DISCUSSIONS  IN  COMMITTEE 
1.  At its session, 23-27  October 1952, the Constitutional Committee set up a Sub-Com-
mittee on Political Institutions. Its Chairman was M.  TEITGEN  and it appointed MM.  AzARA 
et  DEHO-DSSE  as  its Rapporteurs. 
The Sub-Committee  on:  Political Institutions held  5  meetings.  In the first  part of  its 
proceedings it engaged  in a  comprehensive discussion of the different questions which had 
been referred to it, on the basis of notes drawn up by several of its members. The conclusions 
which it arrived at were subsequently reconsidered by the Sud-Committee at the second rea-
ding. 
The Sub-Committee benefited,  in  particular, by studies  or memoranda submitted  by 
MM.  AzARA,  von BRENTANO,  BRUINS  SLOT,  DEROUSSE,  van der  GoEs  van NATERS,  von 
MERKATZ,  TEITGEN  and  WIG NY. 
The plenary Committee, to which  the Sub-Committee's report was  submitted, selected 
those parts of it which concerned the integration of  the E. C. S.C. and  the E. D. C.  in the 
Community with a  view to examining them in conjuction with the proposals  on the same 
question formulated by the Sub-Committee on Powers and Competence.  Its conclusions on 
this  point  constitute  Resolution  I.  The  general  problem  of  the  Community's  political 
institutions  is  dealt with in Resolution III  (1). 
The active assistance of all the members of the Committee has greatly facilitated  the 
task of the Rapporteur, who desires to express his thanks to all his colleagues, and in parti-
cular to M.  von BRENTANO,  President of the Committee, and to M.  TEITGEN,  Chairman of 
the Sub-Committee on Political  Institutions. 
2.  Details of the votes adopted on Resolution I  (integration of the E. C. S. C.  and the 
E. D. C.  in the Community) will  be  found  in  the Appendix  to M.  BENVENUTI's  report on 
the Powers and Competence of the Community (PART I  of the Constitutional Committee's 
report). Details of the votes on Resolution III are given below. 
Resolution  III (Political  Institutions of  the Community). 
§  1.  - An amendment seeking to introduce elections by a system in two stages during 
a transitional period was rejected by 13 votes to 5,  with one abstention. 
- was  adopted by 17 votes to 0. 
§ 2.  - The Committee discussed the question of the representation of the Saar in the 
Community's Parliament. It considered that it would be essential, at a suitable moment, to 
undertake a  careful examination of the problem and that it would  no doubt be necessary 
to settle it before the Community's Statute was definitively adopted by the States. 
It was  explained  that  the  number  of  seats  which  it was  proposed  to  allot to each 
country  un  no  way  prejudged the  question of  the participation of overseas territories in 
the Community. It would be for each country to decide,  where  necessary, the methods by 
which  the everseas territories would  be represented in the Peoples' Chamber and  to make 
a suitable allocation of the seats ar its disposal, with that object in view. 
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An amendment  was  submitted seeking  to allocate  the seats to the different  Member 
States in the proportions laid down in the E. D. C,  Treaty  ..  Some representatives opposed 
this view on the ground that such an allocation would be unduly weighter and might isolate 
the Peoples'  Chamber from  political realities.  Other representatives  thought it was  unde-
sirable that seats should be allocated in the same proportions as  in the Peoples'  Chamber 
and in the Senate. 
Tpe amendmentwas adopted by 15  votes to 0,  with 6 abstentions. 
§ 2,  thus amended, was  adopted  by the same number of votes. 
The  Question  of the  Electoral  Law. 
Proposals regarding the electoral system were submitted by the Sub-Committee on Po-
litical  Institutions and by some members of  the Committee.  . 
The Committee agreed not to take any decision on this question and to submit tlie whole 
of  the proposals that were before it to the Assembly. 
As regards  the  first  election,  the following  proposals were  submitted : 
1st  proposal. 
The first  election would be conducted according to the following  rules: 
- ;Each  country would  constitute  a  single  constituency. 
__:_  In each country, the seats to filled  would  be allotted by ballot, with proportional 
representation and the possibility of combining lists. The details of the latter process would 
be settled in each country by a  national law. 
2nd proposal 
The  first election would be conducted according to the following rules : 
- Each country would form a  single constituency. 
- The problems concerning electoral qualifications, the electoral list, the organisation 
of  the ballot and the counting of the votes, and all other electoral problems not settled 
by the Statute would  be settled in each country in accordance  with domestic law. 
3rd  proposal 
The  first  election  would  be  conducted  according  to  the following  rules : 
- Each country would form a  single constituency. 
- The election would be carried out by a  uninominal majority vote,  with two ballots, 
an absolute majority being requisite at the first  ballot, and a  majority of the votes 
cast being sufficient at the second ballot. 
- The problems concerning electoral qualifications, the electoral list,  the organisation 
of the ballot and the counting of votes and all other electoral problems not settled 
by the Statute, would be settled in each country in accordance  with domestic  law. 
4th  proposal 
The first election would be conducted according to the following rules : 
- Each country would be divided into constituencies, each of which would return one 
representative. 
- The problems concerning electoral qualifications, the electoral list, the organisation 
of the ballot and the counting of votes and all other problems not settled by the Sta-
tute would  be settled in each country in accordance with domestic law. 
As regards  the  subsequent electoral  regime, the following proposal was submitted: 
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§§  3 to  6.  - Adopted without opposition. 
Questions  concerning  incompatibilities and  multiplications of  office. 
Proposals were submitted by the Sub-Committee on Political Institutions and by some 
members of the Committee. It was agreed that the Committee would further study all these 
questions after the Assembly's session. 
A (b)  (Senate) 
An amendment seeking to omit the whole of Section I, B, and providing that the duties 
assigned to the Senate would be exercised, at any rate at the beginning of the Community's 
existence, by a Council of National Ministers, was rejected by 14 votes to 4, with one abstention. 
§ 7.  - Separate votes were  taken on the different clauses. 
- <<The  Senate  represents  the  States ». 
An  amendment seeking to omit this clause  was rejected. 
The clause was  adopted  by 18 votes to 0. 
- « It is the second  Chamber of the  Parliament >>. 
Adopted  by 18 votes to 0. 
- <<It has the same powers and the same rights as the Peoples' Chamber». 
Adopted  by 16  votes to 0,  with 2 abstentions. 
The last two clauses were adopted in the text of an amendment to the report of the Sub-
Committee on  Political  Institutions. 
It was made clear -this  clarification having the force  of an interpretative declaration 
in regard to §§  7 et seq. -that if the Statute were subsequently revised, the right of revision 
would extend to the provisions concerning the composition of the Senate, in the same way 
as to any other provisions. 
§ 8.  - Adopted  by 17  votes to  0,  with one  abstention. 
§ 9.  - An amendment seeking to exclude the possibility, which was provided for in the 
original text, of the members of the Senate being appointed, by mutual agreement, by the 
National Parliaments and governments, was  adopted. 
§ 9.  - As  thus amended, was adopted without  opposition. 
§ 10.  - An  amendment, in accordance with which all the States would be allowed the 
same number of seats in the Senate, was rejected by 12 votes to 1, with 2 abstentions. 
§ 10 was adopted  by 12 votes to 1,  with 2 abstentions. 
§ 11.  - Adopted  without opposition. 
§ 12.  - An amendment seeking to omit sub-paragraphs (b)  to (f),  and to replace them 
by a  clause providing for regular joint meetings of the representatives of the Community's 
institutions and those  of the Associated  State was  withdrawn, it being understood that it 
would  be referred to in the report. 
An amendment seeking to enable observers of third States, members of the Council of 
Europe, admitted to the Peoples' Chamber, to speak on the invitation of the President- as 
already provided in the case of observers in the Senate-- was rejected by 12 votes to 4. 
§ 12 was adopted  by 16 votes to 0. 
Legislative  procedure. 
·  An  amendment, seeking to introduce a  new Section  defining the legislative procedure 
(right of initiative in regard to legislation, procedure for the adoption and promulgation of 
laws),  was  reserved for  further  study after the Assembly's session.  · Part 2.  - Political.institutions  of the ·Community  41 
§ 18.  - Adopted by 15  to 0,  with one abstention. 
§ 14.  - An amendment seeking to eliminate the Council of National Ministers and the 
Conference .  with the ·representatives of the Associat~d States was  reserved. 
§ 14 was adoptet/, by 15 votes to 0. 
§§  15  and 16.  - Adopted without opposition. 
§ 17. -It  was agreed to refer  § 17 to the Assembly, without taking any decision about 
it, together with the other proposals submitted to the Committee by some  of its members. 
The proposals in question will be found in a note to § 17 of Resolution III (cf.  Part VI, Con-
clusions  of the Constitutional Committee). 
§ 18.  - Separate votes were taken on  the different clauses. 
- «Subject to the reservation in § 6, ii  of the resolution on theintegration of the E. C. S. C. 
and the E. D. C. in the Community, the European  Executive Council is collectively responsible 
to  the Parliament  of the Community ». 
Adopted by 13 votes to 2. 
-- «  The members of the European Executive Council  must resign office  in case of the 
adoption by either of the Chambers, by a  majority of the votes cast, of a  motion of censure 
in regard to them JJ. 
An amendment providing that a motion of censure could only be carried by a  two~thirds 
majority was rejected by 9 votes to  8,  with 3 abstentions. 
An  amendment seeking to introduce a. prbcedure of «constructive censure JJ,  similar to 
that provided in the Fundamental Law of the German  Federal Republic,  was reserved for 
study after the Assembly's  session. 
The second part of§ 18 was  adopted, it being understood that the Assembly's attention 
would likewise be drawn to the first amendment (requirement of a two-thirds majority for the 
adoption  of a  motion  of censure). 
§ 19.  - An  amendment whereby the Council of National Ministers would only be in-
vested with power to issue Opinions, was rejected. 
An amendment seeking to limit the requirement of an «approval JJ  (avis conforme) by the 
Council of National Ministers solely to the decisions of the European Executive Council, and 
to make it dear that the corresponding provisions of the E. C. S.C. and E. D: C.  Treaties are 
not affected  by the text of the paragraph, was adopted without opposition. 
§ 19;  as thus amended, was  adopted without opposition, with one abstention. 
§ 20.  - Adopted without opposition. 
§ 21.  - Adopted  without  opposition. 
·  § 22.  ~  An amendment seeking to replace the «approval ))  of the Council of National 
Ministers by simple consultations, at regular intervals, with the European Executive Council 
was reserved for study after the Assembly's session. 
§ 22  was  adopted  without opposition . 
§§  23 and 24. -An amendment seeking to make the laws adopted by the Parliament 
subject to the <<approval  >J  (by  a  simple majority) of the Council of National  Ministers was 
rejected. 
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§ 25.  - An amendment  laying down that the Community's  administration could  be 
provided for by the creation, with that object, of decentralised and autonomous Specialised 
Authorities,  which  would,  however,  be  subordinated to the Community  and  placed  under 
its control, was reserved for study after the Assembly's session. 
An amendment seeking to do away with the « approval ))  of the Council of National Mi-
nisters, required under the last sub-paragraph of § 25, was reserved for study after the Assem-
bly's session.  · 
§ 25  was  adopted  without opposition. 
§ 26.  - Adopted  without opposition. 
§ 27.  - An  amendment  seeking to give the Community an extensive right of  inter-
vention was  reserved  for  study after the Assembly's session. 
§ 27  was  adopted  without opposition. 
§ 28.  - Adopted  without opposition. 
It was  agreed to draw the Assembly's attention to some passages in a note on the Eco-
nomic  an~ Social Council drawn up by M.  DEROUSSE,  the Rapporteur  (cf.  above). 
§ 29.  - Adopted  without opposition. 
·~·, 
3.  Note  on  the  composition,  operation and  competence  of  the  Economic  and  Social  Council. 
a)  The Economic and Social  Council  of  the Community  must be organised  in such  a 
way as to ensure an effective representation of the great workers and employers  associations. 
In this connection it will no doubt be fitting to make room, separately, for· the interna-
tional associations - so far as they exist - which are common to  the Six countries. 
The Assembly will also have to consider how far it will be desirable to organise the repre-
sentation of  the middle classes  and  the consumers,  as  such ;  this may be thought difficult 
on the plane of the Community and may also encounter complications within certain countries. 
Similarly;  the  question  will  arise  whether  - following the example of the I. L. 0. -
the Economic and Social Council of  the Community  should  include  representatives  of  the 
governments (1). 
The structure of  the Council will  naturally depend on the answer given to the above 
questions.  · 
In any case, it seems desirable not to give that body too large a  membership. 
The number of the members must however be calculated in such a way as to ensure the 
inclusion of nationals of each ofthe Six countries in the Council, in respect of each of the cate-
gories of interests which  finally be adopted. It does not, on the other hand, seem necessary 
to go further and to lay specifying the number for each State, as in the case of the Peoples' 
Chamber and the Senate. 
Lastly, the Assembly will probably consider that, so  far as it is concerned, it need only 
have regard to general indications, leaving the adjustment of all details concerning the Coun-
cil to the institution which is best qualified in this respect i. e, the European Executive Council. 
The task that we  are considering falls,  indeed, within the  normal scope of the executive 
power properly so  called. 
b)  If one accepts the above as a starting p:lint there is no difficulty in agreeing that it 
will fall to the Economic and Social Council itself, with the approval of the European Exe-
(1)  At is common knowledge that the institution of the same name in the United Nations  con-
sists solely of governmental delegates. It  seems right to point out that the Council we are now considering 
is not of that character (it is not a  diplomatic institution). Besides, the composition of the Economic 
and Social Council of the U.  N. has been sharply criticised, on that very ground. Part 2.  ~  Political institutions  of  the  Community  43 
cutive Council, to frame the regulations by which it will provide for the detailed discharge 
of its functions : the election of its Bureau, the numbers and frequency of its sessions  and 
the meassures to be taken to comply with urgent requests for Opinions, etc. • . .  · 
c)  It would be going too far to empower the Economic and Social Council to take under 
consideration, automatically, every measure which the Community's Parliament or the Euro-
pean Executive Council may be contemplating in the economic  and  social sphere. Such  a 
procedure would only result in encumbering and delaying the operation of the general ma-
chinery. 
The rule would rather be that each of the two Chambers and each of the elements of the 
executive  organisation, may,  when it sees  fit,  solicit an Opinion from  the Council  on  any 
measure of the Community which wight vrovoke reactions on the economic  or social plane. 
Each of the  above-mentioned  institutions should also be entitled to allow the Council 
a time-limit for its answer. This time-limit might be very short in certain cases,  and after 
its expiry the Opinion would of course no longer be receivable. 
As is fitting for the Council, all the Opinions it delibers must be given appropriate  publi-
city. 
It  will also fall to the Assembly to say whether, in addition to giving the Council compe-
tence« to issue Opinions)), it also favours the idea of allowing it a right of initiative in making 
recommendations to the Parliament or to the European Executive Council. The answer must 
be in the affirmative, in the Rapporteur's view, it if is desired to enable the Council, whose 
powers are on such a modest scale, to take really constructive action within the scope of the 
Community's  economic  and  social  policy. 
d)  The creation of the Economic and Social Council must in no way prejudice the exis-
tence or the competence of the Consultative Committee of the E. C. S.C., for its existence and 
competence  provide  their  own  justification. 
Nevertheless, the European Executive Council, in agreement with the High Authority, 
should  take into consideration as  early as  possible the regulation of  the relations between 
the Council and the Committee on the basis of  mutual co-operation. PART III 
JUDICIAL  INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY 
REPORT 
submitted by M.  von MERKATZ,  Rapporteur SECTION I· 
The Committee examined, in the first place, the question of the fundamental nature and 
the composition of the Court of Justice of the Community. 
In  making  this examination, it had to take account of the following facts: 
- The  European  Coal-·and-Steel  Community,  based on  a  treaty which  was  the result 
of prolonged and careful studies, possesses a  tribunal adapted to the particular aims 
of the  E. C. S.C.  . 
- The European Defence  Community accepted this Court,  (which  will  adapt itself to 
the additional requirements). and adopted it as its own. 
The  two  Communities,  the  E. C. S.C. and the  E. D. C.,  thus  already possess  a  single 
judicial organisation. It seemed necessary and desirable to invest this Court of Justice with 
the jurisdiction of the Community. The essential identity in the characters and aims of the 
Communities, the E. C. S.C. and the E. D. C.,  makes it possible to maintain a  single Court 
of Justice. The adaptation of the E. C. S.C. Court to the requirements of  the E. D. C.  was a 
more difficult task than its adaptation to the requirements of the European Political Community 
is likely· to prove. As  the problem of the formet adaptation has been solved, one is  justified 
n believing that the latter adaptation can likewise be achieved. 
SECTION  II 
2.  The Committee had to consider the question raised by Recommendation No  36  (1952) 
of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, and also by the statement of the Rap-
porteur of the Comittee on Legal and Administrative Questions of  the Consultative Assembly 
of the Council of Europe  (cf. doc.  A S  (4)  23). 
The Rapporteur of the said Committee had said that it was desirable that the European 
Court of Justice, which was to be created under the auspices of the Council of Europe, should 
exercise the functions of a Court of J ustiee for the specialised Communities and for the Com-
munity. 
3.  The Committee took the view that this idea was impracticable, for the following reasons: 
a)  The organisational work1 on the  supranational plane, which the Six States have already 
· undertaken and in part accomplished is leading towards the formation of a  Community whose 
aims can only be attained if its constitutional structure is autonomous, in other words, if all 
the institutions taking part in the· construction of this Community are at the same time insti-
tutions of the Community and are adapted to its requirements. 
The theoretical and pratical conditions of the duties of the judges in the framework of 
communities as they were  at first  envisaged, or realised in practice,  by the Six States, are 
fundamentally different from the conditions for the work of a Court of  Justice which is required 
to function  on the plane of the Council of Europe. 
The nature of an institution of this latter kind is very  clearly revealed by the direct state-
ment that, thanks to the creation of a European Court of Justice, the Council of Europe would 
henceforth have at its disposal, in addition to its «legislative>> element and its «executive >J 
element, also a  third sort of element, i. e. a  judicial institu,tion. This Court must necessarily 
reflect, in its organisation, the character of an organ of co-otilination which is possessed by the 
Council of Europe.  ·  . 
In view of its duties - and  these must find expression in the nature of its competences 
-the  Court of Justice is, in some sort, a« domestic >JCourt, established in a new setting, since 
it is the Court of Justice of a new  supranational Community, to whieh rights of sovereignty 
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b)  That is apparent in the fundamental conception of the Court of the Specialised Com-
munities, a conception which has governed the wording of the various provisions of their statute, 
and which shows that, in a  possible merger with the Court of the Council of Europe, as has 
been projected, this regime,  which is indispensable for the functioning of the E. C. S.C. and 
the E. D. C.,  could not be maintained. 
Having regard to the supra-national nature of the Communities of Coal and Steel and 
Defence (Communities which possess in part the character of a federal State), the Court appears 
almost exclusively as a  sort offederal tribunal and not as an international Court of Justice. 
It  is only in Articles 42 and 89 E. C. S.C. and in Articles 63 and 65 E. D. C.  that we  find 
provisions regarding functions related to international law. And these competences only occupy 
a secondary position, because the disputes in question would, in ordinary cases, having regard 
to their connection with the Treaty, .  be decided  within the framework of constitutional do-
mestic justice, so that there only remain actions of a sort which have to be determined in virtue 
of a compromissory clause contained in public-law agreements concluded by the Communities 
(Article 42 of the E. C. S.C. Treaty and Article 63 of the E. D. C.  Treaty). 
c)  Moreover,  the list  of the different  functions  and competences  assigned on  the  basis 
of this conception shows that they could not be exercised by a Court of Justice of the Council 
of Europe, i. e. by an international Tribunal of the usual kind. 
4.  The Court has, in the first  place, a general competence for upholding the rule of law 
in the interpretation and application of the implementing regulations of the Treaties (Articles 
31  E. C. S.C. and Article 51  E. D. C.). Jn pursuance of Article 84 E. C. S.C. and Article 122 
E. D. C., this general clause also covers the annexed provisions, so  that  the  Court  is  equally 
competent, for  example, for  the interpretation and application of the Protocol on privileges 
and immunities  (cf.  Article  16  of  the  Protocol on  privileges and immunities  of the  E. C. 
S.C. Treaty, and Article  13  of the corresponding Draft of  the Legal.Sub-committee of the 
Interim Committee of the E. D. C.) and for the interpretation and application of the Convention 
concerning the Status of the European Defence Forces (cf.  Article 47 of the Convention). 
The different matters in respect of which the Court has jurisdiction to settle disputes are 
enumerated in  Resolution  IV,  §  2. 
In addition to these duties, there will be others derived from the Statute of the Community. 
It  need hardly be said that the assignment of new duties will necessitate an adaptation of the 
rules of procedure and of the provisions concerning the judicial organisation. 
5.  To sum up, having regard to the number and nature of these attributes of the Court, 
it seems impossible to transfer them to the Court of Justice of an international organisation, 
created according to traditional international law.  Moreover, the Court, as the supreme ins-
tance of the Community, would only constitute one element of the European Judicial orga-
nisation, which would also comprise lower courts (cf. art. 53  E. D. C., and especially art. 12, 
13,  22 and 30 of the Judicial Protocol); and, if this supreme instance is dispensed with, the 
Courts of lower instance will likewise have to be abandoned. The arrangements made in regard 
to this infrastructure will also determine the extent to which the Court itself will be confined 
to the exercise of powers of cassation or revision. 
All these separate competences are exercised on the principle of the unity of the juris-
diction. This unity is  not based solely on considerations of principle,  (for  instance,  on the 
desire of the judicial authority to secure, by means of that unity, the strong position to which 
it aspires as the protector of the law), but also  on the fact that it is difficult, in practice, to 
make a  clear distinction between different matters on the basis of general criteria. 
The Court must, therefore,  decide on all  disputes, no  matter under which Treaty they 
may have arisen. It is only within the Court that the customary separation is made between 
the Court, in plenary session, and the Divisions, but this separation is affected, not according 
as the questions arose under the E. D. C.  or the E. C. S.C., but having regard solely to the 
legal classification of the disputes ; it follows that matters which are dealt with both in the 
E. C. S.C. and E. D. C.  Treaties. can be adjudicated in the same Division.  For that reason, 
when the Court was designed, provision was made for the constitution of separate Divisions 
for  administrative, civil and penal questions. Part  3.  - Judicial  institutions of  the. Community  49 
SECTION III 
The-::sub-Committee  next  dealt  with the  problem  of  the Court's composition,  having 
regard to the different duties which it has to perform. As regards the subdivision of cases into 
administrative, civil and penal actions, the Committee unanimously agreed that it might be 
well simply to adopt the method of subdivision chosen for the Court of the E. C. S. C.  and 
the E. D. C.  However, it hesitated to express an opinion  on that point because the extent 
of the legalprotection to be afforded to the Community has not yet been  determined. 
In regard to constitutional disputes, these will have to be decided by a special Division, 
consisting of the President of the Court and the Presidents of the Divisions. 
7.  Disputes  relating to international law,  which  might  arise  between  the Community 
and the Associated States, would impose an entirely new kind of task on the Court. Here a 
grave problem arises, involving a question of principle which has to be elucidated. It may be 
stated as follows:  Is it really desirable that the International Court of Justice at the Hague 
should be entirely shut out from the system of legal protection set up by the Community ? 
To exclude it might be to risk a loss of contact in questions involving international law with 
the legal evolution of which the Court at the Hague is  the centre. 
Be that as it may, the Committee considers that the Court of Justice, as composed when 
dealing with constitutional disputes, should be constituted as an arbitral tribunal and rein-
forced by judges appointed by the third State, or States. 
In that connection the following  two problems arise : 
1)  Should two distinct  methods of settling disputes between  the Community and the 
Associated States be provided, viz. a truly judicial procedure and an arbitral procedure ? 
2)  By what  method should  States not  belonging to the Community, appoint  judges ? 
The Committee decided  that these questions could  not be answered,  in principle and 
a priori, but that the answer to them must be given in the Association Agreement, or perhaps 
in some other special agreement concerning  the  judicial or arbitral settlement of disputes 
between third States and  the Community.  In any case,  the Committee thinks it desirable 
to draw attention at once to an important point : every effort must be made to avoid any-
thing of an arbitrary description in the method of appointing judges by third States (Asso-
ciated States). The Committee wondered whether it might not be proposed that, the occupants 
of certain high judicial posts would be required, ex officio, to discharge the duties of supple-
mentary judges. 
SECTION IV 
8.  The Committee also  examined  another question : could the Community not become 
entitled to appear in proceedings before the Court of Justice at the Hague in case of  disputes 
between itself and third States (with which no special treaty has been  concluded) or, again, 
in case of disputes arising between Member States of the Community and third States, and 
directly affecting  the Community,  as  such ? 
9.  Another special question arises in connection with the whole problem which has just 
been discussed : what will be the relations between the Court of the Community and the judi-
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The Committee considers that the protection of human rights should be entrusted to the 
organisms provided by the Rome Convention, subject to the following  rules: 
The Rome Convention will become an integral part of the Community's Statute. The Mem-
ber States will be required to undertake, within a time-limit to be specified, to make the decla-
ration laid down  in Article 46  of  the Rome Convention. In addition, the Community itself 
will be required to accede to the Convention on Human Rights. 
However,  the  Committee  wondered  whether  a  dispute,  concerning  internal  affairs  of 
the Community but having the appearance of a suit relating to human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, could be submitted to a tribunal extraneous to the Community, for such a course 
might, in some cases, disturb the legal unity of the Community. With a view to excluding 
such  a  possibility,  it formulated  the following  provisions : 
Should one of the Member States desire to institute proceedings against the Community 
under the Rome Convention, the Court would have jurisdiction ; its decision would be defi-
nitive. Should one of the Member States desire to institute proceedings against another Member 
State under the Rome Convention, the Community's Court should be seised, in the first ins-
tance. Should the Court consider that the case is that of a dispute arising from the relations 
between two Member States, as such, its decision would also be definitive. If that is not the 
case,  the Court must renounce jurisdiction. The parties can then adopt  the procedure laid 
down in the Convention on Human Rights. 
The foregoing  provisions are an application of  the  general  principle  that the Member 
States should  undertake in conformity  with the regime  already existing  in the European 
Coal and Steel Community (Article 87  E. C. S.C.), and in the European Defence Community 
(Article  122  E. D. C.),  not to avail themselves of  any conventions or declarations existing 
between them with a view to settling a dispute regarding the interpretation or application of 
the Statute otherwise  than in  accordance with the stipulations contained  therein. 
In the view of one the members of the Committee it was highly desirable that the crea-
tion of the Community should in no way affect the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice set 
up by the Rome Convention. The Committee, however, held that the status of the Commu-
nity's Court should, so far as concerns matters within the Community's competence, be the 
same, in relation to the Court instituted by the Rome Convention, as the status of a domestic 
tribunal of  one of the Member States. 
SECTION  V. 
10.  During the transitional period the concurrent rules laid down  in  the  E. C. S.C.  and 
E. D. C. Treaties will continue to apply to the status and appointment of judges. 
The permanent regime will be based on the· following principles : 
a)  Number  of  iudges  composing  the  Divisions. 
The  Sub-Committee considers  that as  a  rule the number in each  Division  should  not 
exceed  five,  except in the case  of the Division  which would adjudicate upon constitutional 
disputes, and would at the same time be responsible for preserving the unity of the jurisprudence. 
b)  Appointment of the  Judges. 
The Committee agreed that they must, in no case, be elected by the parliamentary organs 
of the Community, as this method might imply inadmissible political influence. The Committee 
thought that the best plan would be to have the judges appointed by the Governments, such 
appointments being afterwards approved by the Parliament. It.also considered another solution, 
according to which the governmental lists would be submitted to the Chambers which would 
carry out the definitive election on the basis of the lists.  -
The  Committe  also  considered  what  should  be the  qualifications  required  of  persons 
required to undertake the duties of a judge~ After detailed discussions it reached the conclusion 
that long experience in high offices, involving administrative duties, might also be an excellent 
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quirement that a judge of the Court of the Community must be ajurist, in the sense of having 
read law at a  University. 
c)  Guarantee  for  the  financial  independence  of  the  fudges. 
The Committee decided to make the following recommendations : During their term of 
office  as  judges their salaries could not  be reduced; the judges would also  enjoy complete 
immunity, also, in criminal cases  (the Court would have exclusive competence in disciplinary 
and criminal proceedings concerning its own Members). 
The question of the tern:l of office for the judges was also examined. The Committee did 
not think that it should recommend appointments for  life, as this might unduly reduce the 
number of candidates. Similarly it did not think it would be desirable to fix an age limit for 
the judges. 
The Committee considered that it was essential, in order to prevent the composition of 
the Court and of the Divisions from being influenced by politicalconsiderations or determined 
by the requirements of a particular case, that the Court should be entitled to draw up not only 
its Rules of Procedure, but also its Statute. 
11.  The Committee confined itself to examining the following points, in regard to which 
it prefers not to make any recommendations which might prejudge the question: 
1)  the number of  judges ; 
2)  the effect  of the Court's judgments in constitutional cases. 
12.  As  regards the number of  judges,  the Committee  did not think it should  make a 
decision, because it is difficult at this moment to estimate the amount of work which the Court 
will have to undertake. Moreover, negotiations are now proceeding for the bringing into force 
of the E. D. C. Treaty. One of the consequences of these negotiations might well be an increase 
in the number of judges because  of  the additional tasks that will devolve on the Court in 
connection with the Defence Community. 
13.  As  regards the second point, the Committee is inclined to think that in the case of 
constitutional disputes, the judgements ofthe Court of Justice shouldonlyproducethe customary 
effects of a res fudicata, and would not have the force  of law.  The Committee believes that, in 
a  social organisation, orderly, and favouring a  sound administration  of justice, there could 
be no  question of applying to the courts in order to obtain political decisions.  Though it is 
necessary that the courts should enjoy supreme authority, it is none the less true 'that govern-
ment by judges is a  symptom of decadence. 
SECTION  VI. 
14. Finally, the Committee examined the problem of the creation of a  Conseil  d'Etat and 
of a  special Court of the Exchequer. 
In regard to the Conseil d'Etat, the Committee considers that, if  one accepts, in principle. 
the fundamental importance of the unity of jurisprudence, the idea of creating a special Conseil 
d'Etat must be abandoned. Moreover, that organ seems to be invested with a  dual function, 
which in part exceeds the field of jurisprudence, 
- it may exercise a  judicial function -in  case of a plea against the jurisdiction, or in 
regard to misuse of powers, or violation of rules of law-by means of administrative measures, 
more especially with a  view to the protection of public officials ; 
- it may deliver advisory opinions; this activity may be obligatory or optional in different 
cases. 
The present organisation of the Court will enable it to deal appropriately with all civil 
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15.  In connection with the Special Court of th(Exchequer the Committee advises against 
its creation, at any rate so long as the number of cases which may be submitted to it-a number 
which will be probably very small- cannot be estimated with any precision. The Committee 
believes that duties of this nature might well be entrusted to a parliamentary committee, which 
would collaborate, if  need be, with the  Division for administrative cases, instituted within the 
Court. A solution of that nature seems all the more appropriate because the task of a  Court 
of the Exchequer is to examine, not whether the expenditure is justifiable, but whether it is 
in conformity with the law. Furthermore, the Board of Auditors  provided  for  in  Article  97 
E. D. C.  will continue to exercise its .functions. PART  IV 
RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL COMMUNITY 
WITH THIRD STATES AND INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS 
REPORT 
submitted by M.  SEMLER,  Rapporteur. I.  - INTRODUCTION 
A.  - PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  COMMITTEE  AND  OF  THE  SUB~ 
COMMITTEE  ON  LIAISON. 
1.  At its session on  23-27 October the Constitutional Committee set up a Sub-Committee 
on Liaison.  Its Chairman was  M.  van der GoEs  van  NATERS  and it appointed MM.  WIGNY 
and SEMLER  as its  Rapporteurs. 
This Sub-Committee held six meetings; it based its work in regard to the question of 
association on  a  note by M.  WrGNY,  the speech  delivered by M.  MoNNET,  President of the 
High Authority, to the Organising Committee of the Common  Assembly of the E. C.  S.  C., 
on the statement made by M. MoNNET on 17 November 1952 at the first meeting of the« Joint 
Committee» for  the association  of Great Britain and the E. C.  S.  C.,  and on the statement 
made at the same meeting by Sir Cecil  WEIR,  head of the British delegation. 
As  regards relations with N.  A.  T.  0. the Sub-Committee took as a  basis of discussion 
the two notes of  MM.  MUTTER  and KoPF. 
2. The  Plenary  Committee,  at its session  on  15-20  December  1952,  adopted  without 
any substantial changes  the conclusions  submitted to it by the  Sub-Committee. 
3.  The liaisons of the Community represent relations of a  very varied character, so that 
it becomes necessary to select, for each type of liaison, a term which can be used consistently 
in the same sense,  once  and for  all. 
Accordingly'  it was agreed : 
- to use the term « Association » exclusively in the sense indicated in Section II of the 
present report, in other words to use the term «Associated State >>  to denote. a  State which, 
having declared its willingness to collaborate in certain  matters, has concluded a  treaty of 
Association  with  the  Community,  specifying  the co-related rights and obligations  of each 
of the contracting parties (cf.  Section  II,  § 13). 
- to use  the term  «liaison »  to  denote  all  relations  which,  exceeding  the  scope  of 
ordinary international or diplomatic contacts, have resulted in certain mutual engagements 
between the parties concerned. Such would be for instance, the links uniting the Community 
to the Council of Europe, N.  A.  T. 0., 0. E. E. C.,  and E. P.  U. 
B. - TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE AND RESULTS OF ITS DISCUSSIONS. 
4.  In conformity with the questionnaire of the six Ministers, the Committee examined 
the problems arising, in the preparation of the Community's Statute, from its relations 
- with other States, in particular, with the Member  States of the Council of Europe, 
- with  the Council  of  Europe  itself, 
- with international organisations, associations or other institutions, and also with any 
new European  Communities  which  may subsequently  be set up. 
These questions comprised not  only legal problems, but also a great variety of political 
problems.  The  Committee examined them from  two points of view : 
(i)  from that of the. structure of the Community; 
(ii)  and from  that of the powers  and competence to be conferred on  the Community 
in regard to international agreements which already exist or may subsequently be concluded. 56  Report of the  Constitutional  Committee 
5.  As regards the  structure of the  Community, the familiar extreme theories were put for-
ward during the de bates. 
According to one of these theories, the Community would present itself to third States 
and to the various international organisations as a  new State, coherent, furnished  with all 
the attributes of  sovereignty, in favour of which  the Member States, hitherto independent, 
would have relinquished their sovereign  rights. 
According  to  the opposing theory,  the Community  was  only a  very loose  association 
of  States which,  while  retaining their complete independence, had joined together in order 
to accomplish - possibly within the framework of the Council of Europe - certain specific 
and limited  tasks. 
The Committee  considered that neither of  these theories  was  in accord  with the con-
ceptions of the States concerned. It preferred to base its studies on  the positive facts. 
The first  of the facts was the transfer of certain sovereign rigths by some of the States 
to the supra-national institutions created by the E. C.  S.  C.  and E. D.  C.  Treaties. 
The second  fact  is  that the six States have preserved certain  rights of sovereignty -
subject to some important exceptions -even in the fields in which they were giving com-
petence to the supra-national institutions. 
The third fact is the possibility of expanding the circle 'of members, both in the E. C. S. C. 
and in the E. D. C.  (cf.  Article  98  E. C. S.C. and Article 129  E. D. C.). 
The fourth fact is the adoption of the Eden Plan, (cf. Opinion No 3 of 30th September 1952) 
by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
The  fifth  fact  consists. of the provisions  for  collaboration  between  the E. C. S. C.  and 
the Council  of  Europe,  as  set out in the Protocol concerning relations with the Council  of 
Europe. 
6.  Having regard to these facts, the Committee has rioted the following points: 
a)  The Community will have its own legal personality in virtue of which it will act, within 
limits which will have to be laid down in the Statute, in its. dealings with other States and 
international organisations. 
b)  In addition to the Community, each of the six Member States will, in future, enjoy 
a  similar right of action.  The Statute of the Community will have to indicate how far the 
freedom  of action of the States, considered individually,  will  be limited or abolished  after 
the creation of the Community. 
c)  As the existing treaties have already provided for the admission of new members, the 
Statute of the Community  will  have  to provide  for  a  similar possibility.  . 
Furthermore,  it is  manifestly desirable  that  States which,  for  any reason,  are unable 
or unwilling to become members of the Community, should be able to link themselves closely 
to it in some appropriate manner. It is therefore proposed  to provide for  the possibility of 
«Association  >>  in the. Statute of the Community  (cf.  Part II of the present  Report). 
The conditions for  admission to the Community, whether as members or as  Associated 
States,  should  be the same as those  which  settle the qualifications  for  membership of the 
Council  of Europe. 
d)  In conformity with the ideas underlying the Eden Plan and the decisions of the Con-
sultative Assembly of the Council of  Europe, the closest  possible link must be established 
between  the Community and the Council  of  Europe. 
7.  As  regards  the  powers  and competence  to  be  conferred  on  the  Community  in foreign 
affairs,  the  following  points  should  be noted: 
a)  The Member States, or some of them, are parties to various international agreements 
which  specify  mutual rights  and  obligations.  · 
Provision must be made for  the possibility either that the Community may accede par-
tially to these agreements undertaking certain rights and obligations, or that it may comple-
tely assume the former rights and obligations of the Member States, in place of those States. Part  ..  4.  -,.- External  relations  of  the  Community  57 
The Statute will have to confer upon the Community, while specifying its competences, 
the ability to take over  Fights and obligations when acceding to international treatie(of this 
kind. 
The chief treaties in this category, in relation  to the two  existing Treaties (E. C. S.C. 
and E. D. C.), are the Statute of the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty,· and the 
0. E. E. C.  and E. P. U.  Treaties. 
As regards future treaties agreement will have to be reached, before they are concluded, 
between  the Member  States and  the Associated  States on the following  points : 
-'- the Community's participation in such treaties, 
-the relations  between the Community and the Associated  States,  within the ambit 
of these treaties, 
- the relations between the Community and third States parties to these treaties. 
A general formula  authorising the Community to accede  to these new treaties should 
suffice,  when  the Statute is  being drawn  up. 
As  regards possible new Specialised Communities. ( << green pool »,  transport pool, electric 
power pool,  «white pool>>  etc.), the Committee recommends that the Community's compe-
tence  be extended so  as to enable it : 
- to  take  the initiative in  setting up  these  new Specialised  Communities, 
- to undertake the administration  of  these new  Specialised  Communities, 
- to represent the Member States and the Associated States within these new Special-
ised Communities. 
b)  In so far as the six Members States transfer rights and sovereignty to the Community 
under the two Treaties  (E. C. S.C. and E. D. C.),  the question  arises: who. is  going  to  repre-
sent the  future  Community in the international organisms-in particular, in the various Coun-
cils of Ministers (Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Atlantic Council, and Coun-
cil of the 0. E. E. C.  etc.) ? 
Will the Community have representatives side by side with the ministers of the Member 
States, or in place of those ministers ? Will the ministers of the Member States undertake the 
representation of the Community in those organisms ? To whom will these representatives be 
responsible ?  Who  will  give  them their instructions ? 
· These questions alone - and they could be multiplied - suffice to show that the poli-
tica~ problem in this case is not only complicated but, above all,  extremely  delicate. It is 
all the more so because it cannot be decided solely by the Six States, seeing that the assent 
of the other parties to the treaties creating these organisms must also be  obtained: 
The Committee confined itself to an important observation namely, that the obligations 
which  the future Community would have to assume under the international treaties might, 
in certain cases,  substantially exceed the minimum powers and competence which  (as  they 
have already been conferred on the E. C. S.C. and the E. C. D.)  must undoubtedly be trans-
ferred  to the Community. 
II. - ASSOCIATED  STATES. 
8.  Immediately after the constitution  of the E. C.  S.  C.,  several European  States, in 
particular,  Great Britain, expressed a  desire  to establish close  and durable links with that 
Community without, however,  becoming members.  Under the leadership of Sir Cecil  WEIR 
a British delegation went to Luxemburg to open negociations with the High Authority of the 
E. C. S. C.  in regard to the details of an Association  with  Great Britain.  M.  Jean  MoNNET 
and the head of the British delegq.tion,  Sir Cecil WEIR,  explained their positions about such 
an association. The statements ofM. MoNNET and Sir Cecil WEIR,  which outlined their atti-
tudes towards  the  question  of  Association,  were  examined by the Committee,  which  took 
full  account  of them in  its  deliberations. 58  Report of the  Constitutional  Committee 
9.  The Community will  also  establish  and  maintain  links  of  very different  kinds and 
of varying closeness  and duration with other States. It is  already apparent that the States 
which, for one reason  or another, are unable or unwilling to become members of the Com-· 
munity, nevertheless desire the provision of close and durable forms of. liaison with the Com-
munity,  enabling them to participate in the pursuit  of its aims. 
10.  a)  In the interest of Europe, as a  whole, it is desirable that, in the first place, coun-
tries which are members of the Council of Europe, should associate themselves with the Com-
munity. The Committee wondered whether it might be expressly stated that Member States 
of the Council of Europe were entitled to associate themselves with the Community. It has 
abandoned the idea; nevertheless,  it is  unanimously of opinion  that if a  Member  State of 
the Council of Europe desired to open negociations with a view to the conclusion of an Asso-
ciation agreement such a request could not be set aside. On the other hand, the Community 
would retain its full liberty of decision  in regard to European States not belonging to the 
Council of Europe. 
b)  Some  Member  States of the Community and also some other European States, have 
constitutional links with overseas States or Countries. The Committee recommends that the 
possibility should be left open for these overseas States to acquire the status of an Associated 
State, provided, however, that the European State concerned is itself a member of the Com-
munity, or associated therewith.  In that case,  regard must be had to the special nature of 
the relations by which  the European State is  linked to the overseas State. 
c)  The question arose whether the links of Association, as at present contemplated, could 
also  be established  with the United States of America.  The Committee considered it highly 
desirable that the closest  possible links, based on confidence and friendship, should be estab-
lished  between  the  United States and the Community. Nevertheless it considered that these 
close ties should not be created by an Association· agreement, but by the conclusion of a special 
convention. 
11.  Some of the observers asked that the forms of Association should be allowed to define 
and  develop  themselves,  keeping  pace  with  the  development  of  the  Community,  without 
this growth being hampered by too precise a definition, in advance, of the conditions of the 
Association. 
The Committee showed itself in sympathy with this idea. Though it would be impossible 
to dispense with a minimum of rules for defining the concept of <<Association » it is desirable 
to render these rules sufficiently flexible to enable agreements to be concluded in a form that 
would have regard to the British observers' desire that the Association  between  the· Com-
munity and an Associated State should be allowed to develop  progressively. 
12.  In view of the importance which  the system of  Association  presents for  the Com-
munity, the Committee proposes that the Statute of the Community should contain a chapter 
entitled  «Association » or  « Associated  States » in  which  the essential characteristics  of  an 
Association  would  be set forth. 
18.  a)  The  Committee  proposed  the following  definition  of an  Associated  State : 
«The expression  "Associated  State" denotes a  State which,  having declared its willing-
ness to collaborate  in  certain  domains,  has concluded  an Association  agreement  with  the 
Community, specifying the co-related rights and obligations of each contracting party.» 
b)  The  Committee  considered  that it  was  not  desirable  to  determine  in  advance  the 
fields of the Community's competence, in respect of which an Association might be concluded. 
It thought it possible, or even probable, that at the outset an Association would only apply 
to a limited domain, but that in the course of years it would extend more widely.  However, 
it should be  concluded in respect  of matters of  fairly substantial importance 
c)  An  Association  always presupposes the  conclusion of an agreement of Association  bet-
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·  An  Association  engenders  rights  and  obligations  both for the Community  and  for  the 
Associated State. The rights and obligations may be of a different nature, on one side or the 
other. However, the rights conferred  on one of the parties must be co-related to the obliga-
tions assumed by that party. It would  be inadmissible that one party should  claim rights 
while refusing to assume  obligations.  · 
It was  asked that an Association  should  be capable of being effected, not only by the 
conclusion  of a  treaty, but by agreements of other kinds. 
In the view of the Committee, an Association  is  of such high  political importance for 
the Community that every Association  agreement must be submitted by the European Exe-
cutive Council to the Community's Parliament, for  approval; it is  not, however, necessary 
that, in all cases, this agreement should take the form of a  treaty subject to ratification. If 
the Associated State is  disinclined to conclude such a  treaty, it can become pledged  ~imply 
by its government's signature; but the Association agreement will not bind the Community, 
its Member  States, or the other Associated States until it· has been approved by the Com-
munity's  Parliament. 
14.  As  an Association  is  to. constitute a  close  tie for  a  fairly  long  period, it would be 
advisable to prescribe  a  reciprocal  obligation  for  the  parties  to  exchange  information  and  to 
consult  together: Every Association  agreement  must contain a  clause to that effect. 
In certain cases  it will  be  desirable  to create  permanent mixed  committees  between the 
Community and one or more Associated States. These committees could usefully be instituted 
both on the plane  of the Executive Organisation and on  that of the Parliament. 
15.  The Committee considered in what form, and to what extent the Associated  States 
could  participate in  the  internal life  of the Community,  particularly in the formulation  of 
its decisions. 
The Committee was unanimously of opinion  that, in the internal life of the Community, 
certain spheres  are exclusively reserved,  by reason  of their nature, to the Member· States. 
Subject to this reservation, the position of an Associated State within the Community should 
admit of its being assimilated, to a large extent, to that of a Member State, subject, of course, 
to the condition that the Associated  State fulfils  its  corresponding obligations towards the 
Community. 
In a case of that description, the Statute of the Community should offer the Associated 
State the possibility of collaborating, with a right to vote, in the organs ofthe Community, 
where such collaboration is  provided for in the Association  Agreement. This should be done 
both en the plane  of the Executive and on  that of the Parliament. 
If the parties concerned do  not wish to establish so close a link between the Community 
and the Associated State, provision should be made for the sending of observers by the Asso-
ciated State to the organs of the Community,  in which they would  sit,  in a  consultative 
capacity. 
III.  RELATIONS  WITH  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANISATIONS,  .· 
ADMINISTRATIONS  AND  INSTITUTIONS. 
A.  - GENERAL  OBSERVATIONS,  AND  RELATIONS  WITH  THE  NEW  SPECIALISED 
COMMUNITIES. 
16.  As  regards  the relations  between  the  Community  and  the  international organisa-
tions,  administrations  and  institutions,  the  Committee  draw a  distinction  between: 
(i)  the  international  organisations  with  which  relations  will  be  maintained,  without 
any question, in virtue of the provisions of the E. C. S.C. and  E. D. C.  Treaties, 
(ii)  the other international institutions with which it _is  possible or even probable, that 
relations  will  be established,  but in regard to which  there is  less  urgent need  - from  the 
standpoint of the Committee's proceedings -to  define the methods for  the  establishment 
of such liaisons, 
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17.  As regards the first category of organisations, the question of liaison with the Coun-
cil of Europe is dealt with in M.  WIGNY's  report  (cf.  Part V)  ;  the question  of liaison  with 
NATO  and 0. E. E. C.  is  dealt  with in the present  section. 
As  regards the accession of the Community to G. A. T. T. (General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade), the Committee referred more especially to Title X and Article 85 of the E. C. S.C. 
Treaty and to the second part of Chapter I of the Convention concerning transitional measures. 
The  Community's  competence  in  matters  of  commercial  policy  must  correspond  to  its 
competence in this sphere in virtue of the E. C. S.C. Treaty. 
The relations of the Community with the European Payments Union (E. P. U.) will depend 
on  the competence  which  may be conferred  on  the Community in  the  sphere  of  monetary 
policy  and international payments. The Community might  be authorised  to accede,  within 
the scope  of the E. C. S.C. and E. D. C.  Treaties,  or of other  treaties  which  may  subse-
quently be concluded, to international agreements existing in this field,  or it may be autho-
rised to conclude new agreements. Attention is also drawn to the Bretton Woods agreements 
instituting the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank of Reconstruction 
and Development. 
The situation is the same in regard to the International Labour Organisation  (I. L. 0.) 
in virtue of the special provisions ot the E. C. S.C. Treaty, in particular Title I, Article 3 (e), 
a  clause according to which  the Community's institutions must: 
«promote the improvement of the living and working conditions of the labour force  in 
each of the industries under its jurisdiction so  as to make possible the equalisation of 
such  conditions in an upward  direction.» 
18.  As  regards  the second  category  of organisations,  the  Committee  does  not  find  it 
necessary, at this moment, to make proposals in regard to the methods of establishing rela-
tions  with  these organisations. 
19.  As regards relations with the new Specialised Communities, in connection with whose 
creation negotiations have been begun (green  pool, transport pool, white pool, electric power 
pool), the question of the Community's position in regard to these new Specialised Commu-
nities  calls  for  consideration. 
It seems possible that these new Communities will be formed in spheres outside the scope 
of the Community's competence.  In order to avoid duplication, and .a  miltuplicity of Euro-
pean organisations - already so numerous - the question arises  whether it would not be 
advisable to direct the Community to take the initiative in. the creation of these new Specia-
lised Communities, especially where the field of activity of one of the said Communities does 
not fall  within the scope of the Community's general competence. Thanks to the system of 
Association it becomes possible to allow European States which are not members of the Com-
munity to participate in the Specialised Communities, in liaison  with the Community. 
It should also be possible to entrust the competent institutions of the Community with 
the  administration of new  Specialised  Communities, in case the said  Specialised Communities 
have not been  set  up actually within the framework of the Community. 
If the Member States of the Community or the Associated  States desire to participate 
in a Specialised Community, concerned with an object outside the scope of the Community's 
competence, it is advisable that they should be enabled to  be  represented,  collectively,  by 
the Community in this new Specialised Organisation. In such a case, the different States con-
cerned might refrain from  becoming members of the  Specialised  Community, and only the 
Community, as such,  would  accede  to the said Specialised Community in the place of the 
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B. - RELATIONS  WITH NATO. 
20.  The Committee took, as its starting-point, the view that the powers  and  competence 
of the  European Defence  Community in the sphere of general  policy  would  be transferred 
to the Community. This applies especially to relations with the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Or-
ganisation. 
The Committee gave particular attention to certain clauses in the E. D. C.  and NATO 
Treaties. 
21.  The  E. D. C.  Treaty and its  protocols""' contain  a  number of provisions concerning 
the liaison between the E. D. C.  and  NATO  and the relations between the States  members 
of the E. D. C.  and the States members of NATO. 
Mention  should be made in particular of the following articles of the E. D. C.  Treaty: 
Articles 2,  4,  5,  10 §§ 2 and 4,  14,  18  §§ 1-4,  32,  47,  68  §§  2 and 3,  69  §§  2 and  3,  70  § 3, 
77  § 1,  78 his  § 1, 87 his  § 4 a and b,  9l, 94,  102  § 1  c,  120  § 2,  123  § 1,  127  §§  7 and 8, 
128; also of articles 7  § 2 and 26 of the Military Protocol, of the Protocol regarding the rela-
tions between the E. D. C.  and NATO, and of the Protocol regarding mutual assistance gua-
rantees to States members of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
22.  I  think it will be useful, at this point, to quote the texts of the following articles of 
the E. D. C.  Treaty: 
Article 32.  - The Commissariat shall assure the liaison necessary with Member States, 
with third party States and, generally speaking,  with all international organisations whose 
assitance may prove to be necessary to achieve the purpose of the present Treaty. 
Article 47  § 1.  - The  Council  shall  decide  whether  a  joint  meeting  of the Council of 
Council of the the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Council of the Community shall 
be requested. 
23.  I  also  reproduce  the  fo11owing  paragraphs of the  Protocol  regarding  the relations 
between  the  E. D. C.  and  NATO : 
( §  § 1,  2  and 3  are  translated  from  the  French  text.) 
§ 1.  - In regard to questions concerning the common objects of the two Organisations, 
mutual consultations  will  take place  between  the  North  Atlantic  Council and  the  Council 
of the European Defence  Community, and whenever either Council thinks it desirable,  the 
two  Conucils  will  hold a  joint meeting. 
If at any time one of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty or one of the Parties to 
the Treaty setting up a  European  Defence Community considers that there is a  threat to 
the territorial integrity, the political independence or the security of any one of them, or to 
the existence or unity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or of the European Defence . 
Community, a  joint meeting will be organised, at the request of the said  Party, with a  view 
to studying the measures to be taken to meet  the situation. 
§ 2.  - With a  view to  close  co-ordination  on  the technical plane, each Organisation 
shall communicate useful information to the other, and permanent contact shall be established 
between the personnel of the Services of the Commissariat of the European Defence Com-
munity and the personnel of the Services of the civil organs of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation.  · 
§ 3.  - As  soon  as the forces  of the European Defence  Community have been placed 
under the orders of a Commander belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, some 
members  of  the European  Defence  Forces  will  become  members  of the said  Commander's 
Headquarters staff and of the appropriate subordinate Headquarters staffs. The Commanders 
belonging  to the  North  Atlantic  Treaty Organisation  will establish  the necessary  liaisons 
petween these forces  and the other military organs of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
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Article  2.  - The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and 
friendly international  relations by  strengthening their free institutions, by bringing a bout a better 
· understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting 
conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international 
economic  policies  and  will  encourage economic  collaboration  between  any or all of them. 
Article  4.  - The Parties will consult together whenever, in· the opinion of any of them, 
the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened. 
Article 8.  - Each  Party declares  that none  of  the international engagements now in 
force  between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the pro-
visions  of this Treaty,  and undertakes not  to  enter into  any international engagement  in 
conflict  with this Treaty. 
Article  10.  - The  Parties may,  by unanimous agreement, invite any other European 
State in a  position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security 
of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party 
to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United 
States of America.  The Government  of the United States  of  America  will  inform  each  of 
the Parties of the deposit of  each such instrument of accession. 
25.  As regards the competence of the Community in customs and fiscal matters, I  would 
refer to article XI of the «Convention between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty con-
cerning the legal position of their troops >>  ;  as  regards the territorial field  of application  of 
the Convention,  I  would  refer to article  XX of that instrument. 
26.  The  Committee  also  had under  consideration  the legislation  of the  United  States 
of  America in regard to  « Mutual  Defence  Assistance )), 
The recognition of the aims of that legislation, which is form;:tlly  required.  by the Ame-
rican Congress  as a  condition for  granting assistance under the «Mutual Security Act )),  im-
plies the possession  of a  corresponding competence by the Community, in so  far as the latter 
wi11  benefit, in the future,  by assistance  of that kind. 
27.  In regard to the competence of  the Community in matters of economic policy,  we 
would  refer  to article  2  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  (quoted  above  under·§ 4). 
28.  The Committee considered that the European Executive Council of the Community 
would  have to undertake  (perhaps  after  a  period  of adaptation, cf.  Resolution  I,  § 7)  the 
task entrusted to the Commissariat  by Article  32  E. D.  C.  (i. e.  the task of providing the 
necessary liaisons  with  Member  States, third party States and, generally speaking, with all 
international organisations). 
29.  Article  47  of the E. D.  C.  Treaty lays down  that the Council of Ministers  of  the 
E. D.  C.  shall decide  whether a  joint meeting  of the Council  of NATO and the Council  of 
the E. D.  C.  shall be requested. 
Should this right be transferred to the Executive Body in the Statute of the Community, . 
it would  become  necessary to amend this  clause. 
30.  The same question  arises in connection  with  §§  1 and 4 of the Protocol regarding 
the relations  between  the E. D.  C.  and  NATO. 
31.  A question  which  I  have  already raised  in the first  part of this report now arises: 
would the Community, in the future,  be represented in the Council of N.  A.  T. 0. side  by 
side  with the six Member  States or in place of them ? . 
That question is of particular importance because, according to article 9,  sub-paragraph 
2 E. D. C., no Member State may recruit or maintain national armed forces other than those 
for  which provision is  made in  article 10 E. D. C.,  The military sovereignty of the Member 
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Since the Community has to take over the competence of the E. D. C., the Member States 
will  not be able, thenceforward, to  take action in that domain  save within the limits laid 
down  by article 10 E. D. C. 
It will,  therefore,  be necessary  to decide  - the existing treaties, including the North 
Atlantic  Treaty,  being amended  correspondingly  - which  organ  of the  Community  will, 
in the final phase, exercise the functions laid down in the E. D. C.  Treaty, in the North At-
lantic Treaty and in the additional Protocol of the North Atlantic Treaty, of 27  May  1952. 
32.  In the same connection, it will also be necessary to settle whether the Community 
will,  as such,  become  a  member  of  NATO. 
According to article  10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, any other European State may, 
in pursuance of an unanimous agreement by the members, be invited to accede to the Treaty, 
provided that it fulfils  certain conditions. It will have to be considered whether the Com- . 
munity can be regarded as a  «State» within the meaning of that clause. 
If the  answer  is  in  the  affirmative,  there  will  no  longer  be  any place  in  NATO  for 
the individual representation of the different Member States. In that  case, it  will  be noted 
that the problem of the right  of  voting in the Council of NATO  will  cease  to be  of deci-
sive  importance  because  the rule  of  unanimity applies  to all  important  questions. 
C.  - RELATIONS  WITH 0. E. E. C. 
33.  The Committee considered that it is absolutely essential to settle, on  the European 
plane taken as a  whole, the relations between the future European Political Community and 
the 0. E. E. C.,  so  as to take due  account of the legitimate interests of the two  groups  of 
members. 
34.  The  Committee's  opinion  was  based  on  the following  facts  and viewpoints:. 
a)  The whole field of European economic policy, including trade policy, monetary policy 
and the question of international payments, is at present being studied by various organisa-
tions, whose  composition  varies  froin  one case  to another. 
b)  All  Member  States of the Community are members of the Council of Europe, which 
has entered into an agreement with the 0. E. E. C.  for  settling the details of their collabo-
ration. 
c)  Furthermore, all the Member States of the Community are direct members of 0. E. 
E. C.  and the E. P. U. 
d)  The Community comprises six members, the Council of Europe fifteen and 0. E. E. C. 
eighteen. In addition, the E. P.  U.  includes overseas  States and territories which have con-
nections  of  a  constitutional nature  with  certain  European  Member  States. 
Switzerland, Portugal and Austria belong to 0. E. E. C.  and the E. P. U., without being 
members either of  the Community or of the Council  of Europe.  · 
Within the framework of 0. E. E. C. the United States of America are able to participate 
and  collaborate  permanently.  · 
e)  In accordance  with  what  is  stated in  its  Preamble,  the Treaty instituting the  Coal 
and Steel Community was entered into because it was  felt  that the only way to construct 
a united Europe is  by concrete achievements, and by the estblishment of bases of economic 
development. 
f)  In the treaty instituting the  E. C.  S.  C.  the Member States of the Community have 
transferred certain sovereign rights. to the organs of the European Coal and Steel Community 
in connection with matters set forth in the said treaty, which are very closely related to the 
problems involved  in  European economic. policy.  · 
g)  Under Article 93  of the Treaty instituting the E. C.  S. C.,  the High Authority main-
tains all necessary liaison  with 0. E. E. C.  and keeps it regularly informed of the Commu-
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35.  By virtue of  the E. C.  S. C.  and E. D.  C.  treaties, the Community will have more 
or less extensive powers in the following  fields  of economic policy : 
- industrial production  and development, 
- transport, 
- finance, 
- customs  policy, 
- imports and exports, 
- commercial policy, 
-.  monetary policy, 
- international payments. 
All  the questions enumerated above are dealt with by 0. E. E. C.  from the standpoint 
of European economic policy; as the latter sends its reports to the Council of Europe, these 
matters form the subject-matter of discussions, recommendations and decisions of  the Council 
of Europe. 
36.  In view of this situation, the Committee feels  it is essential, in order to promote 
development  and  consolidation  of a  European  economic  policy  (which  is  one of the aims 
and tasks of 0. E. E. C.,  of E. P. U., of the Council of Europe and of the Community},  to 
take at  the  earliest  possible  moment  the  measures  necessary  for  the co-ordination  of  the 
activities of these various bodies so  as to define a  uniform European  economic policy and, 
in time, to institute uniform  political agencies to implement this policy. FIFTH PART 
LIAISON TO  BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE 
COMMUNITY  AND  THE COUNCIL  OF EUROPE 
REPORT 
submitted by M.  WIGNY,  Rapporteur. I.  - GENERAL  OBSERVATIONS 
I. - Terminology. 
In the interests of clarity it is desirable to settle, provisionally, some questions of termi-
nology. 
At the present moment 15 countries participate in the Council of Europe. A smaller group 
will  constitute the Politkal Community, whose  Statute we  are now considering. It will be 
referred  to in this  Report  as the  «Community>>. 
For the sake of brevity we shall sometimes  speak of « the Six » and «the Fifteen >>.  How-
ever, it will be better to speak of the « Concil of Europe>>  and the <<Community>>;  for both 
of these bodies regard themselves as organisations open to further accessions, and that point 
needs  to  be  brought out in the  terminology. · 
2.  - Proceedings  of the  Constitutional  Committee  and  of the  Sub-Committee  on Liaison. 
At its session on 23-27  October 1952 the Constitutional Committee created a  Sub-Com-
mittee on Liaison, having as its  Chairman  M.  van der GoEs  van  NATERS;  it appointed as 
its  Rapporteurs  MM.  SEMLER  and  WIGNY.  · 
This Sub-Committee held meetings on six days; it based its discussions. as regards liai-
son with the Council of Europe, on notes prepared by M.  MARGUE,  M.  PARIS, Secretary-Gene-
ral  of the Council  of Europe and M.  WIGNY. 
At its session on 15-20 December 1952 the Plenary Committee adopted, without amend-
ment, the conclusions  submitted to it by its Sub-Committee. 
3.  - The  Role  of the  Constitutional  Committee. 
The Committee considered  that the task assigned to it was to study the different solu-
tions applicable to the problems referred to it, and, in certain cases,  to indicate its  prefe-
. renee.  That course was followed  in regard to liaison. The texts which the Committee proposes 
are in some cases alternative and in some cases complex : in  regard  to  the  former  category 
the Assembly will be able to make a selection; in regard to the second  it will only retain -
if it sees fit- certain of the conclusions submitted to it. 
4.  - The problem  of liaison. 
This  problem involves  some  questions  which  are quite distinct: 
(i)  We  desire  to organise  the  Community.  What links  should  be  established  between 
it and  the  Council  of  Europe ? 
(ii)  Some of the Member States of the Council of Europe may wish to collaborate more 
closely with the Community without however being completely bound up with it. The result 
might be the formation of veritable <<Specialised Communities» of 7,  8 or 9 States, in an in-
termediate position  between  the Community and the Council of Europe. We are thus led to 
consider what should be laid down in the Statute in regard to the links of «association »  be-
tween the Community and these States. 
(iii)  Relations will have to be established between the Community and the larger Euro-
pean  or international organisations,  already in existence.  • 
The  task has  been  divided  between  two  Rapporteurs.  The present note is concerned 
with the links to be establised with the Council of Europe.  Points  (ii)  and (iii)  will  be the 
subject of a  separate report  by M.  SEMLER. 
5. - The difficulty  and  importance  of the  problem. 
To establish relations between two entities, one of which - the Community - ha.s  not 
been defined, may seem to be, logically, almost impossible. It is however a practical necessity. 68  Report of the  Constitutional  Committee 
The prospects for the acceptance of the Community's Statute are largely dependent on the 
organisation of  effective liaisons. 
It would  be regrettable to create an atmosphere of  mistrust between the Community 
and the Council of Europe. It might lead the latter to adopt an attitude of antagonism. Even 
among the members of the Community there are many who believe that the ·international 
equilibrium of the group can only be ensured by the external support which would be afforded 
by the Council of Europe as a  whole,  or by some of its members. 
The establishment of close liaisons is  therefore a question which concerns both the mem-
bers of the Community and those of  the Council of Europe. 
The desire of the members of the Community in regard to this matter has been mani-
fested in a number of ways.  Article 38 of the E. D. C.  Treaty which forms  the basis of our 
discussions indicates, in the first place, that the permanent organisation of the E. D. C.  «should 
be so conceived as to be able to constitute one of the elements in a subsequent federal or con-
federal structure » ; it then  directs the Assembly to examine problems arising from the co-
existence of different agencies for European cooperation, already established, or which might 
be established. 
·  The resolution adopted at Luxemburg on 10  September 1952  by the six Ministries for 
Foreign Affairs requested the Ad Hoc Assembly to associate observers from other countries 
in its work, especially from  countries which are members of  the Council of Europe, and to 
submit periodical reports to the latter. Not content with indicating the procedure, the Six 
Governments defined the aim : they declared explicitly that they were founding themselves 
directly on the proposals of the  British  Government, which  advocate the establishment of 
the closest  possible  ties between the Community and the Council of  Europe. 
The Council of Europe, for its part has considered the relations  that should be establis-
hed between itself and the «restricted » communities.  Prolonged debates and various interim 
reports finally led to the adoption of Mr. AMERY's report and to OpinionN° 3 which was adop 
ted by the  Consultative  Assembly  on 30  September  1952. 
Reference should also be made, in studying these questions, to  the preparatory report 
on a  European Political Authority submitted by M.  MARGUE  to the  General  Affairs  Com-
mittee on 24 May 1952 (doc. AS fAG  (3)  80)  and to the introductory report of the Committee 
of Jurists on the problem of a European Political Community (doc. SG  (52)  2). 
II.  - THE TWO  TYPES  OF  LIAISON 
6.  The links to be set up between the Community and  the Council of  Europe can be 
grouped in two general categories : internal liaisons and external liaisons. These liaisons may 
be combined. The Committee hopes that contacts will be multiplied to the greatest possible 
extent. 
On the other hand, certain proposals  can be adopted and others rejected. 
A) Internal liaisons. 
7.  At the present time six  States -which hope to see  their number increased - are 
contemplating the coftstitution of a Community. The nature of that Community- whether 
confederal, federal, or sui generis - is of.little importance here. It  remains true that its nature 
will be different from that of the present Council of Europe. That is  a serious matter: for, 
in such a case, iUs difficult to dovetail one legal structure suitably into the other : the Council 
of  Europe cannot comprise  the Political Community ;  and  the latter cannot  subsequently 
expand within the framework of the Council of Europe. 
If it were possible to transform the Council of Europe so· as to give it the same character 
as the Community it would be very much easier to superpose one of these two groups on the 
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Council of Europe. The relations between them would be internal and the  passage from one 
to the other would be facilitated. 
The Committee was in favour of such a  soiution.  It was therefore  led to request the 
Assembly to submit to the Ministers not only the Statute of the Community, but also pro-
posals for  a  revision of  the Statute of  the Council  of  Europe. 
The Council of  Europe has sovereign power to accept or reject  the suggestions which 
will  thus be made. to it. 
The acceptance of  these suggestions would  ensure a  more  harmonious  organisation of 
Europe and at the same time make it easier to find  a  place for the di.fferent  Communities 
within the framework of the Council of Europe which,  at the present time, constitutes the 
wider group.  The rejection of  the suggestions  must not prevent the members of  the Com-
munity from elaborating and adopting their Statute. The Committee  was very firm on this 
point. Moreover, it would still be possible  to establish  effective liaisons, as indicated above. 
B) External liaisons. 
8.  A second general solution would consist in not changing the present Statute of the 
Council of Europe and confining  ourselves to working out the Statute of the Community. 
In this case it would be necessary to enumerate the « external  >>  liaisons to be created  be-
tween these two independent organisations, so as to harmonise their operation. 
The present report deals, successively, with internal liaisons, which are the closest and 
most desirable,  and with external liaisons.  We repeat that all these liaisons are capable of 
being  combined. 
III. - FIRST  SOLUTION.  - INTERNAL  LIAISONS 
9.< If the Assembly adopts the views of  it.s  Committee, it will therefore propose, simul-
taneously,  a  Statute for the Community and a  modification of the Statute for the Council 
of Europe. It  will be remembered that the Consultative Assembly itself unanimously decided, 
as early as September 1949, that the aim of the Council of Europe must be «the establish-
ment of a European Political Authority endowed with limited functions but with real powers.  >> 
In the further paragraphs of  this Report we have amplified the proposals put forward 
by the Committee with  a  view  to making the Council of  Europe a broader Political Com-
munity,  capable of  taking in that of  the Six.  In a  note submitted by M.  PARIS,  Secretary 
General of  the Council of  Europe, in his personal capacity  (Note  appended to the present 
Report), it is emphasised that the implementation of these proposals would only involve slight 
amendments in the Statute, which have often been called for by the Consultative Assembly. 
In certain cases,  even, it will suffice  to confirm officially certain interpretations which alre-
ady prevail. 
A) General Principles. 
10.  Article I, a)  of the Statute of the Council of Europe lays down that «the aim of the 
Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safe-
guarding and realising the ideals and principles which  are their common  heritage and faci-
litating their  economic  and social  progress.  >> 
Some  members of the Committee proposed that the expression of this intention ·should 
be made mote forceful by a changein the wording: «the Members of the Council of Europe 
pledge  themselves. to achieve a greater unity between themselves for the purpose o( safeguar-
ding the principles  which  are their common  heritage and facilitating  ...  , etc. » 
Whether this amendment be agreed to or not, the Members of the Community are bound 
by the pledge which they gave as early as 1949 on entering the Council of Europe. By deci-
ding to set up the Community they could not - and did not wish to -weaken the import 
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The Council of Europe, for its part, has ~lways recognised the possibility of agreements 
among certain  Members.  The  problem  was  studied,  in  particular,  in  connection  with  the 
«specialised authorities >>,  which are recognised as legitimate provided that they do  not retard 
the progress towards a closer  unity among the members of the Council as a whole. This prin-
ciple is worthy of being generalised and clearly set forth in the Statute of the Council of Eu-
rope  (for  instance  in  Article  23  b). 
It would be desirable on psychological grounds that, at the time of the signature of the 
Community's Statute, the general pledges resulting from the Statute of the Council of Europe 
should be explicitly reaffirmed by all its  members, and particularly by those which are also 
members  of the Community.  These pledges  contain  the substance  of the  Eden  Plan. 
The wording of the Statute of the Council of Europe should at the same time be clari-
fied  in order to establish more effectively the liaison between the Council of Europe, the spe-
cialised  authorities and the Community. 
B) Competence  of the  Council  of Europe. 
11.  To ask the Member States of the Council of Europe for renunciations of sovereignty 
would  be to invite certain defeat. However, the powers and competence already vested in· the 
Council of Europe, or demanded by a large majority of the Consultative Assembly, are suffi-
ciently extensive for  their rationalisation to constitute an aggregate, the political import of 
which  is  far  from negligible. 
(i)  The Member States of the Council of Europe are already able to consult each other 
on all matters of general European interest. In a  democratic world this exchange of views is 
highly valuable, and can bring about unification of policies.  We  must maintain this system 
of preliminary consultation and possibly, in certain cases, make it compulsory. 
(ii)  The organs of the Council of Europe niight  be competent to prepare draft treaties, 
or draft laws on parallel lines  (i.  e., domestic laws which  would  be identical in the different 
Member States). Thatis the procedure which has been followed for  many years past by the 
I. L. 0. The Co_uncil of Europe has itself, by a similar procedure, prepared the European Con-
vention  on  Human  Rights. 
It would be a great advantage if this competence were explicitly stipulated in the Statute 
of the Council of Europe. It is an open question whether the right of initiative should be re-
served to the Council of Ministers or be vested in the Consultative Assembly. 
(iii)  The Consultative Assembly has persistently urged that the European administrations 
which have substantially the same territorial competence as itself should be integrated in the 
Council of Europe. The principle ones  concerned  are the  0~ E. E. C.  and the E. P. U ..  The 
super-position would not be perfect but the «additional>> members might  be r  given the status 
of  States co-operating in certain specialised matters. (The term.« Associated State >>  has been 
rejected  because it already possesses  a  different  meaning in  the Statute of the Council  of 
Europe). 
It is easy to conceive how greatly this concentration would add weight to the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe and importance to the discussions of the Consultative 
Assembly. 
If  such an integration is found to be impracticable, a  committee set up under the spon-
sorship of the Council of Europe and including representatives of the Council of Europe, the 
Organisation  of  European  Economic  Co-operation  and of the .  European  Payments  Union 
should study the possibility of coordinating the two last-named bodies with the Council of 
Europe. 
12.  It would appear that these proposals, submitted in this modest form but nevertheless 
already :filled  with veritable substance, could not possibly alarm any member of the Council 
of Europe. Should any of them be hesitant as to a given point, they could be given th(  status 
of a  co-operating State. 
In conclusion, it must be emphasised that the collaboration of the Member States is based 
not only on their participation _in  a  Council whose  political competence is limited but real, 
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C) ·The  organs  of the  Council of EU1'ope. 
13.  Our efforts, therefore, as far as the Council of Europe is concerned should be applied 
less to an extension of its competence than to a readjustment of its organs, so as to make them 
homo9eneous with those of the Community ~tnd thus to  f~tcilitate the interlocking of the two 
orga.Illsations.  Here, again, only slight changes might be needed:  · 
i)  The  Assemblies. 
14.  The  Parliament  of the Community  comprises  two  Chambers.  Which  of them  \Vill 
<dnterlock >>with the Consultative Assembly ? In the Committee's view it should be the Chamber 
which, by its composition, most closely resembles the Consultative Assembly, i.e. the Senate. 
The fact that the Council of Europe will only have contact with the Senate,  seems to imply 
that, under the internal procedure of the Community, it would be to the Senate that draft 
laws must first be submitted. In that way, the benefit of the opinions of the observers from 
the Council of Europe would  be secured from  the very beginning. 
15.  The  Committee  considered  that the members  of  the Community's Senate  should 
be the representatives of the Six Countries in the Assembly of the Council of Europe. This 
should make it easier to secure acceptance of an arrangement whereby the other members 
of the Consultative Assembly could continue to co-operate with their colleagues (though now 
with the status of  observers) when the latter were discussing matters peculiar to the Com-
munity. 
It will be noted that the members of the Community's Senate have to be appointed by 
the national Parliaments, as is  the general rule in appointing representatives in the Consul-
tative Assembly.  The only  outstanding  question  seems  therefore to be  the harmonisation 
of the number of  seats allotted to the respective members of the Community in the Senate 
and in the Consultative Assembly.  A mere decision by the Committee of  Ministers of tlle 
Council of  Europe should  be sufficient  to settle the point. 
16.  What rights should be given  in  the  Community's Senate to the representatives of 
non-member States? Internal liaison is thus seen to be dependent, in substance, ort  the pos-
sibility of achieving  close  co-operation .  within the Senate. 
The following  points  must  be  emphasised : 
- Certain European States which  are not members of the Community,  will neverthe-
lessbe Associates. Their status, which is defined in M.  SEMLER's report (cf.  Part IV), confers 
on them correl~ttive rights and obligations : in particular participation, with a right to vote 
or in  a  consultative capacity,  in the proceedings of  the Senate  or in the  periodical  con., 
terence on  the level  of the Executive Organ\satioll  (cf,  Resolution III  § 14). 
- States which are pot Associates cannot lay claim to these rights solely on the ground 
of  membership  in  the  Council  of  Europe.  The  Committee,  desirous  of  promoting  co-
operatioll, suggests that  observers  with  limited  rights  be  admitted  to the Senate of the 
Community. Representatives in the Consultative Assembly of countries J10t  members of  the 
Community might  attend the meetings  (except  during  secret  sessions)  without  the right 
to speak. They would have no advisory capacity but could  speak when invited to do so by 
the Senate. They could submit memoranda in writing, the printing and circulation of which 
would be decided by the Bureau of the Senate. 
(ii)  The  Executive  Institutions. 
17.  As regards the Council of National Ministers of the Community, the same individuals 
might sit in that Cou11.cil and in the Committee of Ministers of the Concil of Europe without 
the need for  any amendment of the latter's Statute. 
18.  Can the Community, as such,  be represented in the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of  Europe ? 
The Committee considered that, in addition to the six Ministers representing their coun-
tries, individually,  in the Committee of  Ministers,  a  seat should be given to an additional 
member who would be the official representative of the Community. Such a decision would 
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19.  Coordination being thus achieved, the question arises what rights will be enjoyed in 
the Community's Executive organisation by Ministers representing States in  the Council of 
Europe which  are not Members  of  the Community. 
The Committee  considered  that,  although  the status of  Associate  implies  certain pri-
vileges  in these matters (cf.  Resolution III,  § 14),  the mere fact of being a  member of the 
Council of Europe would not justify them. However, the members of the Council of Europe 
who are concerned might be invited to take part in certain proceedings. 
The· question also arises what will be the position of the Ministers of Member States of 
the Community in the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, supposing  that one 
of their decisions came up for discussions there ? It seems obvious that they will be bound 
by their decisions. It would be inconceivable that the minority should reiterate its objections 
before  a  larger body. 
(iii)  Court  of  Justice. 
20.  The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted, on 27 September 1952, 
a  Recommendation  36,  advocating  the institution of  a  single  European Court of  Justice. 
The Committee did not however endorse this proposal (cf.  Part. III and Resolution IV, § 1 ). 
D) Conclusions. 
21.  The  following  conclusions  are  to  be drawn  from  the  foregoing  statement,  which 
defines  the  scope  of  internal liaisons : 
a)  The  Assembly should propose at the same time the Statute of the Community and 
a modification of the Statute of the Council of Europe, with a view to making internal liaisons 
possible  and to facilitating  close  co-operation  between  the Community and the Council of 
Europe. 
This 'will however involve two distinct juridical acts, which cannot be comprised in one 
and the .same  instrument. They cannot  be adopted simultaneously, and the amendment of 
the Statute of the Council of Europe cannot  be made  a  condition  for  the adoption  of the 
Community's Statute.  · 
The changes here proposed in the Statute of the Council of Europe are legal rather than 
political, and do not entail any waivers of sovereignty. But they have the great advantage of 
enabling us to set up a logical framework in which, not only the Community, but also any other 
community which may be set up hereafter can be given a place. Such a harmonious arrangement 
will facilitate super-positions of communities, which may often present great diversity in their 
territorial extent. 
The twofold proposal of the Assembly will moreover have great psychological importance. 
It will prove the determination of the Member States of the Community not to be separated 
from the rest of Europe but, on the contrary, to strengthen the Council of Europe. 
b)  The fact that the institutions of the Community are comprised in the broader insti-
tutions of the Council of Europe must however in no way limit or condition the Community's 
sovereignty; while  facilitating co-operation there can  be no question of subordination. 
IV. - SECOND  SOLUTION  - EXTERNAL  LIAISON 
22.  <<External  liaisons  >>  do not ·offer  the same advantages as  <<internal  liaisons » which 
facilitate the adjustment and interlocking of the organs and institutions that together make 
up the whole European machinery. They may have to be adopted as a  second-best solution 
if the structures of the two Communities are not sufficiently homogeneous. External liaisons 
however offer a valuable assurance of collaboration; they were examined in Opinion No.  3 of 
September 30,  1952 adopted by the Consultative Assembly  of the Council of Europe on «the 
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The Committee  considered  that  external  liaisons  should  supplement  internal liaisons. 
If  the Statute of the Council of Europe is not amended, externalliaisonswill alone be possible. 
It is in view of that contingency that certain points already enumerated in the first solution 
are taken up again  in the second. 
28.  The  Committee  submits  the  follo\>Ving  suggestions : 
a) The Community and the Council of Europe might have their seat in the same locality 
and in the same premises ; this could be done without any loss of sovereignty by either of them. 
b)  Certain relations, based on the procedure of the internal operation of each organisation, 
are conceivable,  for  instance: 
(i)  Exchange of information, statistics and annual reports (cf.  in particular the protocol 
of the E. C. S. C.  Treaty concerning relations with the Council of Europe). 
Similar information should be transmitted to the Council by the States whiCh  are not 
members of the Community, thus providing reciprocity. 
(ii)  The  possibility  of  mutual consultation. 
(iii)  The possibility of mutual recommendations and the  obligation  to  report  on  the 
action  taken in regard to these recommendations  (cf.  the Protocol of the E. C. S.C. Treaty 
and the statutory resolution of the Councill of Europe concerning specialised authorities. 
b)  Other liaisons might be set up, based on a  combination  of personal functions, e. g.: 
-The identity of the members of one Chamber  of the Community's  Parliament  (the 
. Senate)  and of  the  Consultative  Assembly.  · 
- Identity of the Ministers sitting in the Community's Council of National Ministers 
and in the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 
- Identity of the administrative services which might be used, to a  certain extent, by 
the Community and the Council of Europe. 
d)  The Council of Europe might, subject to conditions to be determined, accredit observers, 
whose  competence would have to be defined, to the different institutions of the Community. 
- Attendance at meetings  without the right to speak ; 
- The expression  of opinions,  as of right, or on  invitation; 
- Communication  of written  memoranda etc. 
e)  The Community might decide not to deal with certain matters  till it had obtained the 
opinion of the Council of Europe (Preliminary and  compulsory consultation). This would apply, 
for instance, to all economic questions. It  would be regrettable to conclude agreements  between 
the Six without  having first  studied  the possibility of wider coordination. 
Some members of the Committee however drew  attention to the risk of  multiplying 
organisms  and  making the procedure too cumbersome. 
f)  Finally, different situations might be conceived in regard to third States, considered 
individually. 
(i)  Member States of the Council of Europe would be able to enter the Community (cf. 
Resolution  II,  §§  33  and  34). 
(ii)  States which  are members of the Council of  Europe might  accredit embassies or 
permanent delegations to the Community  (cf.  Resolution II, § 10  and the preceding sub-
paragraph of the High Authority of the E.  C.  S.  C.).  · 
(iii)  Co-operation with specified  States could  be ensured  in forms  more  flexible  than 
affiliation, e. g.  by association agreements which, as we have already said, would lead to the 
setting up of veritable specialised communities of 7, 8,9 members ... (Cf.Part IV of'M. SEMLER's 
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ANNEX  TO  PART  V 
NOTE 
submitted by M.  PARIS, 
Secretary~General of the Council 
1of  Europe 
I 
i 
I. - The aim of the Council of Europe, as stated in !its Statute, is to achieve a greater 
unity between its Members. 
When it was found that some of the Members of the C()Uncil were desirous of establishing 
closer organic ties with each  other - << Specialized  Aut~orities  >>  they were called  at that 
time - it was· admitted that this policy was  in conformity witht the aim of  the Council 
of Europe - provided, naturally, that it was  consistent with a policy of closer union bet-
ween all the Members of  the Council.  · 
All the texts adopted by the Council of Europe in regard to Specialized Authorities and 
partial Agreements were inspired by the same consideration ; to encourage any policy  cal-
culated to tighten the links between a group of Member States within the framework of the 
aim of the Council of  Europe. 
It was,  indeed, the same idea that inspires the <<Eden»  proposal. 
Accordingly, it  should be admitted that the creation of a Community between the Member 
· States of  the European Communities of Coal and Steel and Defence is  in conformity with 
the aim of the Council of Europe. This fact might be declared in the Statute of the Council 
itself, for instance, by the insertion in article 1 of a clause in the .following terms: 
<<  The Community created by the Statute signed at. . . . . . . .  on the  . . . . . . . .  is in con-
formity  with the aim of the Council. The Members of the Council,  which do not belong to 
that Community, remain free to accede to it, or not, or to conclude Association Agreements 
subject to the conditions laid down in the Community's Statute.» 
The rules in regard to the liaison to be established between the Community and the 
other Members of the Council of Europe could be logically deduced from the above decla-
ration. The aim of such a liaison would be : to encourage the action of the Members of the 
Community with a view to the simulta-neous achievement of a closer union between all the 
Members of the Council of Europe. 
II. - The Committee considered that it might be easier to establish what it calls in-
ternal liaison between the Community and the Council of  Europe, if the political character 
of that Council were given greater emphasis. 
It was recognized, on the other hand, that it would be<< politically impossible and prac· 
tically useless to ask the Members of the Council of Europe for  an abandonment of sove-
reignty.» 
As the consultative character of the Council of Europe would therefore have to be main-
tained, the Committee proposes to ask the Members of the Council of Europe to make pre-
liminary consultation of  the Council obligatory in certain cases. 
Here it may be observed that a  similar proposal had already· been submitted by  the 
Consultative Assembly to the Committee of Ministers, but it had failed to obtain the approval 
of that body. 
Could we not, however, seek to strengthen the consultative action of the Council of Europe 
by strengthening the undertakings given by the Members regarding the achievement of the 
Council's aim, on the lines, for example, of the  clauses which bind the Member States of the 
Brussels Treaty (articles 1,  2  and 3)  ? 
III. - The Committee has also suggested that the Council of Europe should have com-
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On  that point it should be noted that, in a  resolution adopted by the Committee  of 
Ministers at its eighth session in May 1951, that Committee declared its intention of giving 
effect  to the following  provisions : 
Powers  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  (Article 15  of  the Statute). 
cc The conclusions of  the Committee may ,where  appropriate, take the form of  a  con-
vention or agreement. In that event the following  provisions shall apply : 
(i)  The  convention  or  agreement  shall  be  submitted  by  the Secretary-General  to  all 
Members for ratification ; 
(ii)  Each Member  undertak~s that within one year of such  submission, or, where  this 
is  impossible owing to exceptional circumstances,  within eighteen months, the question of 
ratification of the convention or agreement shall be brought before the competent authority 
or authorities in its country ; 
(iii). The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General ; 
(iv)  The convention or agreement shall be binding only on such Members as have  r<;~.ti­
fied  it. 
It  would appear, that, by the insertion of that text in the Statute of the Council of Europe, 
and also by reason of the fact that the Consultative Assembly is already at liberty to propose 
draft conventions to the Committee of Ministers,  the Committee could  receive  satisfaction 
on this point. 
IV.  - It has been  suggested by the Committee that the 0. E. E. C.  and the E. P. U. 
should be integrated in the Council of Europe, or, if that is found impossible, that a coordinating 
organ should be set up under the auspices of the Council of Europe. 
The first  of these suggestions is not one  which could  be dealt with by a  simple modifi-
cation of the Statute of the Council of Europe; the second would not require such a  modi-
fication. 
The suggestion for the creation, under the auspices of.the Council of Europe, of a co-ordi-
nating organ  which  would ensure the unity of the policy of the Council of Europe,  of  the 
0. E. E. C.,  and of the E. P. U.  does  not call for  any observations.  Nevertheless,  attention 
should be drawn to the agreements which now govern the relations between the Council of 
Europe and the 0. E. E. C.  These agreements already enable the Council of Europe, and in 
. particular the  Consultative  Assembly,  to assume  an  important consultative role  in  regard 
to the economic policy which the Members of the 0. E. E. C.  pursue in that organization. 
V.  - In order to assist in bringing the organs of the Council of Europe into harmony 
with  those  of the  European  Political Community,  the  Committee  has  put forward  certain 
suggestions :  · 
a)  The number of representatives in the Consultative Assembly should be proportionate 
to the number occupying seats in the Senate of the Community  . 
.  The adoption of this proposal would only require a suitable modification of article 26 of 
the Statute. As a fact the proposal is already comprised in the cc Eden Plan >>  and its adoption 
would not be likely to encount~r serious difficulties. Nevertheless it raises the question of the 
maintenance  of the system of Substitutes. 
It would be possible to envisage the insertion of a  clause in the Statute of the Council 
of Europe, according to which the Members of one of the Chambers of the Community would, 
automatically, be the representatives:of theJMember States of the Community in the Consul-
tative Assembly. 
N.  B.  An examination of the foregoing questions could not be usefully undertaken until 
the Assembly has stated its views on the Committee's proposals in regard to the Community's 
Parliament.  . 
b)  The  Committee  has  examined  the problem of  the  representation  of  the  Executive 
Organ of the Community in the Committee of Ministers of the Council  of Europe. 
It  is difficult to say what modification wiJI have to be made in the Statute for that purpose, 
until the character of this representation, and the role to be assigned to it, have been made 
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It is,  however, evident that such a  representation might appreciably effect  the present 
procedure of the Committee of Ministers. 
VI. - It appears, speaking generally, that a  suitable method of creating liaison between 
the Council of Europe and the Community would be the transmission of reports to the Council 
of Europe by the competent organs of the Community. That system has already been advo-
cated in the statutory text concerning the Specialized Authorities, and has been adopted in 
the Protocol appended to the Treaty instituting the European Coal  and Steel Community. 
However, it would  be advisable  to make it clear under what conditions these reports 
would be drawn up and submitted to the Council of Europe (See in regard to that point  § (~H) 
of  the statutory text  concerning the Specialized  Authorities). 
Furthermore, it would be desirable to consider what action the Council of Europe could 
take on these reports, and what would be the consequences of any resolutions which the organs 
of the Council of  Europe might  adopt in  regard to them. 
VII.-It  would also be desirable to adopt the idea of exchanges of information, documents 
and statistical data between the Political Community and the Member States of the Council 
of Europe not belonging to the Community  (See  § (iv)  a)  sub-paragraph 2 of the statutory 
Resolution concerning the Specialized Authorities). These exchanges might be effected through 
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, and they would enlarge the role which the 
Council  of Europe might assume as an organ of liaison. PART  VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
ADOPTED BYe THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE R£SOLUTION  I 
The integration of the European Steel and Coal  Community and of the European Defence Coin· 
munity in the Community. 
Tra-nsfer  of  the  Powers  a-nd  Compete-nce  of the  E. C. S.C. a-nd  the  E. D. C. 
1.  The Community shall possess the powers and competence conferred on the European 
Coal and Steel Community and on the European Defence Community by the treaties which . 
set up those Communities. 
Methods  for  the  i-ntegration  of the  E. C. S. C  and  the  E. D. C.  i-n  the  Europea-n  Political 
Community (1).  · 
The Community, together with the E. C. S.C. and the E. D. C. shall constitute a single 
legal within this entity the E. C. S. C.  and the E. D. C.  shall be separately administered in 
accordance with the provisions respectively applicable to those Communities. 
a)  Parliamentary  I-nstitutions. 
S.  The Parliament of the Community will forthwith take the place and assume the powers 
and competence of the Common Assembly of the E. C. S.C. and the E. D. C. 
b)  Council  of National Ministers. 
4.  The Council of National Ministers of the Community will forthwithtake the place and 
assume the powers and competence of the Councils of  Ministers of  the E. C. S.C. and the 
E. D.C. 
c)  Institutions  for  the  settleme-nt  of  disputes. 
5. ·!he judicial powers of the Community will the assig'l\:ed to the Court of justice provided 
fot the E. C. S.C. and E. D. C.  . 
d) Executive Institutions. 
TRANSITIONAL  REGIME. 
8.  Until the eJcpity o£ a period of adaptation, the duration of whkh shall be detertnined. 
(i)  The  High  Authority of  the E. C. S. C.  and the Commissariat  of  the E. D. C.  will 
continue in office,  but will discharge the functions assigned to them by the E. C. S.C. and 
E. D. C.  Treaties under the direction and supervision of the European Executive Council; 
(ii)  The President of the High Authority of the E. C. S. C. and the President of the Com-
missariat of theK D. C. will sit« ex officio» upon the European E~ecutiveCouncil  with a right 
to vote, but they will retain their personal status resulting from the E. C. S.C. and E. D. C. 
Treaties, in particular from Articles 24 of the E. C. S.C. and 26 of the E. D. C. 
(iii)  During the period of adaptation the Community; in collaboration with the President 
of the High Authority of the E. C. S. C. and the President of the Commissariat of the E. D. C., 
will prepare the necessary protocols for the complete, progressive integration of the E. C. S. C. 
and the E. D. C. in the Community (2).  · 
(1)  Hereinafter -referred  to  as the Community. 
- (11)  No decision has yet been taken as to the methods by whkh t~se protocols are to be  adopted 
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DEFINITIVE  REGIME. 
7.  At the expiry of the period of adaptation the European Executive Council will take 
over the functions of the High Authority of the E. C. S. C.  and of the Commissariat of the 
E. D. C., in conformity with the rules laid down in the E. C. S. C.  and E. D. C.  Treaties, in so 
far as those rules have not been modified by the Community in accordance with the procedure 
laid down in § 8 of the Resolution on the powers and competence of the Community. 
RESOLUTION  D 
The powers  and competence  of the Community. 
f._.  - GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
1.  A  Political Community,  supranational and indissoluble,  founded  on a  union  of  the 
peoples, is instituted by the present Statute. 
2.  The Community has the following  mission and general aims : 
- to  assist in protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Member States ; 
- to assist, in co-operation with the other free nations, in ensuring the security of the 
Member  States against  all  aggression ; 
- with that object, to co-ordinate the foreign  policy of the Member States ; 
- to contribute, with due regard to the general economy Of the Member States, to eco-
nomic expansion, to increasing employment and to the raising of the standard  of  living of 
the Member States by means, in particular, of the progressive establishment of  a  common 
market; 
- to assist in the attainment by the Member States, in liaison with the other States 
parties to these Treaties, of  the gen~ral objectives laid down in the Convention on Human 
Rights, the Statute of the Council of Europe, the European Convention for  Economic Co-
operation and the North Atlantic Treaty. 
3.  The Community can discharge its mission only within the limits of the competence 
which is expressly conferred on it by its Statute and under the conditions specified therein. 
The competence  and powers conferred  on the Community by its Statute shall be res-
trictively interpreted.  ·  · 
4.  The  Community· is  a  legal  personality. 
In international relations, the Community shall possess the legal personality necessary 
to enable it to discharge its duties and to aschieve its objects. 
In each of the Member States, the Community shall possess the widest measure of legal 
capacity which is enjoyed by national corporate bodies; in particular, it may acquire,  or 
dispose of, immovable and movable assets and may appear before the courts. 
5.  The Member States undertake. to take all the general or special measures necessary 
to ensure the performance of the obligations resulting from the decisions or recommendations 
of the Community's institutions and to assist the Community in the accomplishment of its 
mission. 
The Member States undertake to refrain from any measure which  would  be incompa-
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B. - CONCERNING POWERS AND COMPETENCE WITHIN THE COMPASS OF THE 
E. C. S.C.  AND  E. D. C.  TREATIES,  AND  THE  REVISION  THEREOF. 
6.  The Community shall posse!)s the powers and competence conferred on the European 
Defence Community and the European Coal and Steel Community by.  the treaties which  insti-
tuted those bodies, and, in addition,  any other powers and competence conferred on it by 
th~ present  Sta.tute  or by subsequent amendments. thereto  .. 
TheCommtinity shall exercise its powers and competence underthe conditions laid down 
in the resolution on theintegration of the E. C. S.C. and the E. D. C. in  the Community. 
7.  Excepts  in urgent  cases,  the  normative  measures that have to betaken by the exe-
cutive institutions under article 95  of the E. C. S.C. (sub""paragraph  1)  and article 124,  of 
the E. D. C.  (in cases not provided for in the E. D. C. and E. C. S.C. treaties) must be sub-
mitted for previous appro val by the Parliament of  the Community.  In urgent  cases,  the 
measures in question  shall  be submitted  subsequently  for  ratification by  the  Parliament 
of the Community. 
8.  (i)  The provisions of the E. C. S.C. and E. D. C. Treaties concerning the competence, 
the powers and the institutions of those two Communities can he amended only by the cons-
titutional procedure for revision referred to in section F. 
(H)After the expiry of a  transitional period, the Political Community may revise those. 
provisions of the E. C. S.C. and E. D.C. Treaties which are not covered  by sub-paragraph 
(i)  above,  under the following  conditions:  . 
a)  The provisions concerning the powers assigned to the respective  institutions of the 
Communities or concerning the allocation of powers between them, or concerning the pre-
rogatives of the governments within these Communities (in particular, the powers and com-
petence of the Councils of Ministers of the E. C. S.C. and the E. D.C.) may not be modified 
by the legislative organs of the Political Community except with the unanimous concurrence 
of the Council of National Ministers. 
b)  The other provisions of the E. C. S. C.  and E. D. C.  Treaties which are not cosvered 
by sub-paragraphs (i)  and (ii, a) of the present paragraph shall be  considered laws of  the 
Community and may be amended by the legislative organs of the Political Community under 
the conditions laid down inthe Statute. 
c)  If a  State considers  that an amendment adopted under the procedure referred to in 
sub-paragraph (b)  is calculated to provoke grave and persistent disturbancesin its economy, 
it ma:y appeal tot he Court, which may consider whether or not the complaints is well-founded 
and  decide  to  annul the  amendment. 
(iii)  In case of a dispute concerning the procedure applicable to a proposal for an amend-
ment (or in regard to the compatibility of the said amendment with the maintenance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms;  or with certain other fundamental principles of the Sta-
tute, which must he defined subsequently) the Court may be seized of the question by an ins-
titution of the. Community or by a Member State. The examination of the proposal by the 
Community's institution shall be suspended  until the Court has given judgment. 
(iv)  In the case of the E. D. C., the agreement of the non-member States which are con-
cerned must be obtained in regard to the compatibility of the amendments to the Treaty with 
the engagements for mutual aid undertaken by the E. D. C.  and the United  Kingdom,  on 
the one hand, and theE. D. C.  and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, on the 
other hand, so long as the said treaty continues in force. 
C. - POWERS AND COMPETENCE WITHIN THE GENERAL SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM 
CREATED  BY THE  ;E. S.C. S.  AND  E. D. C.  TREATIES. 
Powers  and  competence  in matters  of  foreign  policy. 
9.  The Community shall lay down, by the methods referred to in paragraphs 13 and 14, 
the common objectives in foreign policy of the Member States within the spheres of compe-
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The attainment of the objectives thus laid down shall be ensured both by the Commu-
nity and the Member  States. 
10.  The Community shall possess the right, within the sphere of its competence, of accre-
diting  and  receiving  representatives.  . 
11.  The  Community  may  conclude  international  agreements  concerning  the  matters 
referred to in paragraph 6.  It may conclude agreements for Association with third States. 
These agreements shall bind the Community and each of the Member States. The latter 
may not conclude international agreements which would conflict with the Community's prior 
engagements. 
12.  (i)  Agreements previously concluded by the Member States, in matters within the 
Community's competence, which conflict with the Statute or with international agreements 
subsequently concluded  by the Community, must be denounced or revised as soon as is pos.-
sible  under international law. 
(ii)  Draft agreements which Member States sign separately with third States concerning 
matters within the Community's competence are to be transmitted to the European Executive 
Council for an opinion before ratification  .. The latter body may seek a ruling from the Court 
as to the compatibility of the draft agreement with the earlier engagements of the Community. 
In such cases, ratification will be postponed until the Court has given judgment. 
In case the whole or a part of the agreement is found to be incompatible, the Court may 
forbid  its ratification  ( 1). 
13.  Until the expiry of a transitional period (the length of which remains to  be defined), 
- the common objectives of the Community's  foreign  policy  will be defined  by the 
European Executive Council, subject to the unanimous concurrence of the Council of National 
Ministers,  and  under the control of  the Community's  Parliament. 
- the European Executive Council may, within the limits of the general policy thus laid 
down,  negotiate  international agreements  on behalf of the Community.  These  agreements 
will be signed by the latter after authorigation has been given by the unanimous agreement 
of the Council of National Ministers, and will, if necessary, be submitted to the Community's 
Parliament for  leave to ratify. 
The provisions of  §§  12  and 13 will not affect the powers which have already devolved, 
upon the executive organs of the E. C. S.C. and E. D. C.  in regard to the conclusion of inter-
national agreements. 
14. The definitive regime is to be settled before the expiry of the transitional period by the 
legislative organs of the Community,  following  the  unanimous  agreement  of the Council 
of  Ministers (2). 
Powers  and Competence  within- the  sphere  of the  policy of the  Specialised  Authorities. 
14 bis. Rapporteur's note: this question is to be carefully studied in the Committee after 
the session of the «Ad  Hoc>>  Assembly. 
(1)  The procedure laid down in paragraph 12  (ii)  does not cover the case of a  Member State con-
cluding an international agreement in conflict with the common political objectives laid down by the 
Community. 
This question is linked to the more general question of the observance by Member States of the 
Community's decisions, and the means of constraint which the Community might adopt towards them, 
should they default in their obligations. It is clear that if the default related to a  political obligation, 
it could not be dealt with by a purely judicial decision. On the other hand, if it were referred to a poli-
tical organ for appraisal, this might lead to a conflict between the Community and one of its members. 
So long as the system of a  dual competence concerning the same subjects continues to exist, it will be 
impossible to avoid one or other of these disadvantages. 
(a)  This procedure is the same as that laid down for the revision of the powers of the Councils 
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Financial powers. 
15.  (i)  The Community shall have a  single,  annual and comprehensive budget. 
(ii)  The budget shall be prepared by the Community's Executive Organ,  according  to 
its own rules of procedure. It shall be voted by the Parliament of the Community. 
(iii)  The European Executive Council shall have a right of initiative in matters of expen-
diture. The Parliament may exercise its right of amendment within the limits of the grand 
total of expenditure. 
(iv)  If an annual budget has not been approved by the Parliament before the beginning 
of the financial year, the budget of the preceding year will continue in force for a quarter at 
a time, pending the adoption of the new budget. 
16.  The receipts of  the Community shall include : 
-receipts which are to be levied directly by the Community; 
- contributions paid by the Member States. 
The contributions of the Member States shall be settled by agreement between the Com-
munity and the Member States. 
A basic  law,  adopted by  the  Parliament  of  the  Community  and  subject  to  the 
unanimous agreement of  the Council of National Ministers will determine the methods  for 
determining the assessment, the rates and the method of collection of the Community's taxes., 
The taxes will be voted each year by the qualified organs of the Community, under con-
ditions laid down in the said organic law. 
No privileges will be allowed  in regard to fiscal  matters. 
17.  The Community shall have the power to issue loans. 
No loan may be issued without the approval of the Parliament, except when  necessary 
to provide for the annual balancing of accounts by the Treasury. 
18. The administration of the budget shall be undertaken and controlled by the qualified 
organs of the Community, bearing in mind the requirements of the economies of the Member 
States, and avoiding any measures which might prejudice their economic or financial stability. 
19.  During the transitional period, a provisional regime will be established on the following 
bases: 
(i)  The budgetary regime and system of receipts and expenditure as  laid down in the 
E. D. C. and the E. C. S. C. Treaties will continue in force.  ·  · 
The single common budget will be subdivided into three separate chapters, governed by 
different legal systems. The beginning and end of the budgetary years will be the same for the 
three chapters. 
The three chapters will all be communicated to the Parliament, but  in so  far  as  expen-
diture relating to the E. D. C.  and the E. C. S.C. is concerned the Parliament will exercise 
only those functions specified in the E. D. C.  and E. C. S. C.  Treaties. 
(ii)  The expenditure other than that provided by the E. D. C. Treaty and by the E. C. S.C. 
Treaty will be covered by the governmental contributions. 
The amount and the method of assessing these contributions will be decided by common 
agreement between the Community and the Member States.  Until this agreement has been 
reached, the allocation of these charges will be made on the basis of the quotas laid down in 
the  E. D. C.  Treaty. 
20.  During the transitional period the organs ofthe Community shallprepa.re the  defi~ 
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D.  - ECONOMIC POWERS. 
In order to achieve the general tasks set forth in § 2, and more particularly with regard to 
questions linked to the progressive attainment of a common market on the lines of the E. D. C. 
and E. C. S. C. Treaties, the Community tnay deliver opinions, addressed either to the Govern~ 
ments or to the Parliaments of the Member States under conditions laid down by the Statute. 
22.  Before  the  Member,  States adopt :  , 
- measures restricting the free movement of goods, in particular monetary measures, or 
- measures effecting exchanges of manpower, 
the Community must be consulted first  as to the conformity of these measures with the 
principles laid down in the E. D. C.  and E. C. S.C. Treaties. 
In urgent cases,  the Community must be informed forthwith,  so  that an opinion  may 
subsequently  be  delivered.  · 
23.  The Member States are bound to ask the opinion of the Community on any new 
treaty which they have concluded within the fields indicated in  § 22,  before submitting it to 
their Parliaments for permission to ratify. 
24.  The provisions referred to in  § 25  below concerning the powers conferred upon the 
Community in order to create a common market, will be embodied in a special Protocol, which 
will be submitted to the Member States for ratification at the same time as the Statute, but 
which  will  not form an integral part of the  Statute. 
25.  The said Protocol shall be drawn up on the basis of the following principles: 
I. The Community shall have the power, in accordance with the procedure laid down in 
sub-paragraph II: 
(i)  In regard to  the  liberalization trade. 
a)  to prohibit the introduction of any measure  by the  Member  States imposing  fresh 
quantitative restrictions  on the free  movement of goods  between the Member  States. 
b)  to decide on the gradual reduction and final abolition of quantitative restrictions between 
the Member  States. 
(ii)  In regard to  customs  dues 
a)  to take the necessary steps for  the progressive establishment of a  common  customs 
r~gime  vis~a~vis third States ; these measures to be calculated to promote the development of 
international trade ; 
b)  to decide on the gradual reduction and final abolition of customs duties between the 
Member  States ; 
(iii)  In regard  to  monetary questions. 
to take the necessary steps to ensure the stability of the exchange rates and the progressive 
unification  of the monetary systems in  Member  States. 
II. The decisions referred to in § I above shall be taken upon the proposal of the European 
Executive Council, by the Parliament of the Community. The First Chamber will decide by 
a  simple majority, and the Second Chamber  (Chamber of States) by a  two-thirds majority. 
They may adopt the measures necessary to ensure the efficient functioning of the common 
market, and also transitional measures rendering it possible to grant compensation to certain 
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E.- POWERS  AND  COMPETENCE  TO  ENSURE THE SAFEGUARD  OF  HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. 
26.  The Comri:mnity and each of the Member States shall guarantee to every person under 
their jurisdictionthe rights and freedoms laid down in the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on  4th November 1950 and in 
the Protocol thereto signed in Paris on 20th March 1952. 
The Community shall have the necessary competence to ensure the maintenance of these 
rights and freedoms in Member States, under the conditions laid down in the Statute. 
F.  -PROCEDURE FOR  THE  AMENDMENT  OF  THE  STATUTE. 
27.  The initiative for a revision of the Community's Statute shall appertain to the Par-
liament and to the European Executive Council, as  well as to each Member State. 
Proposals for  amendments shall be submitted to the Parliament of the Community, to 
the European Executive Council and to the Council of National Ministers. 
28.  Amendments to the provisions of  the E. D. C.  and the E. C. S.C. Treaties referred 
to in  § 7,  (i)  above,  and amendments relating to: 
- the provisions of the Statute referred to in section  A of the present resolution, 
- the powers and competence of the Community or its institutions, shall be adopted by 
the Community following the agreement of the Parliament (voted by a qualified majo-
rity in each Chamber), of the European Executive Council,  and the unanimous  agree-
ment of the Council of National Ministers. They shall be transmitted to the Member States 
for communication to the Parliaments and shall not come into force until such time as 
they have been approved by the Parliaments of all the Member States (1). 
29.  Amendments  concerning  the  powers  assigned  to  the  respective  institutions of the 
Community and the allocation of powers between the institutions adopted by the Community 
in virtue of the agreement  of the Parliament of the Community  (both  Chambers  deciding 
by a  qualified majority),  the  agreement of the European Executive Council, and that of the 
Cduncil of National Ministers deciding by unanimity. They shall come into force immediately 
upon their adoption. 
80.  Amendments relating to clauses of the Statute other than those referred to in  §§  28 
and 29 above shall be adopted by the Community following  the agreement of the Parliament 
of the Community, deciding by a qualified majority, the agreement of the European Executive 
Council, and that of the Council of National Ministers deciding by a majority. They shall come 
into force  immediately upon their adoption  by the Community.  · 
81.  In case of dispute regarding the procedure applicable to a given proposal for an amend-
ment, or regarding its compatibility with the maintenance of human rightsand fundamental 
freedoms (and certain other basic principles of the Statute which remain to be defined later), 
the matter may be referred to the Court by an institution of the Community or by a Member 
State. The examination of the proposal by the institution concerned shall be suspended till 
the Court has given judgment. 
,  (1)  The following alternative proposal was  submitted to the Committee,  which the latter agreed 
to bring to the notice of the Assembly : 
«The amendments (enumerated in  § 28)  after having been adopted  by the Community in  virtue 
of the unanimous agreement of the Council of National Ministers,  (or by  a  majority ?),  shall  be  the 
subject of a treaty concluded by the Governments  of the Member States and submitted for  ratification 
by the States in accordance with the constitutional rules of the respective countries.» 86  Report  of the  Conshtutional  Committee 
G.  MEMBERSHIP 
32.  The Community shall be instituted between  the Six  States  which  are  members of 
the European Coal and Steel Community and of theEuropean Defence Community. 
33.  The following  may apply for  membership of the Community: 
- the Member States of the Council of Europe, 
- any other European State regarded as capable of complying with the principle that 
every person under its jurisdiction shall enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
34.  The qualified organs of the Community  decide upon the request for admission and 
specify the conditions for admission according to the procedure laid down in the Statute. This 
procedure takes the form  of Act  additional to the Statute, in the which provision may also 
made  for  any  consequential  adjustments in  the  Statute that  may become necessary.  This 
Act  shall be submitted for ratification by the Member States. 
35.  The  Community  may conclude  agreements  for  Association (1): 
- with  European  non-member  States ; 
- with non-European States attached by constitutional links to a  Member State or to 
a  European  Associated  State. 
36.  Membership  (Consistence) 
Note by the. Rapporteur : the Committee considered that this important problem might 
be more usefully studied after the session  of the «Ad  Hoc>>  Assembly in January, when  the 
main lines of the Statute will have been settled. 
RESOLUTION  III 
The  political institutions  of the  Community. 
A.- THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMUNITY. 
a)  The  Peoples'  Chamber. 
1.  - Members  of  the Peoples'  Chamber shall be elected by direct  universal suffrage. 
2.  - The seats  in the Peoples'  Chamber shall be allotted  as  follows : 
- Germany, France and Italy will each be allowed 63  seats; Belgium and the Nether-
lands 30  seats each,  and Luxembourg 12  seats. 
3.  ~  Each country shall be at liberty to make the voting for the European elections 
compulsory. 
4.  - Electoral disputes  shall be submitted to the Peoples' Chamber itself.  The latter 
shall be at liberty to consult the Court of the Community on any legal points which it thinks 
desirable to submit to it. 
( 1)  The nature and the contents of the Association Agreements are dealt with in Resolution 5. Part  6.  - Conclusions  adopted  by  the  Constitutional  Committee  87 
·  5.  - Each deputy shall represent the Community as a whole. Voting upon mandatory 
instructions shall not be allowed.  · 
6.  - The question of  immunities  and  prerogatives shall be  regulated by a  provision 
similar to that of article 40  of the Statute of  the Council of  Europe. 
b)  The  Senate~ 
7.  - The Senate shall represent the States. 
It shall be the Second Chamber of the Parliament, and shall have the same powers and 
the same rights as the Peoples' Chamber. 
8.  - The Second Chamber cannot be a simple Council of National Ministers. 
The members of the Second  Chamber shall not be bound by mandatory instructions 
from  their governments. 
9.  - The members of the Senate shall be elected by the National Parliaments. 
They will thus be qualified to sit in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe 
and in the Senate of the Community at the same time. 
Each country shall be competent to decide, on the basis of its own Constitution, how 
the term «National Parliament n is  to be construed. 
10.  - The States shall be represented in the Senate on the  principle not of parity, but 
of  a  qualified distribution of  seats. 
Germany, France and Italy will be allowed 21  seats each; Belgium and the Netherlands 
10  seats each  and Luxembourg  4  seats. 
11.  --'-- Members  of  the  Senate  shall vote individually. 
c)  Liaison. 
12.  a)  The European Executive Council will negotiate the agreements which  associate 
third States with the Community. The Parliament of the Community shall ratify these  agree-
ments.  Such approbation shall bind the Community and the Member States.  · 
b)  The agreements for  Association  may provide  for  the  admission of  representatives 
of the Associated States into the organs of the Community. They shall lay down the rights 
and obligations of these organs of the Community. 
c)  The Senate may decide to admit observers appointed by third States which are mem-
bers of the Councilof Europe. These observers may attend the debates  of  the Senate and 
of its Committees ; they may not speak unless invited to do so by the President. 
d)  The Peoples' Chamber may decide to admit observers appointed by third States which 
are members of the Council of Europe. These  ob~ervers may attend the debates of the Cham-
ber. They shall not be entitled to speak.  · 
e)  In no  case may observers take part in the voting. 
/)  The question of the admission of observers of countries not members of the Council 
of  Europe is  reserved. 
B.- THE EXECUTIVE. 
13.  - The Political Community shall have no  Head of  State. 
14.  - The  Executive  Organ  of  the  Community  comprises  the  European  Executive 
Council and the Council of National Ministers. These two Councils will meet periodically in 
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15.  - The European Executive Council shall be represented by its President in matters 
of  ceremony and on the international plane. 
16.  ~  The European Executive Council shall· be organized in such a way as to enable 
it to function  continuously. 
17. -The European Executive Council  shall be appointed  as  follows  (1): 
- The President willbe appointed by a  procedure to be laid down subsequently, by 
the Council of National Ministers, in accordance with the provisions of  § 24. 
- When the President has been appointed he will select· six members of the Europea:p. 
Executive  Council,  either from  among  members  of  the Community's  Parliament or from 
among  persons not belonging to it. 
18.  - Subject to the reservation in § 6  (ii)  of the resolution on the integration of the 
E. C. S.C.  and  the E. D. C.  in the Community,  the European Executive Council  shall be 
collectively responsible to the Parliament of the Community. The members of the European 
Executive Council must resign from office if a motion of censure is passed in regard to them 
by a majority of either of the two Chambers. 
19.  - All  decisions concerning the competence of the European Executive Council shall 
be submitted for approval to the Council of National Ministers. This clause shall in no way 
affect the corresponding provisions of the Treaty of the E. C. S.C. or of the Treaty of the E. D. C. 
or of the present  Statute. 
20.  - Apart from a general competence to declare its approval, as provided in the pre-
sent  Statute, the Council  of National Ministers shall have powers of decision in matters for 
which provisions is  made in  the E. C. S.C. and E. D. C.  Treaties, according to the methods 
laid down  in those  Treaties. 
(I)  The Committee has referred the present paragraph to the Plenary Assembly without taking 
any decision upon  it,  and has attached to it the other proposals which were submitted by members 
of the Committee. 
Proposal  by MM.  Mollet  and  ]aquet. 
The European Executive Council shall consist of a  President and eight members appointed by  the 
Peoples' Chamber by a  two-thirds majority, on the proposal of the Committee of National Ministers. 
Proposal  by  M.  Becker. 
The  European Executive Council shall be appointed as follows : 
The first President will be appointed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Six Member States 
by a  two-thirds majority. 
Subsequent Presidents will be elected by the two Chambers in joint session. The election will be 
decided by a absolute majority of the members entitled to sit. Should such a majority not be obtained 
at the first or second ballot, a third ballot will be held ; the election will then be decided by a majority 
of the votes cast. 
The President  will select six persons, either from among the members of the Community's Par-
liament or from persons not belonging to that body,  who,  together with himself,  will constitute the 
European Executive Council. 
The European Executive Council will remain in office for two years, It may be overthrown before 
the expiry of that period by a vote of confidence passed by the Senate in pursuance of a  motion made 
to the Senate by the Peoples' Chamber. 
The vote of no confidence may be passed either with reference to a single Minister, or to the Coun-
cil as a  whole. If it is moved in regard to the President or in regard to the Council as a.  whole, it is 
only valid if the new President of the Executive Council is named in the motion. 
Proposal  by  MM.  Bergmann,  Persico  and  Santero. 
The European Executive Council will be constituted as follows: 
Its first  President will be appointed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States 
by a  two-thirds majority. 
Subsequently, the Presidents  will be appointed by a  two-thirds majority of the two Chambers 
. in joint session, at a  first or a  second ballot. Should a third ballot be necessary, a  simple majority will 
suffice. 
When the President has been  appointed he will select six members of the European Executive 
Council, either from among the members of  the Community's Parliament or from among persons not 
belonging to it, and will obtain a  vote from the Peoples' Chamber confirming the composition of the 
Council. 
The Executive Council will be appointed for two years. It may be overthrown before the e'q>iry 
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The members of  the European  Executive  Council  shall  be associated  in these  delibe-
rations in a  consultative capacity. 
21.  - The European Executive Council shall prepare the work of the Council of National 
Ministers. 
22.  - Subject to the approval of the Council of National Ministers, the European Exe~ 
cutive  Council  shall  undertake the general  direction  of  the Community. 
28.  ~  The Council of National Ministers shall consist  of  the Ministers entrusted with 
European  affairs  in  their  respective  governments. 
24.  - Except as  otherwise specially provided,  the Council  of National Ministers shall 
express its opinions by a  two-thirds majority of its members.  · 
Character  of the  Community's  administration. 
25.  - The Community's administration shall  be,  in  principle, an administration  dele-
gated to the national administrations. The administration of defence  will  constitute an ex-
ception.  · 
The Community  shall,  however,  be entitled to  establish  an administration  of its own 
if the Parliament  authorizes it so  to  do. 
Should the execution  of the measures enacted by the Community be entrusted to the 
administrative  departments  of  the  Member  States,  the European  Executive  Council  shall 
be entitled to supervise  the execution  by any appropriate means of investigation. It may, 
for instance, call for reports, undertake enquiries on the spot, examine documents, hear wit-
nesses  and inspect  records  and  documents. 
To ensure the smooth functioning of the Community's administration in harmony with 
the national administrations,  the  E~ropean Executive  Council  ma.y  establish councils  and 
mixed  administrative  or  consultative  committees. 
The measures for  implementing the rules above laid down wi11 be taken on the initiative 
of the European  Executive Council  and, consequently,  with the approval of the Committee 
of National Ministers. 
Basic  Principles  of  the  European  Civil  Service. 
26.  - The European Executive Council shall draw  up staff  regulations  for  civil  ser-
vants of the Community.  · 
Posts in the Community's Civil Service shall be filled on the basis of free access to the 
said service and of an equal footing for applicants. subject to the issue of rules providing for 
the distribution of the Community's  posts  among  the various nationalities in accordance 
with a  balanced  system. 
Right  of  intervention  ( «federal  executive  procedure  >>  ) 
27.  -_Every Member State, of the Community, shall be required to uphold and  main-
tain human rights as defined in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4th November 1950 and in the Protocol signed on 
30th March 1952. 
Acceptance of the Community's  Statute shall automatically involve  unreserved  adhe-
rence to the clause  conferring  compulsory  jurisdiction on the European Court  of  Human 
Rights.- _ 
The Community shall be assimilated to the signatory States of the European Convention 
for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as regards the judicial mecha-
nism  (Committee  and  Court)  provided by that Convention. 
The European Executive Council may institute proceedings before the Committee and 
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constitutional order, democratic institutions and fundamental human freedoms,  in case the 
latter should be gravely and persistently menaced in the territory of any of the Member States 
of the Community. 
The European Executive Council shall be further authorized to afford direct assistance! 
within the scope of the treaties in force, if invited to do so by the competent constitutiona, 
authorities of  the Member State concerned. 
C.  - ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL COUNCIL. 
28.  - An Economic and Social Council shall be set up and invested with a consultative 
function. 
Should the Council of Europe, in its turn, set up an Economic and  Social  Council, the 
one belonging to the Community shall be absorbed by that of the Council of Europe. In that 
case, the Economic and Social Council of the Council of Europe would exercise the consul-
tative function in economic and social matters vis-a-vis the Community, it being understood 
that, if needed, the opinion of that Economic and Social Council could be obtained in a dual 
form: an opinion by a majority of the representatives of the Member States of the Council 
of Europe, and an opinion by a majority of the representatives of the Member States of the 
Community.  . 
29.  - No transitional regime will be established. The institutions provided by the Sta-
tute shall be set up as soon as the latter comes into force. 
RESOLUTION  IV 
The judicial iustitutions:or the  Community. 
1.  The jurisdiction of the Community shall be assigned to the Court of Justice provided 
for the European Coal and Steel Community and for the European Defence Community. 
Accordingly, it has been decided that the jurisdiction of' the Community should not be 
assigned to the Court of Justice provided for in Recommendation  36  {1952)  of  the  Con-
sultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
Disputes arising within the Community, which fall under the provisionsofthe European 
Convention for the Protection of !Human Rights and Fundamental  Freedoms must be submitted 
to the Community's Court of Justice. 
If  the Court of Justice of the Community finds lhat a dispute regarding a question of law 
coming under the European Convention affects at the same time for  the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental  Freedoms both the relations  between Member States  and the  Community 
and relations between Member States as such, it will give final judgment on the matter (in 
conformity with the principle laid down in articles 87  E. C. S.C. and 122  E. D. C.).  Should 
this not be the case, the Community's Court of Justice will renounce jurisdiction, thus enabling 
the parties to bring the matter before the judicial authorities provided for in the European 
Convention for the Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
2.  The Court shall adjudicate upon disputes arising in the following  fields : 
A.- DISPUTES UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. 
a)  Appeals for annulment of general or individual acts of the Community's institutions• 
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of the High Authority or of the Commissariat in conformity with articles 33 and 38 E. C. S. C 
and articles 54,  57  and 58  E. D. C.). 
b)  Appeals on the ground  of failure  to take action, or demanding that the European 
. Executive Council (or the High Authority or the Commissariat) should fulfil its obligation to 
take certain action (cf.  art. 35,  E. C. S.C., 55  E. D. C.). 
c)  Appeals on the ground of action, or failure to take action, of such a nature as to'provoke 
fundamental and persistent disturbances in the economy of a Member State (cf. art. 37 E. C. S. C. 
55  E. D.  C.).  . 
d)  Disputes concerning the general contractual obligations of Member States, arid con-
cerning the penalties imposed for the failure to observe these obligations (d. art. 88 E. C. S. C., 
117  E. D. C.). 
e)  Disputes arising in cases where the legislation of a Member State has conferred juris-
diction (cf.  art. 43, para 2,  E. C. S.C., art. 64, para 2,  E. D. C.). 
f)  Appeals on points of law ccmcerning  cases in which a  national tribunal contests the 
validity of the decisions of the European Executive Council (or of the High Authority, or of 
the Commissariat  in  accordance  with  art 41  E. C. S.C.,  62  E. D. C.). 
B. - DISPUTES UNDER CRIMINAL LAW. 
a)  Fixing the amounts of :fines (pecuniary sanctions or fines) and daily payments (cf. art. 36 
E. C. S.C., art. 107, para 6, and 108, para 2, E. D. C;).  . 
b)  Military criminal cases (art. 61  and 67 E. D. C., and art. 19, 22 and 23 of the Judicial 
Protocolattached to the E. D. C.  Treaty.). 
C.- DISPUTES UNDER CIVIL LAW. 
a)  Appeals concerning injury due to an official act, including the whole extensive category 
of claims for damages (cf. art. 40,  34, para 2, E. C. S.C., art. 60 E. D. C.  in conjuction  with 
Chapter 1 of the Judicial Protocol and art. 114,  § 2, of that Treaty). 
b)  Appeals  concerning  contracts  (cf.  art.  42,  E. C. S.C.,  63  E. D. C.). 
D.  - MATTERS OF EXECUTION. 
a)  Suspense of compulsoryexecution of a decision  or recommendation of the Community 
(cf.  Art.  39,  para 2,  and art. 92,  E. C. S.C., art. 59,  para 2,  E. D. C.).· 
b)  Executions affecting the assets of the Community as a  result of decisions by organs 
of  the Member States (cf.  art. 1  Of  the Protocol on  the privileges  and  immunities  of  the 
E. C. S.C., art. 1 of the Draft Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the E. D. C.). 
c)  Interim action (cf. provisional measures, laid down in art. 39, para 3, E. C. S.C., art. 59 
E. D. C.). 
E.  - JURISDICTION  IN CERTAIN  CASES  IN VIRTUE  OF  SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
OF THE ANNEXED TREATIES OR CONVENTIONS (cf.  art. 43,  para 1,  E. C. S.C., 
art.  64,  E. D. C.),  in particular: 
a)  Redesignation and  revocation of members of the High Authority and of the Commissariat 
(in  conformity with art 10,  para 11,  and art.  12,  E. C. S; C.,  art.  23,  E. D. C.). 
b)  Disputes  between  the High  Authority a:nd  buyers arising  from  the prohibition  of 
contracting  (cf.  art. 63,  § 2,  E. C. S.C.).  .  . 
c)  Loss of pension rights by members of the Commissariat (cf. art. 20,  § 2, para 4, E. D. C.). 
d)  Decision regarding the obligation of Member States to give information to the Commis-
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e)  Collaboration in the modification of the powers and competence of the  .lligh Authority 
at the expiry of the transitional period (cf.  art. 95,  E. C. S.C.). 
8.  In these procedures,  jurisdiction shall be exercised in accordance  with the principle 
of the unity of jurisprudence. 
Accordingly, the Court shall give judgment in all disputes, irrespective of the Treaty under 
which  they originated. It is only within the Court that the allocation of cases  between  the 
Plenary Court and the Divisions of the Court will be effected. 
In the organisation of the Court it will therefore be necessary to create separate Divisions 
for  administrative, civil and criminal cases. 
4.  A special Division will settle constitutional disputes. This Division  will consist of the 
President of  the Court  and the Presidents of the Divisions.  -
5  .. The Division which is competent to adjudicate upon constitutional disputes, afforced 
by judges appointed by the Associated State, or States, will also function as an arbitral tribunal 
for  disputes with the Associated  States.  . 
6.  As a  rule, the Divisions will consist of a maximum of five  members. 
7.  During the transitional period, the concurrent rules laid down  by the Treaties setting 
up the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Defence Community will con-
tinue to govern  the status and the appointment of the judges. 
Under the definitive regime  the status of the judges shall be established in accordance 
with the following  principles : 
a)  The judges are appointed : 
- either by the governments, the appointments being approved by the Parliament  of 
the Community ; 
- or by the Parliament of the Community on the basis of a list furnished by the Govern-
ments; 
b)  The judges' salaries may be reduced during their term of office. 
c)  Judges shall enjoy a right of immunity. The Court shall have exclusive competence in 
disciplinary and criminal proceedings concerning its own members. 
d)  Judges shall not be elected for life.  No  age limits shall be laid down. 
e)  The Court  shall be competent  to  draw up its own  internal regulations and rules  of 
procedure. 
RESOLUTION  V 
Relations  of the  Community  with third  States  and  international  organisations. 
A.- ASSOCIATED  STATES 
A chapter on  Association, laying down the general conditions for  an Association,  shall 
be inserted in the Statute of the Community  . 
. The expression «Associated State >>  denotes a State which, having declared its willingness 
to collaborate in certain  fields  of action, has concluded an agreement of Association with the 
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2.  The legal status of an Associated State may be acquired: 
a)  by any European State which  is not a  member of the Community; 
b)  by any overseas State, when  constitutional links exist between  it and a  European 
State which is a member of the Community or is associated therewith. 
3.  An Association may be  concluded  for the Community's whole  field of activity, or in 
regard to one or more matters. 
- 4.  In principle, Association pre-supposes the intention of creating a link for a relatively 
long period of time. 
5.  An agreement of association creates rights and obligations both for the Community  and 
for the Associated State.  · 
The rights conferred on either of the contracting parties must be co-related to the obli-
gations which it assumes. 
6.  Association is effected by the conclusion of a agreement of Association, or such other 
arrangement, having the same object in view,  as may be agreed in common. 
7.  An agreement of Association  must contain the following essential provisions: 
a)  indication of the matters in respect of which the Association is concluded ; 
b)  specification of the rights and obligations of both contracting parties; 
c)  indication of the means to be employed for giving effect to the Association. 
These means include : 
- the accrediting of permanent representatives, or observers, of the Associated  State to 
the organs of the Community, in which they will sit, either  in a consultative capacity 
or with a right to vote ;  -
-the appointment of permanent mixed committees on the executive or on the parlia-
mentary level ; 
- the undertaking by the parties to keep each other informed and to consult together· 
For the rest, an agreement of Association may contain conventions of any kind which are 
connected with the aims of the Association. 
B.- NATO 
1.  In consequence of  the integration of the  European-Defence Community in the  Community, 
the powers and competence ofthe European Defence Community are transferred. to the Com-
munity. 
The Community must observe the articles of the E. D.C. Treaty which determine external 
relations with third parties, in particular, articles 2,  5,  13,  18,  32,  47,  68,  69,  70 ,77,  78 his, 
87 his,  91,  94,  120,  123, and the two protocols appended thereto. 
- 8.  Consequential modifications  will have to be made in the North Atlantic Treaty the 
Treatysetting up the European Defence Community in the form of supplementary agreements 
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RESOLUTION  VI 
Links  to  be  established  between the  Community and  the  Council  of Europe. 
a)  General  observations. 
1.  The links between Community and  the Council of Europe must be as numerous as 
possible. 
2.  They may be of two kinds : 
(i)  internal links, which imply the participation of the Council of Europe in the internal 
activities of  the Community ;  · 
(ii)  external links intended to co-ordinate the functioning of the two organizations, which 
would remain independent. 
All these links must be dovetailed. The Assembly specially recommends the establish-
ment of internal links.  This will involve certain .  amendments to the Statute of the Council 
of Europe; If that proves impossible, the external links will nevertheless be adequate. 
b)  Internal links. 
3.  The Assembly, desirous of giving expression to the wish of  the participating States 
to strengthen the Council of  Europe, of which they also  are members, and to make it the 
general political framework for  Europe by facilitating  the dovetailing of the Community's 
institutions with the corresponding institutions of the Council of Europe, suggests that the 
amendments indicated in the following paragraphs should be made in the statute of the Coun-
cil of  Europe. 
4.  The Statute of the Council of Europe should be amended, or its meaning should be 
clarified,  in order to provide for : 
- first,  prior consultation, which in certain cases would be obligatory, on all questions 
of European interest ; 
- secondly, the right of initiative in the preparation of all draft treaties, or legislation 
on similar lines, which relate to the above questions ; 
- lastly,  the competence  resulting from  the integration of  the C.  E.  C.  A.  and the 
E. P. U.  within the framework of the Council of Europe. 
In the absence of such integration, a mixed committee, set .up under the auspices of the 
Council of Europe, should study the co-ordination of the activities of all these organisations. 
5.  The Statute of the Council of Europe should be amended, or its meaning should be 
clarified, in such a way as to enable the structure of the Council to be adjusted to that of 
the institutions of the Community. 
The member States of the Community should be enabled to send the same representatives 
to the organs of the Council of Europe as to the corresponding organs of the Community. 
Conversely,  all the members of the Committee of  Ministers  of the Council of  Europe 
and  all the Representatives to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. would 
be able to participate, to an extent which would be laid down,  in the work of the Council 
of National Ministers and of the Parliament of the Community. 
The Assembly in particular has in view : attendance without the right to speak; or with 
the right to speak when invited to do so ; or to express a consultative opinion without res-
triction ; or again the right to communicate written reports, the publication and dissemination 
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6.  If some of the States should wish to participate more closely in the life of the Com-
munity, without however becoming  members,  they  are at liberty to acquire  the status of 
Associated  members,  which  may entitle them, under specified  conditions,  to  take part in 
decisions,  subject to reciprocal, obligations (1). 
7.  The Assembly considers it essential that the following fundamental principle should 
be observed : that privileges should be proportionate to obligations. 
8.  The collective participation of the Council of  Europe and,  in consequence,  of  the 
nine States which  are not members of the Political Community, is  designed to ensure the 
most effective contacts and the fullest consultation. It cannot involve any limitation of the 
sovereignty of the Political Community. 
9. If the Council of Europe is associated with the Community, it is desirable that, con-
versely, the latter should be represented as a collective entity, independently of the represen-
tation of its own members in the different institutions of the Council of Europe. In particular, 
there should be an additional member in the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
as the official delegate of the Community. 
10.  The Council of Europe is free to accept or reject the suggestions put forward above 
for  the amendment  of its Statute. If it accepts  them, internal. links  could be established 
between the Community and the Council of  Europe at the same time as the external links 
indicated above. 
If  it rejects them, external links only can be established. 
c)  External links. 
11.  The external links proposed in the following paragraphs may be forged either as a 
whole or in part. 
12.  The Community and the Council of Europe might have their seat in the same  town 
and in the same building without in any way sacrificing their mutual independence. 
18.  Some external links based upon the actual working of the two  organisations  might 
be envisaged, in particular: 
a)  the exchange of information, statistical data and annual reports, on  a  basis  of  reci-
procity; 
b)  the possibility of engaging in mutual consultations; 
c)  the possibility of making recommendations, on a basis of reciprocity, and the obligation 
to report upon the effect  given  to such recommendations. 
14.  Other links might be based upon a personal combination of functions, in particular: 
a)  identity of the members of one of the Chambers of the Community's Parliament and 
of the members of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe ; 
b)  identity of the  Ministers  participating in  the Council  of  National  Ministers  of  the 
Community and in the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe ; 
c)  the utilization to a certain extent of the same administrative services, by the Community 
and1 the Council of Europe. 
(1)  Ibis quertich is dealt with in  Resolution  5  (section A)  concerning the Community's relations 
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15.  Under conditions  to be laid  down,  the Council  of  Europe may appoint observers, 
whose role must be defined, in the different institutions of the Community. 
16.  The Community will consider certain matters only after the opinion of the Council 
of Europe has been obtained. 
SPECIAL  RESOLUTION 
Certain  measures  to be  taken  forthwith  by  the  Governments. 
The  Assembly, 
Considering it indispensable that European public opinion should be made more conscious 
of the progress that has been made towards achieving the unification of Europe. 
Believing that the attainment of this aim might be helped by the immediate adoption 
of certain measures, 
Recommends that the Six Governments : 
a)  abolish visas  for  the movement  of  citizens of  the Member  States between the Six 
countries by the time the E. D. C.  Treaty enters into force at the latest ; 
b)  consider  the issue  of uniform  postage stamps for  the Six countries. -----------~-----,-----------------...... 
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MM. 
TEITGEN  Pierre-Henri,  Chairman  (France).  M.  R. P. 
AzARA  Antonio,  Rapporteur  (Italy).  Christian Democrat  Party. 
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LEFEVRE  Theodore  J. A.M.  (Belgium).  Christian Social Party. 
ScHAUS  Eugene  (Luxembourg).  Liberal Party. 
TEITGEN  Pierre-Henri  (France)  M. R. P. 
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